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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PART 1: INTRODUCTION BY CHAIRMAN KOVACIC
A few years from now, the FTC will reach the one hundredth anniversary of the
statute that gave it life. How well is the agency fulfilling the destiny that Congress
foresaw for it in 1914? What type of institution should the FTC aspire to be when the
agency’s second century begins in 2014?
Over the past seven months, the FTC has conducted a self-assessment to consider
these and other basic questions about the agency’s future direction. Two aims motivated
this initiative. The first is to ask what we must do to continue the valuable work that the
agency performs today and to identify steps we must take to do still better in the future.
The focus of this exercise is an agency that is one of the great success stories in the
modern history of public administration.
The progress of the Federal Trade Commission in its modern era has built heavily
upon the willingness of its people to assess their work critically and explore possibilities
for improvement. The FTC at 100 self-assessment is the latest element of that tradition,
and the exercise has yielded valuable insights about strengthening the agency. Several
areas stand out. The inquiry has helped identify what resources – personnel, facilities,
equipment – the FTC will need to perform its duties in the future. Nothing is more vital
to the success of the Commission than its human capital. A second result is to suggest
how the FTC might improve its approach for choosing strategies for exercising its
powers. No task of administration is more important than selecting priorities. A third
product of this self-assessment has been to identify how the FTC can strengthen its
processes for implementing its programs. The manner in which an agency organizes its
operations deeply shapes the quality of its substantive initiatives and affects the costs that
firms bear in complying with the agency’s commands. Finally, the inquiry has pointed to
how the FTC can better fulfill its duties by improving links with other government bodies
and nongovernment organizations.
The consultations for this project have identified seven general characteristics of
good administrative practice that the FTC should strive to achieve in its work in the
coming years. The successful competition agency of the future is one that:
Formulates and clearly communicates well-specified goals to its staff and to
external constituencies.
Establishes and refines internal planning mechanisms that devise a strategy and
programs for accomplishing its goals.
Employs a problem-solving approach that uses the full range of the agency’s
policy tools to correct apparent market or government failures that impede the
attainment of competition and consumer protection objectives.
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Creates internal quality control systems that test the soundness of proposed
initiatives.
Emphasizes the recruitment and retention of skilled administrative staff,
attorneys, and economists.
Makes regular, substantial capital investments in building knowledge, in
developing relationships with collateral public agencies and academic research
centers at home and abroad, and in improving physical infrastructure assets.
Establishes processes for the routine evaluation of programs, agency organization,
and procedures.
In these and related measures, the FTC will prosper if it embraces an ethic of continuous
self-assessment and improvement.
PART 2: INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF SUCCESSFUL FTC PERFORMANCE
This self-study dwelled extensively on the basic question of what criteria serve to
separate good performance from adequate or weak performance. The definition of
standards is fundamental to the study of the performance of the Commission or any other
public body, yet the need clearly to specify criteria frequently gets less attention than it
deserves. One of the central aims of this self-study was to identify institutional features
that beget good substantive outcomes over time.
I.

Agency Mission
A.

Clearly Articulating the Mission

A fundamental characteristic of a good institution is the clarity with which it
understands its purpose and defines its “mission.” The FTC’s mission has two
dimensions: one related to the substance of policy and the other related to the process by
which policy is formed. The substantive dimension consists of the public policy goals
that the Commission should accomplish on behalf of the American people. The process
dimension involves the means that Congress placed at the Commission’s disposal to
address economic policy issues.
As a threshold matter, agency leaders must clearly articulate the agency mission
so that staff and external constituencies have a firm grasp of what the agency is trying to
achieve. In its most recent strategic plan, the FTC has defined its mission in the
following manner: “To prevent business practices that are anticompetitive or deceptive
or unfair to consumers; to enhance informed consumer choice and public understanding
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of the competitive process; and to accomplish these missions without unduly burdening
legitimate business activity.” 1
There appears to be widespread understanding that the FTC’s current mission
focuses on consumers and that the improvement of consumer welfare is the proper
objective of the agency’s competition and consumer protection work. The improvement
of market outcomes for consumers, and not the status of specific firms or collections of
enterprises, is seen the reason to challenge fraud, deceit, and related forms of unfair
practices, and to police anticompetitive mergers and other practices that improperly
suppress rivalry in the marketplace. This perspective appears to enjoy broad support
within the community of competition policy and consumer protection agencies.
A vital aspect of the FTC’s mission is to exercise the unique mix of institutional
capabilities Congress has entrusted to it. The FTC’s powers are genuinely
multidimensional. The Commission best fulfills its destiny when it uses a problemsolving approach that applies the most effective mix of the agency’s portfolio of policy
instruments, which include law enforcement, administrative adjudication, advocacy, the
collection of data, the preparation of reports, and rulemaking. A certifying characteristic
of good performance for the Commission is its demonstrated capacity to employ this full
panoply of capabilities to address important public policy issues.
B.

Measuring Outcomes Rather than Outputs

In addition to a clearly articulated mission, there should be a close nexus between
the mission and outcomes for the public that can be measured. That is, a mission ideally
should be defined in a manner that lends itself to meaningful measurement of whether the
agency carries it out successfully. In the case of a competition or consumer protection
agency, it should develop a mission that is focused on outcomes for the public (for
example, preserving competitive markets or preventing fraud), rather than agency inputs
or outputs (for example, number of staff employed or cases filed). It is typically easier to
identify and measure government agencies’ outputs rather than outcomes. Thus, agency
leaders should articulate a mission that lends itself to developing outputs that enjoy a
close nexus with desired outcomes. Beyond emphasizing outcomes rather than outputs, a
mission that focuses on measurable outcomes has several advantages for an agency’s
pursuit of its goals.
C.

Internal and External Support for the Mission

Finally, for an agency to thrive, its mission should enjoy support from key
internal and external constituencies over time. For the FTC, one core constituency is its
own staff of administrative professionals, attorneys, and economists. The Commission
derives significant advantages from building widespread internal agreement upon and
endorsement of its mission. Among other benefits, such support enables managers to
1

FTC, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2006-2011, at 1 (2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/spfy06fy11.pdf.
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economize on resources. When the FTC’s staff understands and embraces the agency’s
stated aims, managers need spend less time to create incentives for staff to pursue the
mission and can reduce the effort devoted to monitoring whether staff’s efforts are
consistent with the FTC’s mission.
Beyond mobilizing its own employees, an agency also must enjoy support for its
mission among external constituencies. Lack of external support for the mission can
erode the perceived legitimacy of the agency’s individual actions, cause Congress to
withdraw part of its jurisdiction, and, in extreme circumstances, call into question its
continued existence. In addition, although support for a mission is crucial to any agency,
it is important to distinguish between support for a mission among internal and external
constituencies over time, on the one hand, and unanimous support for specific agency
actions, on the other. The former is necessary for a successful agency; the latter is not.
II.

Agency Structure

The structure of an administrative agency such as the FTC deeply influences the
skill with which it carries out its responsibilities. The structure and organization of a
competition and consumer protection agency can affect the performance of its priorities
directly, for example, by having operational units dedicated to bringing specific types of
cases or examining individual economic sectors, and indirectly, for example, by
facilitating communication and coordination among agency components or having
sufficient flexibility to address changes in rapidly transforming markets.
Consumer protection and competition agencies around the world have a variety of
structural designs. Some agencies have only competition or consumer protection
enforcement authority. Others, like the FTC, combine the functions to meet a broader
mission of protecting the marketplace for consumers. Among agencies with both
functions, some organize their work along industry lines, while others divide along
competition and consumer protection lines. Some agencies have a single commissioner
or director, while others are led by a collegial body.
A.

Current Agency Design

Since the early 1970s, the FTC has had a bureau structure that includes the
Bureau of Competition (“BC”), Bureau of Consumer Protection (“BCP”), and Bureau of
Economics (“BE”). On the whole, the FTC’s structure of operating units has worked
well. External consultations revealed many instances in which other countries have
emulated major elements of this structure. Further, the FTC’s administrative structure
and its organization of bureaus have proven to be highly adaptable and flexible. New
divisions or other subunits can be, and have been, created in response to changes in
marketplace conditions or perceived agency needs.
Consider two examples of how the agency has, in recent years, altered its
structure to better address its mission. In 2007, the agency altered BCP to form the
Division of Privacy and Identity Protection out of the Division of Financial Practices,
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which has enabled the FTC to better address consumer-related financial-privacy
concerns, while also improving the focus on the other issues that remained in the
Division of Financial Practices. In 2008, the Bureau of Economics developed a research
unit to oversee BE research that will have impacts across all areas of enforcement.
B.

Looking Ahead: Significant Issues Involving the FTC’s Structure and
Operations

The FTC’s self-study consultations demonstrated that organizational adaptability
and an ethic of continuous institutional improvement are major characteristics of good
agency performance. Several structural attributes of the FTC affect its success. One
involves the integration of competition and consumer protection missions within a single
agency. A related issue, which the dual mission especially implicates, is communication
and coordination across agency components. This is particularly important for the
nonenforcement activities of the agency, which can be effective tools to shape policies
across practice disciplines. Another structural issue is the placement of economists
within the agency. A further significant structural issue is the proper role of
administrative adjudication in the agency.
Shared authority is a common condition of the FTC’s competition and consumer
protection missions. There are other federal agencies that address aspects of these
missions, such as the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Food and Drug Administration,
and the Federal Reserve Board. However, the dual missions that fall under the “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices” and “unfair methods of competition” standards within the
FTC Act make this agency particularly well suited to address the interplay between
consumer protection and competition. The Commission’s capacity to meld expertise in
economics, competition, and consumer protection is a conscious element of its
institutional design and a major reason for its existence.
A longstanding concern of students of public administration is the skill with
which the individual components of an institution share information with each other and
otherwise coordinate their activities. The need to achieve effective intra-agency
information flows and cooperation is a matter of particular importance for the FTC.
Among other reasons, this is a function of the Commission’s dual-purpose mission and its
portfolio of research capabilities and other policy instruments that may be used by
multiple agency units. Whether the agency is consistent in communicating the central
tenets of the competition and consumer protection missions to agency staff and to outside
stakeholders is an indicator of its likely success in achieving its mission.
Panelists and other commentators discussed ways to integrate the agency’s
disciplines by means of nonenforcement resources. Panelists and commentators have
observed that the FTC can improve its performance by building stronger links among the
bureaus and other offices, such as between competition and consumer protection staff, as
well as by more completely integrating economists in all aspects of the agency’s work. 2
2

Competition agencies routinely include economists on their staffs, and there are different ways to
incorporate economists’ input into agency decision making. Until recently, the FTC’s Bureau of
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Some panelists suggested that a policy office could play a useful role in improving these
links and disseminating important insights throughout the agency.
Finally, under Section 5(b) of the FTC Act, the Commission may challenge unfair
or deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of competition through administrative
adjudication. Roundtable panelists shared a variety of opinions about the administrative
adjudicatory process, and many suggested modifications to modernize and make the
system more effective. Former General Counsel Stephen Calkins observed that
elimination of the administrative adjudication feature would undermine the
Commission’s special role. Calkins explained: “[O]ne of the alleged comparative
advantages of the Commission is that it can be an adjudicative body. And I do think that
it is – it’s important for this agency to get it right, to make it work, because it’s one of the
reasons we have a Federal Trade Commission.” 3
Other panelists suggested that federal courts are the proper forum for the FTC to
pursue cases, as the process of having the FTC both issue the complaint and then become
the appellate tribunal in the outcome creates an appearance problem. Another criticism
of FTC administrative adjudication involves the time it takes to complete the
proceedings. Panelists also discussed ALJ expertise in handling the types of
administrative cases before them. 4 Looking ahead, the agency should determine what
role Part III adjudication should play in advancing competition and consumer protection
law enforcement and policy. In particular, the agency should consider when
administrative adjudication is most appropriate, as well as ways to improve the
adjudicatory process. 5

Economics had a relatively unique position vis-à-vis economists at many other competition and consumer
protection agencies in that the BE Director reports directly to the Chairman of the agency and makes
recommendations directly to the full Commission. As a result, economist input into enforcement and other
decisions is not merely subsumed into recommendations controlled by attorneys or case handlers, as is the
case at many other agencies. More recently, a number of competition agencies have been adopting the BE
organizational model and giving the office of the chief economist a direct reporting line to the agencies’ top
leadership.
3

Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 105-06. Throughout this report, citations to “Tr.” refer to the various FTC at 100
roundtable transcripts. Participants are identified by last name; roundtables are identified by location.

The agendas, biographies, transcripts, and other information relating to the FTC at 100 roundtables are
available on the FTC’s website at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/workshops/ftc100/index.shtm. In addition,
Appendix 1 to this report provides the identity and affiliation of the roundtable participants. Appendix 2
provides a list of the agencies, organizations, and individuals participating in FTC at 100 external
consultations.
4

It bears noting, however, that the ALJ selection process is dictated by government-wide requirements and
not by FTC rules or policy.
5

Presently, the rules governing Part III proceedings are in the process of being revised to address concerns
over the speed of certain types of cases. The proposed revised rules and comments are available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/P072104nprmpt3.pdf.
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III.

Agency Resources

The FTC’s ability to achieve its mission depends in significant part on its
allocation and management of personnel, capital, and information resources.
A.

Personnel

How the FTC approaches recruiting, training, and retention of talented and
competent personnel bears significantly on the agency’s ultimate success. Given the
evolution of competition and consumer protection policy, and changes in the tools of
economic analysis, any agency self-assessment should consider how the agency can
recruit and retain well-trained personnel in relevant areas of expertise, as well as how the
agency trains and educates its existing staff to remain current in such areas. External
consultations yielded several recommendations on how to improve the recruiting,
training, and retention of skilled professionals at the FTC. For example, to offset the
government/private sector pay disparity and recruit talented professionals, many panelists
suggested that the FTC employ a combination of first-rate training and ample
opportunities for staff to apply their skills and knowledge in interesting and innovative
legal and policy areas.
B.

Capital Resources

In several respects, an agency’s budget dictates the deployment of its resources
and thus dictates its ability to achieve its mission. A well-planned and effective budget
policy, including allocations within that budget, is essential for the success of any agency.
The FTC’s budget must be able to strike a balance that both reflects agency priorities, as
expressed to staff and external stakeholders, and is sufficiently flexible to respond to
circumstances that require a shifting of budgetary priorities. For example, allocation of
BCP resources among the many tools with which it pursues its mission – including
enforcement actions, rulemaking, consumer and business education, policy R&D efforts,
and promotion of industry self-regulation – has shifted at different times to meet different
agency needs.
C.

Information

The Commission needs information to detect problems, investigate them, and
then, through litigation or otherwise, address them. The FTC’s effective use of personnel
and capital resources is largely dependent on the information the agency is able to obtain
regarding marketplace conduct, mergers and other transactions, and legal, economic, and
technological developments.
The agency, through its Consumer Response Center, receives and responds to
thousands of consumer and business complaints or inquiries each week. Complaints are
made available to FTC staff and other law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and
worldwide through the FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network, a secure online database that
includes not only complaints received by the FTC, but also by other selected government
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agencies and nongovernmental entities. On the competition side, the agency gathers
information about transactions and ongoing conduct in the marketplace primarily through
specific statutory reporting requirements, including those established by the Hart-ScottRodino Act. The FTC also gathers information to detect and investigate possible law
violations through complaints from, and inquiries directed to, competitors, suppliers, and
consumers.
Further, in both the competition and consumer protection areas, the agency gathers
relevant industry and marketplace information by convening conferences, workshops, and
hearings to address current and emerging issues in these areas. Such events have become an
important means through which the Commission and its staff identify problems and develop
appropriate responses. The agency also obtains information from other competition and
consumer protection agencies, both foreign and domestic.
Of course, like other enforcement agencies, the FTC also has enforcement-related
authority to issue compulsory process, such as subpoenas and civil investigative
demands. Apart from a particular investigation, however, the FTC also has unique
powers to obtain information – in both competition and consumer protection matters –
pursuant to Section 6(b) of the FTC Act, which enables it to conduct wide-ranging
economic studies that do not have a specific law enforcement purpose. Whether the FTC
uses its 6(b) authority in a particular context depends on whether there are important
policy topics that require investigation that could not be done with publicly available or
voluntarily submitted data.
IV.

The Agency’s Relationships

The FTC has important relationships with several types of outside entities. These
relationships impact the agency’s performance in various ways, and each requires a
slightly different approach by the FTC to maintain the relationship. Some relationships –
such as those with Congress, consumers, and industry – involve interaction and
communication regarding how the agency pursues its mission. Some relationships – such
as those with domestic and international agencies – involve coordination in law
enforcement efforts. Some relationships – such as those with domestic and international
agencies and the academy – involve efforts by the FTC to research, develop, and promote
sound competition and consumer protection policy. In any case, the FTC can benefit
from, and improve its effectiveness with, input from each of these stakeholders.
Congress. As an independent agency created by Congress, the FTC has an
important relationship with Congress as an institution and with individual members of
Congress. Primarily through its Office of Congressional Relations, the FTC works
closely with congressional committees and subcommittees, individual members, and their
staffs, responding to inquiries regarding competition and consumer protection matters,
testifying before congressional panels on FTC policies and programs, and preparing
reports for Congress.
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A number of panelists stressed the importance of the FTC managing carefully its
relationship with Congress. One way to envision the FTC’s work is that its activities
involve either accumulating political capital or spending political capital. In choosing
new programs, the agency must be attentive to the balance of its political capital account.
An agency that chronically runs major deficits is likely headed for trouble.
Other Federal Agencies. Due to the wide breadth of the FTC’s activities and
overlapping jurisdiction in certain substantive areas of the law, the FTC has numerous
policy and enforcement relationships with other federal government entities, including
the Department of Justice, the federal banking regulators, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, and the United States Postal Inspection Service. For example, relations
with other federal agencies are important to the FTC’s consumer protection mission
because of the overlapping jurisdiction that exists in certain areas (for example, the
shared jurisdiction over consumer credit with the federal banking agencies) and the
statutory law enforcement relationships in others (for example, the FTC’s dependence on
the DOJ to pursue civil penalty cases).
In the competition area, the FTC’s most central interagency relationship on the
federal level is with the DOJ Antitrust Division. The FTC and DOJ have significant
overlapping jurisdiction with respect to antitrust enforcement and policy. For example,
the agencies share antitrust jurisdiction over most mergers and business conduct. Given
these overlaps, the two agencies have developed premerger and enforcement clearance
and communication procedures to avoid duplicative enforcement in competition matters.
For those within the ambit of both the FTC’s and DOJ’s enforcement jurisdictions,
comity and consistency of views between the agencies is important because it provides
certainty for consumers and market participants. Also, it can allow the agencies to
operate more efficiently. Thus, as the FTC works to improve its performance, it should
consider how to improve its relationship with the DOJ to enhance the clarity,
transparency, and consistency of antitrust enforcement.
Through its advocacy program, the FTC advises other federal agencies across a
wide array of areas, such as food labeling, lending practices, and energy regulation. FTC
staff also frequently consults informally with other federal agency staff. Through these
formal and informal consultations, the agency has been able not only to coordinate efforts
with these agencies but also to influence their work – and secure assistance in the FTC’s
work – in ways that benefit consumers and competition.
State Agencies. As with federal agencies, the FTC engages with state enforcers
and other state institutions to address overlapping issues in competition and consumer
protection enforcement, as well as policy matters. Comity with state antitrust and
consumer protection agencies has become increasingly important given state involvement
in many federal enforcement actions. Today, the FTC often conducts investigations
jointly with state attorneys general because both have an interest in the particular merger
or conduct at issue. On broad policy matters, the FTC often advises state legislatures and
agencies through advocacy filings.

ix

International Enforcement Agencies. Building and maintaining strong bilateral
relationships with foreign agencies is a critical element of the FTC’s programs, including
its enforcement program. Given the many important FTC cases involving foreign parties,
foreign-located evidence or assets, or parallel review with other agencies, effective
cooperation with agencies outside the United Sates is a necessity. Strong personal
relationships facilitate case cooperation and dialogue, making contact at a personal level
an important factor in international cooperation.
The Commission’s engagement with foreign governments on policy matters
serves to inform the policy of other nations. By describing how the U.S. agencies
approach various issues, the FTC hopes to provide useful information for other nations to
consider as they make their own choices regarding market-based or regulation-based
approaches to policy questions. In addition, given the importance of the exchange of
ideas and strategies, these interactions with foreign counterparts can inform an agency’s
domestic agenda and practices.
Another important way in which the Commission works with foreign counterparts
is by providing technical assistance to both younger and more mature competition and
consumer protection agencies. Technical assistance projects and programs can allow an
agency to improve its relationships with foreign counterparts and provide a significant
opportunity to engage in the type of export and import activity that promotes cooperation
and convergence.
Consumers and Consumer Groups. Consumers are, of course, one of the key
constituencies for the FTC. How the agency relates to consumers – either directly or
through various consumer and advocacy groups – is thus a significant factor in the
agency’s ultimate success. The agency’s direct interactions with consumers are largely
limited to receiving complaints from consumers and issuing educational materials for use
by consumers. A significant means for relating to consumers is therefore through
interactions with various consumer groups.
Panelists stressed the importance of ensuring that the means by which the FTC
provides its consumer information remain up-to-date. This means understanding the
different gradations or demographics of consumers, the information media on which they
rely, and preparing the FTC message such that it can be understood in the appropriate
format for the targeted consumer.
In addition to getting its message out to consumers, the FTC must consider its
(two-way) interactions with consumers and consumer groups. Panelists discussed how
greater transparency of agency decision making and the inclusion of interested groups in
the process would help in making FTC actions more effective. Panelists suggested that
having liaisons within the agency to facilitate communication with consumer groups and
industry would be a sensible step toward building relationships with these constituencies.
Market Participants. Industry stakeholders rely on the FTC for information and
guidance on competition and consumer protection enforcement, regulation, and policy.
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In turn, the agency can benefit in its work from the insight, expertise, and cooperation of
industry groups. Panelists discussed whether the FTC offers useful guidance, whether it
gathers industry views and suggestions – for example, through public workshops and
hearings – and whether it coordinates effectively with industry, where appropriate.
Academia. Finally, several panelists stressed the importance of reaching out to
the academic community to spur research in areas of interest to the FTC, which can
expand the agency’s research resources as well as benefit the participating academics.
Although outside academics have been useful in certain agency initiatives, panelists
expressed some concern that FTC issues are either little known or underappreciated by
the larger academic community. Thus, research and work that is valuable for purposes of
the agency’s enforcement efforts may not be appreciated by all members of the academic
research community.
V.

Agency Leadership, Strategic Planning, and Policy R&D

Agency leadership must motivate the staff to pursue the agency’s mission, both
by clearly communicating that mission to staff and by listening to staff’s input on how
best to achieve the mission. Strategic planning allows the agency to identify competition
and consumer protection problems on the horizon, as well as determine which tool or
tools with which to address such problems. Policy R&D is a necessary foundation for
tackling the challenging competition and consumer protection policy issues that the
agency has been tasked with addressing. The FTC’s efforts in these three areas –
leadership, planning, and research – significantly impact the agency’s ability to deploy its
resources in an effective manner.
A.

Leadership

Effective leadership at the top of the agency sets the tone for how the staff
executes the agency’s mission. Effective leadership involves not only understanding the
agency mission, structure, and the interests of key stakeholders, but also communicating
the mission and priorities to agency staff to motivate them to carry out the mission of the
agency effectively over time. Agency leadership also affects employee morale, which
often dictates agency success.
B.

Strategic Planning

Strategic planning at a government agency involves more than just a
determination of how insightfully to identify and understand problems that arise, but also
a determination of how to pick the right tool or right collection of tools (or even the right
sequencing of tools) to use to address such problems. In the case of the FTC, the agency
must decide, for example, whether to issue guidelines, bring a case, create rules, or hold
public consultations to address the various competition and consumer protection
problems that it faces.
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External consultations confirmed the importance of strategic planning to the
success of this, or any other, agency. Former Chairman Timothy Muris explained that it
is insufficient to have a core mission and to define it well; the agency needs a strategy to
implement it. That strategy requires continual new thinking and innovation. 6 In addition
to innovation, roundtable panelists identified policy continuity as another important goal
of strategic planning. Former General Counsel Debra Valentine framed the relevant
inquiry as follows: “How can you keep an acute sense of the past and the evolving trends
so that you can try to keep some strategies going through time, notwithstanding the
inevitable impulse of the next gang to really want to leave their mark?” 7 U.K. Office of
Fair Trading (“OFT”) Chief Executive John Fingleton explained that the governance
structure of the OFT provides “a certain type of continuity,” as the OFT’s Board is
responsible for setting long-term strategy for the agency, rather than making individual
enforcement and policy decisions, which is left to the Executive. 8
The goal of policy continuity, however, does not imply inflexibility in strategic
planning. Several panelists emphasized the importance of building flexibility into any
strategic planning efforts. The Chairman of the U.K. Competition Commission, Peter
Freeman, characterized the need for flexibility as follows: “[A]s the Duke of Wellington
has said, ‘time spent on reconnaissance was seldom wasted.’ Also, I think he said words
to the effect of ‘all plans collapse on first contact with the enemy.’” 9 Strategic planning,
Freeman continued, “cannot be too rigid and it cannot be too binding. [B]ut everything
we do should take place . . . against a background of priorities and policy
consciousness.” 10
The Commission’s strategic planning efforts include specific enforcement and
policy agendas brought to the agency by Chairmen, Commissioners, and senior staff; the
strategic planning done pursuant to the Government Performance and Results Act and
various other reporting requirements; and senior staff retreats that the Commission has
held for more than a decade. Other examples of strategic planning include “policy
review sessions,” which were used in the 1970s and 1980s to permit the Commission
members and staff to discuss significant policy issues. The Commission recently revived
this custom in 2008 to discuss how the Commission might address various issues
concerning the financial crisis.
Recommendations for future FTC strategic planning offered by roundtable
panelists addressed, among other things, the level at which such planning should take
place. Former BCP Director Jodie Bernstein recommended that the FTC engage in
agency-wide – not just bureau-by-bureau – strategic planning because it would
“energize” both BCP and BC by letting each bureau see what the other’s ideas are. This
6

Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 20-21.

7

Valentine, London Tr. at 85.

8

Fingleton, London Tr. at 86.

9

Freeman, London Tr. at 80.

10

Id. at 83-84.

xii

would address the concern Bernstein has with the Balkanization of the agency into
bureaus or even divisions that do not communicate with each other. 11 Further, several
panelists stressed the importance of including outside entities – including state agencies,
congressional staff, consumer groups, and industry – in the planning process in order to
anticipate where the next controversy will be, get relevant information from key
stakeholders, and gauge how much support the agency will have to take action in a given
area.
External consultations revealed several examples of strategic planning undertaken
at other competition and consumer protection agencies. For example, the U.K. OFT has a
dedicated “strategy and planning team,” which is engaged in all parts of strategic
planning development and implementation to help ensure consistency across the agency.
The European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition implements its
strategic planning in part through the use of a peer review system designed to foster intraagency debate concerning particular matters. The Canadian Competition Bureau recently
has engaged in a process that involves an environmental scan – including a review of
sector and marketplace developments to identify potential problems relevant to each of its
branches – that feeds directly into the agency’s agenda setting.
C.

Policy Research and Development

Policy research and development plays an important role at the FTC. An agency
that intends to be thoughtful and to consider its policy actions seriously must have some
ability to analyze the trade-offs inherent in any policy choice. That capability can be
developed through, among other means, academic-style research, information gathering
and report writing, and conferences and workshops that bring together elements from
business, government, consumer representatives, and the bar to discuss issues related to
competition and consumer protection policy and law.
The FTC has a mandate to undertake certain forms of research based on Section 6
of the FTC Act and the historical report-writing activity of its predecessor entity, the
Bureau of Corporations. That mandate differentiates the FTC from most other antitrust
or consumer protection agencies in the world. From its inception, the FTC carried on a
general investigative function that complemented its law enforcement activities. The
results of the investigations were compiled in reports that were intended to shed light on
various questionable business practices of the day. That activity was the precursor of
what is now thought of as research and policy R&D at the FTC.
1.

Goals Served by Policy R&D

Apart from the primary purpose of answering specific research questions, the
FTC, including its several components, undertakes research for a number of reasons.
Research and policy R&D is undertaken to improve agency decision making in specific
areas, such as law enforcement, rulemaking, and competition and consumer protection
11
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advocacy. Research activities often allow the agency to develop ways to better analyze
problems that can be used in antitrust or consumer policy settings. Doing such analysis
in a law enforcement or litigation environment often is difficult or impossible; doing it in
a research environment is thus necessary.
Research topics often allow the agency to gain a better understanding of
industries, including those, such as energy and health care, which feature prominently in
the agency’s law enforcement agenda. For example, the agency’s gasoline and diesel
price monitoring project allows the agency to track changes over time in price-cost
margins and to notice anomalies in prices in various cities or regions. Although checking
for such anomalies is now routine, this effort initially was a policy R&D project. Other
R&D projects are designed to gain information about industries that the agency expects
to be important in its future enforcement and policy efforts.
Policy R&D efforts at the FTC also serve the important purpose of scanning the
horizon for future competition and consumer problem areas. The agency gathers relevant
industry and marketplace information by convening conferences, workshops, and
hearings to address current and emerging competition and consumer protection issues.
Such events have become an important means through which the Commission and its
staff identify problems and develop appropriate responses.
2.

Setting a Research Agenda

Given the prominent role of policy research and development at the FTC, having
a systematic means for identifying and planning relevant research is imperative.
Historically, ideas for research topics from within the FTC have come from many
sources. Several studies have been essentially staff-initiated; many have been projects
promoted by the agency Chairman or the Commission; and others have been sponsored
by multiple bureaus. It is often difficult to identify a single source of a research idea.
Often the specific ideas come from staff, but with encouragement from agency leaders
who may have identified general areas for investigation. Other times, ideas for studies
follow from previous projects. In other instances, congressional interest, if not a direct
congressional request, might instigate a study.
FTC research ideas have come from a variety of sources. During the past few
years, a large portion of the research work has been generated by presidential or
congressional requests for examinations of various competition and consumer protection
issues. Beyond these external requests, much recent FTC research has been initiated or
developed by the agency’s Chairs, by non-Chairman Commissioners, and, as has been
true throughout the history of the FTC, by the staff.
There are several steps in the research process, including defining the broad topic
areas of interest for research, generating interesting, policy-relevant, and achievable ideas
within a topic area, and producing and monitoring the research. In the recent past, these
tasks largely have been handled within each economic or legal organization within the
agency. In principle, these tasks could be accomplished either in such a decentralized
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manner or through a more systematic, centralized process involving the simultaneous
collection of research ideas from multiple sources, coordination of topic choices, and then
monitoring of output.
Some roundtable panelists discussed the policy R&D process and suggested rather
different approaches. Former BE Director Michael Salinger, for instance, argued that
combining the agency’s policy groups might be sensible, but that the Bureau of
Economics research work should remain independent of the legal policy shops and that
the research process should remain decentralized. 12 In contrast, two former heads of
legal policy shops, Susan DeSanti 13 and Joseph Kattan, 14 favored a more centralized
approach under which ideas from a wide variety of sources would be vetted early and
production would be centrally controlled through an agency-wide committee. The goals
of such an approach would be better to control the chosen topics – for example, to select
projects that relate more closely with current enforcement or advocacy priorities – and to
coordinate resource deployment across several relatively autonomous groups.
VI.

Deployment of Agency Resources
A.

General Issues Involving Resource Allocation

An agency’s allocation of its scarce resources undoubtedly is one of the most
significant determinants of its ultimate success. Once it identifies a desired outcome –
for example, a reduction in the number of deceptive weight-loss claims – a successful
agency will make optimal use of its tools to achieve that outcome. The FTC has several
tools available to pursue its mission. These tools include law enforcement, first and
foremost; however, they also include many other options – such as advocacy, education,
policy research and development, and rulemaking – that can be more effective than
enforcement in many circumstances. Resource allocation, then, is to a large extent a
matter of picking the right tool or tools from the FTC’s existing arsenal – or adding new
tools to that arsenal – to best address the matter at hand.
B.

The FTC’s Many Resource Deployment Options
1.

Law Enforcement/Litigation

The FTC’s law enforcement authority encompasses both consumer protection and
antitrust. In allocating resources to its law enforcement efforts, the agency should first
consider the goals that underlie such efforts. Among the most important goals of the
FTC’s law enforcement mission are providing guidance to industry, developing sound
law, and obtaining consumer redress. Deterrence of unlawful conduct, however, is the
lodestar of the agency’s law enforcement efforts.
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Perhaps the most important consideration in evaluating the enforcement efforts of
the FTC is its case selection. Such evaluation should consider where the agency decides
to focus its enforcement efforts. For example, should that focus be where potential
consumer benefits and/or redress are largest? Should the focus be on areas involving the
greatest amount of commerce? How much of the agency’s enforcement efforts should be
devoted to developing or clarifying competition and consumer protection doctrine?
Another relevant factor in selecting cases is the litigation risk attendant to
pursuing any given case. In the various external consultations, there was a fairly uniform
view that the agency ought to be less risk-averse in bringing cases. Other considerations
in evaluating the agency’s law enforcement efforts include the amount and type of case
generation in which the agency engages, the appropriate number of cases to pursue at any
given time, and the proper forum – administrative or judicial – for bringing cases.
2.

Policy Research and Development

As discussed above, policy research and development at the FTC includes a broad
array of activities designed to inform the agency’s pursuit of its competition and
consumer protection missions. These activities include workshops, hearings, studies,
reports, and ex post assessments of agency initiatives and actions. Consultations with
various outside parties and representatives from other competition and consumer
protection agencies identified significant support for the FTC’s allocation of resources to
its policy R&D efforts.
3.

Advocacy

As an important complement to its law enforcement mission, the FTC engages in
competition and consumer protection advocacy before other policymakers, including
state legislatures, regulatory boards, and officials; state and federal courts; other federal
agencies; and professional organizations, such as bar associations. In response to
requests or where public comments are sought, the FTC issues advocacy letters,
comments, and amicus briefs, providing policymakers with a framework to analyze
competition and consumer protection issues raised by pending governmental actions or
ongoing judicial disputes. Advocacy can play a particularly important role in addressing
governmentally imposed restraints on competition, where other tools may be unavailable.
There was strong support among those consulted for the FTC’s advocacy efforts.
4.

Rulemaking

The Commission’s strongest policymaking tool, in addition to litigation, is
rulemaking. In 1975, Congress granted the Commission express authority to issue
substantive rules, referred to as Magnuson-Moss rulemaking, which requires more
complex procedures than those needed for rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”). During the past 15 years, 17 rules have been promulgated by
the Commission, and several existing rules have been amended. In addition, three new
rulemaking proceedings are in progress. Most new rules have been enacted based on
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specific statutes that authorized the use of APA rulemaking procedures. Also during the
past 15 years, the Commission has made regulatory review and reform a high priority.
Recognizing that over time some rules may become obsolete or unnecessary or simply
need updating in light of new technologies and marketing techniques, the FTC initiated a
program to review its rules at least once every 10 years.
5.

Guidelines, Guides, and Advisory Opinions

To promote transparency and encourage compliance with the law, the FTC issues
guidelines, typically in conjunction with the DOJ Antitrust Division, to provide guidance
regarding the application of the U.S. antitrust laws. These guidelines explain competition
policy in specific areas, such as horizontal merger review, collaborations among
competitors, licensing of intellectual property, and health care.
A central issue involving agency guidelines is one of timing – including the
appropriate times at which to issue and, if necessary, update any given set of guidelines.
Former BC Project Director for Intellectual Property Hillary Greene identified the
“central tension” in formulating guidelines as follows: waiting until there is a sufficient
consensus in any particular area of the law, on the one hand, and providing certainty and
guidance in such area of the law, on the other hand. 15
Industry guides, which are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, or
C.F.R., have become a vehicle to inform businesses how the Commission would apply
Section 5 of the FTC Act in specific situations. Industry guides are advisory in nature –
that is, they are not an independent basis for enforcement actions, and violations do not
give rise to civil penalties. However, they serve to inform businesses about practices that
could be considered unfair or deceptive. Industry guides typically focus on particular
problematic practices in advertising, marketing, or labeling. Promulgation of guides does
not require formal rulemaking proceedings, but, in recent years, the Commission has
solicited public comments, and may hold a hearing or workshop, before adopting or
substantively amending guides. Like rules, industry guides are subject to review every
10 years.
The FTC’s efforts at providing guidance to industry also include advisory
opinions concerning proposed conduct provided in response to requests for advice. On
the competition side, BC staff render so-called advisory opinions, which often involve
issues in the health care field. On the consumer protection side, BCP staff render socalled staff opinion letters, which typically address proposed interpretations of FTC rules
and regulations. Commission advisory opinions, which are issued relatively infrequently,
are intended to address substantial or novel questions of fact or law or subjects of
significant interest.
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6.

Consumer and Business Education

During the past 20 years, educating consumers and businesses about their rights
and responsibilities in the marketplace has become an increasingly important part of
fulfilling the agency’s consumer protection mission. Enforcement efforts to combat fraud
are enhanced by informing consumers how to recognize and avoid becoming victims of
fraudulent marketing practices. For example, educating consumers not to respond to
emails that “phish” for financial account information can be a more effective tool to
combat this practice than bringing successive enforcement actions against numerous
perpetrators. Educating businesses about their legal obligations under a variety of FTC
rules enhances compliance, and to that end, the Commission issues clear, plain-language
guides – in print and on video – that pose numerous examples of required or prohibited
conduct. External consultations yielded widespread expressions of support for the
agency’s consumer and business education efforts in the consumer protection area.
7.

Encouragement of Appropriate Industry Self-Regulation

Meaningful self-regulation is an important complement to the Commission’s law
enforcement efforts – particularly in the area of deceptive marketing practices. For
example, the program administered by the National Advertising Division/National
Advertising Review Council arm of the Council of Better Business Bureaus has worked
well to obviate the need for Commission action in some instances. In cases where the
process does not reach a successful conclusion, the matter is referred to the Commission
with much of the underlying investigative work already accomplished. In addition, selfregulatory programs have been helpful in areas – such as food and entertainment products
– where the Commission has advocated seller restraint in promotions directed to children.
8.

Partnership and Outreach with Domestic Agencies

Another important tool available to the FTC is outreach to domestic agencies.
The Commission’s engagement with domestic agencies involves efforts on both the
policy level, including advocacy, as well as enforcement cooperation, facilitated by the
Commission’s broad authority to share with domestic law enforcement agencies
nonpublic information otherwise subject to prohibitions on disclosure. Enforcement
cooperation can facilitate the Commission’s own investigation, where a federal or state
agency shares expertise or provides investigative assistance. It also can leverage the
Commission’s limited resources, by enlisting other agencies in undertaking efforts that
advance the FTC’s mission. The FTC often seeks to maximize its enforcement impact on
the consumer protection side by coordinating “sweeps” – multiple legal actions filed at or
near the same time by multiple authorities. Cooperation with domestic (and foreign)
enforcement agencies is an integral component of these sweeps.
9.

International Partnerships and Outreach

The FTC recognizes that a competition and consumer protection agency cannot
limit its activity or vision to its own borders, and thus devotes significant efforts to
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international activity, coordinated by its Office of International Affairs. As with the
Commission’s dealings with domestic agencies, these efforts include engagement on
policy initiatives and practices as well as enforcement cooperation. An important
component of the policy engagement, mentioned above, is the FTC’s technical assistance
program.
To obtain the most results from its engagement with foreign enforcers, both in
bilateral and multilateral contexts, an agency with an effective international program
develops short-, medium-, and long-term strategies that guide participation in these fora,
with a clear idea about when the agency wants to take a leadership role and when the
agency plans to take a more passive or “importing” role. The best-designed program
identifies areas for teaching, and those for learning, recognizing that the two roles are not
mutually exclusive.
On the enforcement side, the Commission’s work with its foreign counterparts
facilitates its ability to obtain meaningful and timely cooperation from foreign
counterparts for FTC-generated investigations and litigation matters. Another critical
dimension is the agency’s ability to influence the enforcement agenda and priorities of a
foreign agency through notifications, consultations, and other bilateral mechanisms. A
third dimension is the FTC’s capacity to provide assistance, in appropriate cases, to
foreign authorities when they request the FTC’s assistance or refer complaints involving
U.S. businesses.
PART 3: MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FTC ACTIONS
VII.

Measuring Agency Effectiveness

When assessing the characteristics of agency output, the FTC should stay focused
on how its actions impact consumer welfare. Unlike agencies that produce a readily
measurable output directly to consumers, however, the vast majority of FTC actions are
not aimed at consumers directly, but rather toward parties – typically business and
sometimes government – in an effort to stop conduct and mergers that threaten to harm
consumers. 16 For example, the FTC sues businesses for taking actions that violate the
consumer protection and competition laws and engages in advocacy with governments to
discourage anticompetitive regulation. Thus, there is an indirect link between FTC action
and changes in consumer welfare: the FTC helps consumers primarily through its ability
to reduce the occurrence of conduct that violates consumer protection or antitrust laws or
otherwise reduces consumer welfare.
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targeting messages directly to consumers to inform them of these actions can reduce the occurrence of
fraud and deception.
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A.

Direct Measurements of Welfare

Given widespread acceptance of the FTC’s consumer-focused mission, direct
measurement of the increase in consumer welfare as a result of FTC actions would be
ideal. As a practical matter, direct measurement of welfare effects entails comparing
price and output in the relevant markets before and after the FTC action. For example,
consumers pay higher prices and purchase fewer goods or services than they otherwise
would in the case of an antitrust violation. As a result, consumers suffer direct financial
losses, and also forego the satisfaction they could have received from additional
purchases, had the price been set at the competitive level. Of course, events unassociated
with FTC actions also affect cost and demand conditions and, hence, observed prices. To
isolate welfare changes resulting from the FTC’s competition and consumer protection
actions, it is important to control for other factors that also affect market outcomes and
that occurred during a similar time frame.
Several panelists addressed the promise and problems associated with direct
measurement of market outcomes after FTC action in the context of merger
retrospectives. Because mergers make up a large portion of the FTC’s competition
caseload, the ability to evaluate the effect of mergers on consumers would go a long way
toward direct evaluation of the FTC’s competition program. Panelists, however, spoke
extensively about the limitations of such studies, identifying significant methodological
and data constraints. Proponents of merger retrospectives argued that they need not all be
price-focused, state-of-the-art empirical projects, but rather they can be useful if they
provide replicable measures of postmerger performance on any of several dimensions.
B.

Proxies for Direct Welfare Measurements

When direct measurement is not feasible, it is necessary to look for proxies for the
impact of FTC actions on consumers, such as the outcome of enforcement actions; the
direct impact, deterrent effect, and precedential value of these actions; the FTC’s
intellectual leadership; the guidance and transparency provided by the FTC to businesses
and consumers; and the burdens the FTC places on industry.
Some proxies have a closer nexus with welfare changes than others. The raw
number of cases brought is at best a limited metric to evaluate FTC enforcement actions.
Further, a focus on the number or percentage of wins is likely to be similarly
uninformative – a large number of wins, for example, is likely to signal that the
Commission is bringing only easy cases and that more problematic conduct remains
underdeterred. Rather, evaluators should pay attention to the extent to which the FTC is
bringing the proper mix of cases to maximize its positive impact on consumer welfare.
This mix will include cases in large markets that vindicate substantial consumer interests
in the short run and also include cases that are likely to have large, long-run deterrent and
precedential value. Determining the optimal mix of cases to use as a benchmark for the
actual mix of cases is likely to be somewhat subjective.
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Empirical study of the relationship between FTC enforcement (and other) actions
and market outcomes may guide this endeavor. For example, evaluating the deterrence
effects of enforcement actions targeting anticompetitive conduct may yield useful
information to guide future enforcement efforts. Because consumers can take actions to
reduce the incidence of fraud and deception, consumer education can be an effective
adjunct to enforcement in promoting consumer protection. Evaluating the success of
consumer education in reducing fraud and deception may be difficult in every
circumstance, but a few carefully designed studies may provide valuable information.
FTC actions also should be evaluated to determine whether they demonstrate
intellectual leadership in the areas of competition and consumer protection policy.
Commission cases can lead the way in developing legal norms. Further, it is important
for the FTC to engage in competition and consumer protection policy R&D to calibrate
the fit between FTC actions and consumer welfare and to inform courts and policymakers
in their decisions. The extent to which courts, policymakers, and academics follow the
FTC’s lead in these areas is an important evaluative criterion. Educating the public and
policymakers on the benefits of competition also is important. Thus, any evaluation
should measure the extent to which consumers use FTC competition-promoting materials
and the extent to which FTC advocacy influences policy outcomes.
The external community values guidance from the FTC, and the agency should
strive to make decisions more transparent to improve policy determinations. The FTC
can provide such guidance and transparency through guidelines, industry guides,
advocacy, speeches, and other domestic and international outreach that inform the
relevant external constituencies about the FTC’s current thinking in certain areas. Any
evaluation of FTC actions should ask whether the FTC adequately publicizes its actions
and whether it effectively conveys policy norms to industry, the courts, and other
constituencies.
Evaluations of FTC output also should measure the extent to which FTC actions
place unreasonable costs on the business community, both in terms of money and time.
Such measurement will inform Congress, industry, and the public and also likely will
enhance internal incentives to reduce burdens the FTC places on businesses. When
developing a metric, it is important to develop appropriate benchmarks for both financial
and time burdens, which are likely to vary by action. For example, it should consider the
appropriate time to process investigations or from filing an administrative complaint until
a final Commission decision.
C.

Responsiveness to Core Constituencies

Finally, being open and responsive to core constituencies’ concerns is crucial.
Absent external support for its mission over time, the FTC cannot operate effectively. At
the same time, it is important to distinguish between cultivating external support for the
mission by demonstrating a willingness to take seriously constituency concerns, and
attempting to garner unanimous support for every agency action. Further, the agency
should be cognizant of the potential tension between intellectual leadership and
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responsiveness to constituency demands. When these circumstances arise, the FTC can
ameliorate this tension by engaging in outreach to develop support from its constituencies
for its policies.
PART 4: CHAIRMAN’S RECOMMENDATIONS
The report concludes with a set of recommendations for consideration by future
leaders of the FTC. The recommendations correspond to the review of the institutional
arrangements by which the Commission performs its responsibilities (discussed in
Chapters I-VI), as well as the means for measuring the effectiveness of the agency’s
performance (discussed in Chapter VII). It is hoped that the process used for this selfassessment not only has illuminated ways to improve the Federal Trade Commission but
also has supplied a template for future self-assessment exercises.
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PART 1: INTRODUCTION BY CHAIRMAN KOVACIC
The Rationale for a Self-Assessment
Albert Cummins was one of the chief sponsors of the Federal Trade Commission
Act of 1914. In the weeks before the passage of the legislation that would create the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”), Cummins predicted that the new
agency “will be found to be the most efficient protection to the people of the United
States that Congress has ever given the people by way of a regulation of commerce.” 1 A
few years from now, the FTC will reach the one hundredth anniversary of the statute that
gave it life. How well is the agency fulfilling the destiny that Congress foresaw for it in
1914? What type of institution should the Commission aspire to be when the agency’s
second century begins in 2014?
Over the past seven months, the FTC has conducted a self-assessment to consider
these and other basic questions about the agency’s future direction. Two aims motivated
this initiative. The first is to ask what the FTC must do to continue the valuable work
that the agency performs today and to identify steps the agency must take to do still better
in the future. The focus of this exercise is an agency that is one of the great success
stories in the modern history of public administration. In the late 1960s, the
Commission’s performance attracted scalding criticism that raised doubts about its
continued existence. 2 Forty years later, the agency stands in the front ranks of the
world’s competition policy and consumer protection institutions.
None of this happened by chance. One crucial ingredient was the tireless
commitment and strenuous labors of our attorneys, economists, and administrative
professionals. Another was superior leadership that saw the way to greatness. Yet even
more significant was the acceptance, in the face of crisis and in moments of success, of a
culture that understood that the development of a superior institution demanded a
willingness to ask the hardest questions about the agency’s purposes and performance.
Good policy results are not suspended in air. They emerge from and rest upon a structure
of institutional arrangements that are the product of statutory design and administrative
implementation. 3 These arrangements encompass the organizational form of the FTC,
formal rules that govern its operation, and informal customs or norms of behavior that
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have developed within the agency. 4 The FTC learned long ago that it is impossible to
deliver the equivalent of broadband quality policy content over dial-up institutions.
The urgency to revisit fundamental questions about the possibilities for
institutional improvements stems from several sources. The policymaking challenges to
the Commission grow ever more demanding. In carrying out its competition and
consumer protection responsibilities, the agency confronts some of the most difficult
issues of economic policy. The FTC’s success in a variety of initiatives – whether in
protecting the privacy of the home through the Do-Not-Call Rule, striking down
unnecessary barriers to rivalry in professional services, preparing reports that shape
public debate or legislative deliberations about intellectual property, or contributing to the
formation of networks that help promote international agreement on superior techniques
– has created high expectations about the Commission’s capacity to respond to these
challenges. The agency’s experience in undertaking these and other measures has shown
that the pursuit of sensible policy solutions requires an unrelenting search for better
practices.
A further motivation to revisit basic questions is the example of our foreign
counterparts. The world today is a vastly different place than it was when the FTC
opened its doors nearly one hundred years ago. To be effective, an agency must account
for the ever-growing international dimension of commerce. The intensification of crossborder economic integration has deeply affected consumer and business behavior and
significantly influenced how the Commission and its foreign counterparts seek to
accomplish their competition and consumer protection missions.
This is an unparalleled era of institutional experimentation and reform in the
fields of competition policy and consumer protection. We have much to learn from what
happens outside our borders. Within the past decade, some of our more experienced
counterparts – for example, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(“ACCC”), the Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) in the
United Kingdom, the Directorate for Competition (“DG Comp”) and the Directorate for
Health and Consumer Affairs (“DG SANCO”) in the European Commission (“EC”), the
Conseil de la Concurrence in France, the Cabinet Office in Japan, and the Competition
Bureau of Canada – have undertaken a basic examination of key elements of their
authority, organization, and operations.
For example, in the consumer protection area, two of the most striking examples
are Australia’s efforts to restructure its entire consumer policy framework and Japan’s
ongoing examination and reorganization of governmental consumer protection
4
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institutions. In Australia, the Productivity Commission, an independent research and
advisory body, released a comprehensive report in May 2008 – based on nearly two years
of consultations and analysis – on ways to improve the consumer policy framework to
empower consumers, harmonize and coordinate consumer policy across Australian
federal, state, and territorial jurisdictions, and avoid unnecessary duplication and
increases in regulation. 5 The Productivity Commission recommended the introduction of
a single generic consumer law applying across Australia as well as the transfer of
regulatory responsibility in several areas, including consumer credit, to Australia’s
federal regulators. In October, the Council of Australian Governments (“COAG”)
adopted many of the Productivity Commission’s recommendations, and implementation
is underway. 6 In Japan, following a spate of consumer food safety incidents, a
governmental panel delivered a report to the Prime Minister in June 2008 that
recommended transferring overall responsibility for consumer protection matters from
several different agencies to a new consumer agency that will come under the auspices of
the Cabinet Office. 7 Since then, the government submitted a bill to the Japanese Diet to
establish a new Consumer Affairs Agency, which is currently under review.
Over the past decade or so, several of the member states of the European Union
(“EU”) have undertaken major programs of institutional renewal. In the United
Kingdom, the government engaged in extensive legal reform starting with the 1998
Competition Act, which introduced EC-style competition prohibitions into U.K. law, and
the 2002 Enterprise Act, which created, among other things, a new governance structure
for the OFT involving a board comprised of executive and nonexecutive directors.
Following these legal changes, the OFT established a unit to engage in market studies
and advocacy in 2002. In 2006, informed by outside evaluations, the OFT dismantled the
division of labor along competition and consumer lines into sectoral market-facing areas,
supported by specialist teams such as strategy and planning and evaluation, and internal
back-of-house areas. As the result of an extensive review of its competition policy
system, France soon will implement structural reforms that will establish a single
competition authority from the two French agencies that currently share competition
policy responsibilities.
The European Commission’s DG Comp also has engaged in a major restructuring
effort in this decade. Several losses in merger cases in 2002 inspired DG Comp to
examine itself and undertake widespread reforms. The changes focused on defining
activity by market concepts and industry knowledge, introducing more transparency and
reducing hierarchy, providing for more flexibility in staff movement around the agency,
5
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and engaging case teams in internal peer reviews to improve the quality of enforcement
actions. DG SANCO has conducted several forward-looking workshops and simulations
to identify the key challenges it will face in the future, and to identify what skills, tools,
internal processes, and working methods it needs to develop to meet those challenges. 8
Newer agencies in such countries as Brazil, El Salvador, Hungary, Mexico,
Singapore, South Africa, and South Korea also are exploring major institutional
improvements. Two interesting examples in the consumer protection area are El
Salvador and South Korea. In El Salvador, the consumer agency, the Defensoría del
Consumidor, prepared a report that elevated consumer issues to the equivalent of
“Cabinet-level” by developing a National System for Consumer Protection, composed of
the Defensoría and representatives of the executive branch and other government
institutions, to coordinate consumer protection issues. 9 In South Korea, the Korean
Consumer Protection Board, which was a quasi-governmental entity, has merged with the
Korean Fair Trade Commission, a governmental competition authority, enhancing the
state’s support for consumer policy and enforcement missions and linking consumer and
competition issues structurally. On the competition side, the Netherlands Competition
Authority (“NMa”) has engaged in a more sophisticated balance of its various tools and
enforcement instruments, focusing on risk-oriented enforcement action on a proportional
scale and more on market studies, with less engagement in markets in which there are
little or no problems and in which none are expected to arise, as well as additional efforts
directed at informational campaigns, guidance, and compliance programs.
The determination of our foreign counterparts, old and new, to benchmark
themselves with their peers and to incorporate superior techniques into their own
operations is well worth emulating. 10 In the international arena, one hallmark of a good
agency always has been its capacity to influence views of what constitutes sound
competition and consumer protection policies by “exporting” ideas, mainly through the
example of its own policy work and enforcement practice. Today, as the FTC’s overseas
consultations for this project demonstrated, the difference between an agency with a good
international program and one with an excellent international program may be the
agency’s skill in importing ideas, as well. This demands close attention to the experience
of other jurisdictions and the willingness to embrace superior practices from the rest of
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the world. The exchange of ideas and strategies in consumer protection and competition
is increasingly “a two-way street.” 11
If the FTC is to exert effective leadership in forming policy at home and abroad,
we must be no less driven than our foreign counterparts to examine and enhance our own
institutional framework and operations and have procedures in place to respond
effectively to new commercial phenomena and to learn from developments taking place
within established and emerging competition and consumer regimes around the world.
What has emerged globally is a form of competition by individual jurisdictions to achieve
superior regulatory frameworks. This rivalry reflects awareness that the attainment of
superior frameworks – systems that achieve sound policy outcomes at the lowest cost to
society – can be a valuable source of national economic advantage. That is a competition
worth having, and the FTC means to be a successful participant in the contest.
Another reason for the FTC to conduct this self-assessment is to ingrain in the
agency a habit of periodic self-evaluation to illuminate the way to future improvements.
To a large extent, the chief means for evaluating the performance of public institutions in
the United States has consisted of convening from time to time (often in the face of crisis)
blue ribbon panels of outside experts. 12 So it has been with the Federal Trade
Commission. 13 To a point, these blue ribbon studies are helpful, but they have severe
limitations. Among other weaknesses, the blue ribbon panels tend too often to glide over
basic questions about the appropriate standards for measuring agency performance.
Reviews of agency performance also take place through the work of committees
assembled to facilitate the transition from one presidential administration to another.
Presidential transition reports suffer from their own frailties. The imperative to turn them
out in a short time – often a few weeks or months – sometimes imbues a transition
report’s analysis and recommendations with glibness and superficiality. Because their
drafters lack the time to place events in a larger historical context, policy prescriptions in
these documents often focus myopically on the short term. Because their assessments of
past performance set a benchmark against which future innovations can be assessed, the
drafters may tend to devalue past accomplishments.
The FTC at 100 project seeks to overcome these limitations by encouraging
acceptance of a norm of periodic self-assessment and creating a template for the agency
to engage regularly in an analysis of its performance. There is no substitute for the
agency’s own sustained efforts to get things right. As George Stigler observed in a blue
11
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ribbon study of defense procurement in 1970, “[n]o organization can achieve or maintain
efficiency in structure or operation by having a critical review made by expert outsiders
once each five or ten years. . . . A good organization must have built into its very
structure the incentives to its personnel to do the right things.” 14
The FTC at 100 project also has attempted to decouple the process of selfassessment from any single electoral cycle and to put the focus on adjustments that will
improve the agency over the long term. By focusing on the Commission’s centennial,
this exercise has sought to achieve a longer-term perspective and engage the agency in
the valuable process of considering the goals that animated the agency’s creation and
assessing how well the FTC has attained them. The aim is to identify approaches for
improvement that are not only good today but will be good in the decades to come.
Focal Points and Means
The FTC self-assessment has focused on two broad issues. First, when we ask
how well the Commission is carrying out its responsibilities, by what criteria should we
assess its work? The scholarly literature and popular commentary on the FTC is replete
with rough assessments of whether the Commission is performing “well.” Far more often
than not, the definition of “good performance” that presumably underpins such judgments
is poorly specified. It is impossible to form conclusions about an agency’s performance
without some basic understanding of what the agency ought to do. This, in effect,
requires the construction of an agency report card.
Second, by what techniques should we measure the agency’s success in meeting
the normative criteria by which we determine whether the agency is performing well?
Once standards for assessing performance are chosen, it is necessary to decide how to
apply them. How, in other words, are grades to be calculated? A major aim of this
element of the self-assessment is to identify the best means for measuring the effects and
quality of what the FTC has done.
We addressed these questions through a mix of internal deliberations and external
consultations. We asked difficult questions of ourselves and sought to see ourselves as
others see us. The external consultations took two forms. We conducted extensive
interviews and convened 12 workshops (including seven outside the United States) at
which expert observers from academia, business groups, consumer organizations, and
government bodies discussed the Commission’s programs, operations, and organization.
The self-assessment yielded three basic products. One is a consideration of the
agency’s likely resource needs over the next five to six years. The second was a
collection of observations from our external consultations about the quality of individual
substantive and procedural measures that the FTC has undertaken. The third is a review
of the institutional arrangements by which the Commission performs its responsibilities.
14
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This report presents the third of these products. Although the report does not treat
all topics addressed in our deliberations, or examine some matters in complete detail,
many of the proceedings have been posted on the FTC’s website for fuller study. We
hope that the process used for this self-assessment not only has illuminated ways to
improve the FTC but also has supplied a template for future self-assessment exercises.
Conclusion: The Engineering of Competition and Consumer Protection Policy
The progress of the Federal Trade Commission in its modern era has built heavily
upon the willingness of its people to assess their work critically and explore possibilities
for improvement. Critical self-study and external consultations not only have helped
identify paths to achieving greatness, but also have renewed the institution’s commitment
to fulfill the destiny that Congress in 1914 wished it to achieve.
The FTC at 100 self-assessment is the latest element of that tradition, and the
exercise has yielded valuable insights about strengthening the agency. Several areas
stand out. The inquiry has helped identify what resources – personnel, facilities,
equipment – the FTC will need to perform its duties in the future. Nothing is more vital
to the success of the Commission than its human capital. A crucial reason for the
agency’s improvement in recent decades is a progressive strengthening of the quality of
its administrative professionals, attorneys, and economists. A second reason is the
farsighted investment the agency has made in information technology to improve the
productivity of its employees. Nothing will be more vital to our future success than
seeing that the modern historical trend toward assembling an ever more capable staff and
ever more powerful technological tools to support them continues. This inquiry also has
helped identify steps the agency should take, once it has attracted talented individuals, to
make the workplace a most satisfying experience.
A second result is to suggest how the FTC might improve its approach for
choosing strategies for exercising its powers. No task of administration is more
important than selecting priorities. 15 Everything the Commission does flows from its
process for deciding which pursuits are most worthy of its attention. The setting of
effective strategies calls for the agency to use its litigation and nonlitigation tools.
Among other features, this exercise involves deciding how to set the agenda for the
FTC’s research program. From the start, the Commission was intended to undertake
studies and to supplement and undergird its enforcement efforts with a broad research
agenda. Today, in a world of multiple competition and consumer protection decision
makers, intellectual leadership assumes an ever-increasing role in determining the ability
of an individual agency to shape policy developments. Identifying the best possible form
and application of our research activities is indispensable to the FTC’s ability to exercise
intellectual leadership.
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A third product of this self-assessment has been to identify how the FTC can
strengthen its processes for implementing its programs. The manner in which an agency
organizes its operations deeply shapes the quality of its substantive initiatives and affects
the costs that firms bear in complying with the agency’s commands. Finding better ways
to organize our operations not only will improve the Commission’s own efficiency but
also can reduce the compliance costs for business operators without diminishing the
effectiveness of the agency’s substantive programs.
Finally, the inquiry has pointed to how the FTC can better fulfill its duties by
improving links with other government bodies and nongovernment organizations.
Cooperation among government bodies within and across jurisdictions is one of the most
important frontiers for improving the productivity and effectiveness of public competition
and consumer protection authorities. The broad decentralization of authority within the
United States, the emergence of multiple regulatory authorities around the world, and the
awareness of heightened interdependence among regulators and national regulatory
regimes underscore the need for stronger interagency networks and intensified
collaborative projects. The gains from greater cooperation also extend to the FTC’s
relationships with nongovernment bodies, such as academic research centers, consumer
groups, and professional societies.
The emphasis throughout the study is institution-building. Discussions about
competition law and consumer protection tend to focus heavily on conceptual issues of
doctrine and large questions about the appropriate substance of public policy. The
attention given to these unquestionably important matters – the “physics” of competition
policy and consumer protection – obscures the importance of how to engineer institutions
and programs that can transform theory and concepts into effective programs. This study
is about the “engineering” of competition and consumer protection policymaking. It
recognizes that successful public policy outcomes are the product of good physics and
good engineering. It takes faith in the proposition that has guided generations of
successful athletes and musicians: over time, good technique begets good performances.
The orientation of this study also is long-term in nature, at least by the customs of
national policymaking in the United States. The measures suggested here generally do
not lend themselves to instant accomplishment but instead require sustained, incremental
effort. The five-year focus seeks to draw attention to institution-building activities that
demand a continuity of effort across administrations and across the tenure of individual
chairmen. The public policy environment in the United States does not tend to nurture
this perspective. In the eyes of many observers, the reputations of individual agency
officials are set by observable events that transpire during the individual’s tenure. This
point of view discourages investments in activities with long-term, capital qualities that
generate benefits to the agency well beyond a single manager’s time in office.
Fred Hilmer, the President of the University of New South Wales and a major
figure in the modern development of Australia’s competition policy and consumer
protection system, tells his executive MBA students that the success managers enjoy
today probably has roots in decisions taken by their predecessors five or more years ago.
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Professor Hilmer poses the following inquiry to his manager-students: what are you
doing today to improve the lot of your successors five years hence? This report seeks to
answer that challenge for the FTC by encouraging acceptance of a norm that gives proper
attention to building and enhancing the institutional foundations on which good policies
must stand.
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PART 2: INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF SUCCESSFUL
FTC PERFORMANCE
One cannot make sensible judgments about whether an agency is performing
skillfully or poorly without first defining the criteria by which the agency will be tested.
It is a meaningless exercise to say that an agency today is good or bad, doing better or
worse, or surpassing other institutions without identifying the grounds for the assessment.
By what criteria are we to decide whether the FTC is a good institution? The
definition of standards is fundamental to the study of the performance of the Commission
or any other public body, yet the need to clearly specify criteria frequently gets less
attention than it deserves. The literature on the FTC underscores the point. There is a
massive body of commentary that evaluates the programs, operations, and structure of the
FTC. Two flaws weaken many of these accounts. Some commentators offer broad
qualitative judgments without a clear statement of standards. In the course of trying to
increase the gravity of their own assessments by discerning longstanding trends, other
authors mechanically invoke the conclusions of earlier assessments without carefully
studying the criteria employed by previous analyses.
This self-study dwelled extensively on the basic question of what criteria serve to
separate good performance from adequate or weak performance. One of its central aims
was to identify institutional features that beget good substantive outcomes over time.
Public policy is delivered through an infrastructure of institutional arrangements. The
quality of a jurisdiction’s institutional infrastructure shapes substantive policy results.
Presented below are the institutional arrangements whose attainment ought to be the
FTC’s objective.

10

I.

Agency Mission

A fundamental characteristic of a good institution is the clarity with which it
understands its purpose and defines its “mission.” The FTC’s mission has two
dimensions. One is related to the substance of policy, and the other deals with the
process by which policy is formed. The substantive dimension consists of the public
policy goals that the Commission should accomplish on behalf of the American public. 16
The FTC functions well as an institution when it clearly defines what it means to do and
spells out how it will go about its duties. 17 A well-defined conception of the agency’s
aims helps facilitate the choice of projects by which the agency implements its authority.
To do these tasks well, the Commission needs to understand what problems Congress
created it to solve. 18
The second dimension of the FTC’s mission involves the means that Congress
placed at its disposal to address economic policy issues. Congress gave the Commission
a distinctive collection of institutional endowments. These include law enforcement
powers, a collegial governance structure, special information gathering tools, the
authority to issue reports, the combination of competition policy and consumer protection
responsibilities, an elastic substantive mandate, rulemaking powers, and the authority to
use administrative adjudication to articulate standards of business conduct. The
Commission’s application of this portfolio of policy instruments is no less an ingredient
of its mission than the attainment of substantive policy goals entrusted to it. If the agency
cannot produce superior policy outcomes by reason of this combination of policymaking
attributes, the rationale for the FTC’s very existence comes into question.
Both dimensions of the FTC’s mission ideally should be defined in a manner that
facilitates meaningful measurement of whether the agency is achieving its substantive
aims and using its distinctive institutional capabilities effectively. Measurement is the
final element in a public administration lifecycle that begins with the definition of aims,
proceeds with the selection of implementing programs, and concludes with the
assessment of results. In measuring how well the agency uses its capabilities to
formulate competition policy or consumer protection policy, the Commission should
focus on the economic outcomes it achieves for the public (for example, reducing
economic losses that result from fraud), rather than focusing on the inputs the FTC
dedicates to a task (for example, the number of staff assigned to address activities in a
certain sector) or the program outputs it generates (for example, the number of cases filed
16
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or the number of studies completed). Practical difficulties associated with directly
measuring economic outcomes account for the frequency with which the Commission
and other authorities fall back upon agency inputs or outputs as proxies for economic
impact.
Once the agency has defined the substantive and process elements of its mission,
the Commission must articulate these elements clearly to enable its own staff and
external constituencies to understand what the agency is trying to achieve and how it is
seeking to do so. 19 The FTC’s clear articulation of its mission is a vital means by which
it attains the necessary objective of building support for its work from internal and
external constituencies over time.
In this section, we address these and related issues concerning the Commission’s
mission. In doing so, we draw upon various views of the FTC’s mission that were
presented during the public consultations of the self-assessment. Some concepts,
particularly the challenges of measuring successful completion of the mission and
gaining external support, also will be discussed in greater detail later in the report.
A.

Clearly Articulating the Mission

As a threshold matter, agency leaders must clearly articulate the agency mission
so that staff and external constituencies have a firm grasp of the organization’s
objectives. 20 As one leading public administration scholar has explained:
Everyone in the organization needs to understand the big
picture. Thus, the leaders of the organization need to
proclaim, clearly and frequently, what the organization is
trying to accomplish. . . . If the agency’s leaders want
everyone in the organization to take the mission seriously,
they need to reiterate its fundamental points at every
opportunity. 21
For some administrative agencies, statutes clearly specify the mission. For
example, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) is required by law to send monthly
checks to eligible persons. Accordingly, the SSA easily has discerned its mission – to
pay benefits on time and accurately – from its statute.
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The clarity found in the Social Security example is not ubiquitous. Most
government agencies “are likely to have general, vague or inconsistent goals, about
which clarity and agreement can only occasionally be obtained.” 22 The urgency to
achieve clarity and coherence in policymaking is especially acute for the FTC, to which
Congress has given responsibility for implementing over 50 statutes. Given the array of
policy impulses that motivated the enactment of these measures, it may not be possible to
identify a single unifying principle that links all legislative commands within the
Commission’s policymaking domain. Nonetheless, continuous FTC efforts to identify
and reinforce common aims across the span of its jurisdiction serve the important end of
building a coherent portfolio of projects that address the most serious competition and
consumer protection problems while minimizing inconsistencies or contradictions that
reduce its effectiveness.
A vital starting point for this endeavor is the Commission’s principal statutory
mandate. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and bars
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 23 The key operative terms of these commands are
not self-defining, and it is difficult to derive an operational mission directly from their
text. 24 In these circumstances, the FTC and other agencies with comparatively openended substantive mandates must define and develop an operational mission. The
Commission’s leadership should ensure that the mission derived from broad statutory
commands is sufficiently specific in identifying what the FTC does to guide agency
action.
From time to time, Congress has amended the FTC Act to define more fully some
of the statute’s most general commands. For example, Section 5 of the FTC Act today
provides that the Commission cannot find an act or practice to be unfair unless it “causes
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.” 25 Reflecting these provisions, the Commission has defined its mission as
follows: “To prevent business practices that are anticompetitive or deceptive or unfair to
consumers; to enhance informed consumer choice and public understanding of the
competitive process; and to accomplish these missions without unduly burdening
legitimate business activity.” 26
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There appears to be widespread understanding that the FTC’s current mission
focuses on consumers and that the improvement of consumer welfare is the proper
objective of the agency’s competition and consumer protection work. 27 An important
consequence of this focus is that Commission policy does not seek to enhance or degrade
the position of individual market participants as an end in itself. For example, the
improvement of market outcomes for consumers, and not the status of specific firms or
collections of enterprises, is the reason to challenge fraud, deceit, and related forms of
unfair practices, and to police anticompetitive mergers and other practices that
improperly suppress rivalry in the marketplace. 28 This perspective appears to enjoy
broad support within the community of competition policy and consumer protection
agencies. During his tenure as the first Chief Economist in DG Comp, Lars-Hendrik
Röller punctuated this concept with his habit, in the course of discussions about proposed
enforcement initiatives, of asking case handlers, “What is the theory of consumer harm?”
To say that the well-being of consumers, rather than individual producers, is the
appropriate concern of competition and consumer protection policy does not by itself
determine exactly what an agency with these responsibilities should do. Modern
commentary and the consultations for the FTC self-study display extensive discussion
about what specific competition and consumer protection initiatives best serve consumer
interests in the immediate term and for the long run. How much weight, respectively, do
efficiency effects and distributional consequences deserve in the decision to intervene?
Are the efficiency gains realized by producers cognizable only if producers pass those
gains largely or entirely to consumers in the relatively short term?
The FTC self-study did not try to resolve these debates, but several informative
observations concerning the issue emerged from the proceedings. The first is that
modern FTC programs designed to address improper collusive or exclusionary
restrictions on output, price, or quality commonly have positive distributional effects as
well as efficiency consequences. 29 The same can be said of the agency’s consumer
protection programs. For example, many initiatives undertaken as part of the
Commission’s program to combat serious fraud have special significance for
economically disadvantaged populations or other social groups that, for various reasons,
27
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might be especially vulnerable to fraudulent sales schemes. 30 In general terms, it is
difficult to find instances in which the pursuit of the programs that have formed the core
of the FTC’s modern competition and consumer protection programs have featured a
tension between the attainment of efficiency and distribution-related goals, respectively.
Second, many roundtable panelists commented on the disciplining role that a
focus on consumer welfare provides. For example, one panelist noted that focusing on
consumer welfare, rather than also on potentially countervailing, and less measurable,
interests like “fairness,” provides “clarity of objective.” 31 In the context of the FTC’s
efforts to apply its authority to forbid unfair methods of competition and to ban unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, an emphasis on preventing and redressing consumer harm
provides a valuable means for ensuring that the application of the agency’s powers will
make markets work better for consumers.
In addition to the broad substantive reach of its mandate, the FTC has a broad
sectoral reach. The Commission’s enforcement jurisdiction extends to conduct “in or
affecting commerce” in most sectors of the economy. 32 However, the FTC Act (and
sometimes other laws) imposes certain limits on the Commission’s sectoral reach,
including limits applicable to common carriers and financial sectors. 33 Some panelists
expressed the view that the FTC’s mission should be extended to encompass areas of
commerce currently subject to limits on the agency’s jurisdiction. For example, one
panelist advocated expanded FTC law enforcement jurisdiction to “represent the
consumer interest at the federal level” in areas such as banking and mobile phones. 34
Similarly, another panelist noted that, in the wake of the current financial crises, the FTC
should play a major role when Congress reforms the current regulatory oversight scheme
for financial services companies currently beyond the scope of FTC jurisdiction. 35 These
suggestions were consistent with the basic articulation of the agency mission to protect
consumers in the marketplace.
The concern about the modern suitability of longstanding jurisdictional limits
underscores an important point about the FTC’s mission. The definition of aims is
inherently evolutionary. Technological innovation and other commercial phenomena call
for periodic reassessment of assumptions that guided the establishment of exemptions
and other restrictions on the Commission’s authority. More generally, dynamism in
30
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commerce and in public administration call for the FTC to revisit from time to time the
reason for its existence and to ask how its goals best can be realized. The question of
implementation – how the FTC should carry out its consumer-focused mission – will be
explored throughout the remainder of this report.
B.

Measuring Outcomes Rather than Outputs

In addition to a clearly articulated mission, there should be a close nexus between
the mission and outcomes for the public that can be measured. 36 Missions focused on
agency outputs (such as cases) rather than outcomes (such as increased consumer
welfare) may not lend themselves to meaningful measurements of public benefits. 37
It is typically easier to identify and measure government agencies’ outputs rather
than outcomes. Thus, agency leaders should articulate a mission that lends itself to
developing outputs that enjoy a close nexus with desired outcomes. 38 For example, in the
context of public health, an agency might confidently assume that increased output of
immunizations will advance a mission focused on the outcome of a healthier
population. 39 As one roundtable panelist explained with regard to the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services:
One of the things that they’re trying to do is improve the
safety, quality, affordability and accessibility of healthcare;
prevent and control disease, injury, illness and disability;
protect the public from infectious occupational,
environmental and terrorist threats. . . . [I]f you listen to
that carefully you could think, gosh, measures darn near
fall right out of that. . . . [T]hey look at things like
percentage of the population with prescription drug
coverage. That’s something that’s verifiable, tells you
whether they’re achieving some of their mission or not.
The number of people and percent of people in the country
with ongoing access to healthcare. The percentage of the
population with immunization coverage. These are all
things that are either health outcomes or closely related to
health outcomes that fall right out of their mission. 40
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In some cases, theoretical analysis or empirical research can provide a confident
basis for determining that certain types of outputs – for example, prohibitions on
agreements by rivals to restrict truthful advertising or rules forbidding sellers to make
unsubstantiated claims about the efficacy of weight-control products – ordinarily serve to
improve consumer welfare. Even for these policy presumptions, it is appropriate for
public officials to consider from time to time whether the assumptions that support
investments in certain types of outputs remain sound. A further matter for continuing
observation and analysis is whether adjustments in the specific mix of outputs might
achieve better policy results. For example, the initiation of cases to prosecute serious
marketing fraud properly can rest upon the assumption that serious fraud ordinarily
diminishes consumer welfare, typically enjoys no legitimate business justifications, and
warrants categorical condemnation. At the same time, the FTC and other consumer
protection agencies might consider supplementing anti-fraud cases with consumer
education programs that encourage precaution taking by potential victims. Over the past
decade, this type of examination has led the Commission to increase outlays for
consumer education and to hold occasional workshops to explore enhancements in its
program to deter fraud. 41 In this area and in other matters, an outcome-focused policy
perspective helps ensure that the Commission’s existing programs are not simply a
consequence of adhering to custom and that the FTC remains alert to possibilities for
improving results for consumers by adjusting the mix of its policy initiatives.
Several foreign enforcement agencies that also have responsibility for both
consumer protection and competition matters have mission statements that are focused on
outcomes and reflect such agencies’ dual roles. The mission of the U.K. Office of Fair
Trading, for example, is “making markets work well for consumers.” 42 The Canadian
Competition Bureau’s vision is “to be an organization of excellence that produces high
impact outcomes and is flexible in order to meet the challenges of the marketplace today
and in the future.” 43 The purpose of the New Zealand Commerce Commission “is to
promote dynamic and responsive markets so that New Zealanders benefit from
competitive prices, better quality and greater choice.” New Zealand’s statement of aims
identifies three strategic goals: (1) “markets are dynamic and all goods and services are
provided at competitive prices”; (2) “consumers are confident of the accuracy of
information they receive when making choices”; and (3) “regulated industries are
constrained from earning excess profits, face incentives to invest appropriately and share
efficiency gains with consumers.” 44
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Beyond emphasizing outcomes rather than outputs, a mission that focuses on
measurable outcomes has several advantages. First, it can provide staff with information
on how their actions affect achievement of the agency’s goals. This information can
allow the agency and its staff to better calibrate actions against goals, which can improve
effectiveness. If the agency can define a mission for which it can identify measurable
outcomes, managers can more easily understand where they are successful and where
they must improve. Second, a measurable outcome-focused mission can motivate
improved performance by allowing staff to know when they are performing their job
well. Third, when missions focus on outcomes rather than inputs or outputs, the agency
more readily can adjust the allocation of its resources better to achieve desired policy
results while continuing to focus on the agency goals. 45 Alternatively, if the mission is
not defined in a readily measurable way, an agency can expend scarce resources engaging
in activities that do not advance its goals.
The consultations with the Canadian Competition Bureau (“Bureau”) revealed a
promising approach to incorporating the measurement of outcomes into the definition of
its mission and its selection of individual projects. In recent years, the Competition
Bureau has moved toward pressing its operating units to state, when proposing new
investigations, cases, or other measures, how the effectiveness of a chosen initiative
might be measured as the initiative unfolds. 46 The Bureau’s practice seems worthy
emulating. By asking its project teams to address from the beginning “how will we know
this initiative is working” seems a useful way to assist the Commission in deciding which
matters to pursue and to monitor progress toward the accomplishment of the agency’s
goals.
A further advantage of emphasizing the measurability of outcomes involves the
FTC’s external constituencies. Measurability of outcomes allows political decision
makers, nongovernment constituencies, and the general public better to estimate the
particular level of public benefits associated with a given outlay of public funds. In this
manner, measurable outcomes will allow Congress to allocate more efficiently scarce
government resources to maximize benefits per dollar spent. The Commission’s capacity
to define its mission in terms of measurable outcomes has assumed greater importance at
a time of financial crisis in the United States and overseas. To some observers, the crisis
has raised doubts about the utility of competition and consumer protection policies that
rely principally on market-based, decentralized economic choice as the way to organize
economic affairs. In such an environment, the FTC and its counterparts overseas cannot
expect those outside their walls to accept the value of their competition policy and
consumer protection programs as a matter of faith. Quantitative and qualitative measures
of effectiveness necessarily will assume greater prominence. With growing frequency,

45

See BEHN, supra note 21, at 12 (noting that when target outputs do not further the mission, which is
focused on an outcome, agency leaders need to adjust target outputs); Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 18 (“[When] the
focus is on the goal rather than the means of the goal . . . [y]ou can dispose of the way of doing things or a
means if it doesn’t work, but the focus on the goal remains.”).
46

Consultation with Canadian Competition Bureau, Sept. 17, 2008.

18

competition and consumer protection authorities can expect to hear variants of the
aphorism that says: In God we trust. All others provide data.
Chapter VII of this report examines more fully how best to measure the FTC’s
effectiveness in general and the impact of its programs on consumer welfare. As a
general matter, the FTC since the late 1970s has devoted growing attention to the
question of how to measure the effects of its policy choices. In this endeavor, the
agency’s Bureau of Economics and its data gathering and reporting powers have supplied
a valuable foundation for devising approaches to measure the economic effects of FTC
decisions to intervene and not to intervene. As one panelist noted, this form of economic
expertise provides a vital tool for measuring whether actions had positive effects on
consumer welfare: “[A]lthough consumer protection and competition laws are relatively
broad, there is a consensus among the Commission and the antitrust community generally
(e.g., courts, academics, practitioners) that consumer welfare is the guiding principle for
antitrust laws, and economic analysis, in turn, is the proper method for determining what
advances consumer welfare.” 47 Another panelist noted that the FTC consumer protection
mission’s market-based approach is conducive to measurement because, like the
competition mission, it is intended to protect and promote consumer welfare. 48
C.

Internal and External Support for the Mission

A successful agency must enjoy support for its mission from core constituencies
inside and outside the institution. For the agency to gain and maintain such support,
these constituencies must understand the mission and be able to determine whether the
agency is carrying out its responsibilities successfully.
For the FTC, one core constituency is its own staff of administrative
professionals, attorneys, and economists. The Commission derives significant
advantages from building widespread internal agreement upon and endorsement of its
mission. Among other benefits, such support enables managers to economize on
resources. When the FTC’s staff understands and embraces the agency’s stated aims,
managers need spend less time to create incentives for staff to pursue the mission and can
reduce the effort devoted to monitoring whether staff’s efforts are consistent with the
FTC’s mission. 49
Some foreign agencies, such as the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission, the Canadian Competition Bureau, and the U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading,
build support among staff for the agency’s mission by devoting extensive effort to
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articulate principles or values to guide staff in carrying out the agency’s mission. 50 These
agencies make recurring efforts to relate these principles and values to the routine of
selecting and implementing projects. These and other agencies have used a variety of
innovative means to communicate their goals to their staff. Some involve regular
communication through internal information conduits. Others take the form of special
agency-wide events. Canada’s Competition Bureau and the OFT hold annual “town
halls” attended by all of their personnel. Among other activities, these town halls provide
an opportunity for senior management to review recent events and to spell out their vision
for the way ahead. In 2008 the European Commission’s competition directorate held an
“away day” in Brussels that assembled its entire staff for a similar event.
The FTC today uses a variety of means to communicate its goals to its staff.
These include regular announcements on the Commission’s intranet, periodic retreats for
individual operating units, a yearly state of the Commission address delivered by the FTC
Chairman, an annual awards ceremony, and other occasions that provide opportunities for
senior leadership to explain the agency’s aims. Staff can watch Commission meetings in
person, by teleconference, and over the Internet, and these provide guidance about the
agency’s aims. Several times each year, the Commission holds meetings and seminars in
Washington for smaller groups of its staff. Given the size of the FTC’s workforce and
the distribution of staff geographically across the country, there would be considerable
cost involved in following the practice of some foreign counterparts and having annual
meetings of all personnel in Washington. Nonetheless, given the positive results that
other agencies seem to achieve with their larger gatherings, the Commission might
consider convening an agency-wide gathering every few years, or assembling all
members of one of its principal operating groups (e.g., all administrators, attorneys, and
economists who work, respectively, on competition or consumer protection matters).
Short of these measures, ongoing efforts by the FTC to study innovations in internal
communication undertaken by peer organizations promise to yield useful ideas for
adoption inside the Commission.
Beyond mobilizing its own employees, an agency also must enjoy support for its
mission among external constituencies. Lack of external support for the mission can
erode the perceived legitimacy of the agency’s individual actions, cause Congress to
withdraw part of its jurisdiction, and, in extreme circumstances, call into question its
continued existence. James Q. Wilson explains that for any agency leader, “a good
strategy is one that identifies a set of tasks that are both feasible and supportable –
50
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activities the organization has the capacity to engage in and that will elicit the support of
important constituencies.” 51 Political adroitness in building such support is every bit as
important to the success of the FTC’s programs as technical proficiency.
It is important to distinguish between support for a mission among internal and
external constituencies over time, on the one hand, and unanimous support for specific
agency actions, on the other. The former is necessary for a successful agency; the latter
is not. 52 As former Chairman Muris explained, “I think that what you need is some
understanding of the core mission that has support amongst that constituency [staff,
business, courts, academics, and peers in government], not just today, but over long
periods of time and through electoral cycles.” 53 Another way for the Commission to
envision its work is that each of its initiatives accumulates political capital, expends
political capital, or does both. To succeed over time, the FTC must monitor its political
capital account. Ideally, the balance usually will be positive. The agency can function
effectively with temporary, limited deficits – such as when it undertakes a program that
initially involves serious political risks but promises to generate substantial positive
economic returns to the economy. Substantial, chronic deficits are dangerous.
From the external consultations for the self-study and from other assessments of
the agency’s work, the FTC today appears to enjoy substantial support for its mission.
As noted earlier, there appears to be widespread agreement that the FTC is properly
focused on protecting consumers and promoting competition. 54 Even those who have
questioned whether the agency’s organic statute clearly defines the agency’s mission 55
agree that the mission – as currently interpreted – has broad, bipartisan support. 56
Further, several panelists expressed the view that the FTC’s vague statutory language
provides it with the flexibility to allocate resources to accomplish its mission of
protecting consumers. 57 The Commission’s modern custom of engaging in regular,
extensive public consultations about a wide variety of its competition policy and
consumer protection programs has provided an important, useful way to identify
preferences of external groups and to build a consensus for its initiatives.
To maintain a positive balance of political capital requires continuous effort from
administrative agencies such as the FTC. As one political scientist has made the point,
“each agency must constantly create a climate of acceptance for its activities and
51
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negotiate alliances with powerful legislative and community groups to sustain its
position. It must, in short, master the art of politics as well as the science of
administration.” 58 How the FTC can identify its core constituencies and continue to
build support for its mission is discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of the
report.
*

*

*

A key foundation for the FTC’s success is to articulate its mission clearly and to
state its mission in terms that focus on the outcomes the Commission seeks to achieve for
consumers. The ability to tie outcomes back to the mission facilitates the development of
reliable performance measures. The FTC’s staff can be more effective when they can
relate the results of their actions to the agency’s mission. When the FTC staff
understands and supports a stated mission, Commission managers need spend fewer
resources to motivate staff to pursue the agency’s aims. Even if a mission is outcomeoriented and enjoys internal support, the mission also must enjoy external support for the
agency to succeed.
These observations point to an important criterion by which we can determine
whether the FTC is a “good” administrative body. Good performance begins with clarity
and coherence in defining the Commission’s very purpose. The FTC is likely to be a
more effective institution when it adopts a regular habit of asking itself the following
questions: Has the Commission clearly defined its mission? Has the Commission
defined its mission in a manner that focuses on the outcomes it hopes to achieve for
consumers, rather than simply identifying the policy outputs – such as cases, reports, and
rules – it intends to produce? Does the Commission’s definition of its mission lend itself
to the formulation of measurable outcomes? Is the Commission’s mission well
understood and supported by both the agency’s staff and external stakeholders?
The exercise laid out above is not a one-off event but an enduring imperative.
From its formation in 1914, the Commission has operated in a dynamic environment. By
giving the Commission a broad, elastic charter and related powers, Congress anticipated
that the agency would evolve in the face of changing economic conditions, new
commercial phenomena, shifting political currents, and developments in legal thought
and industrial organization economics. To perform this inherently evolutionary
policymaking role, Congress gave the agency a distinctive collection of institutional
attributes to facilitate continuous adaptation and improvement.
By embracing a routine habit of examining itself and its operations to define and
redefine its purpose, the Commission can engage in what two scholars of public
administration, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, have called “thinking in time streams,”
which consists of applying “the kind of mental ability that readily connects discrete
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phenomena over time and repeatedly checks connections.” 59 For the Commission, the
connections that warrant close scrutiny are the links between its goals, its implementing
measures, and the outcomes that such measures produce for consumers. By checking
those connections intensely, the FTC puts itself in the best possible position to answer the
three basic questions that Neustadt and May single out as the core concerns of public
agency decision-making: “‘Will it work?’ ‘Will it stick?’ ‘Will it help more than it
hurts?’” 60
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II.

Agency Structure

The structure of an administrative agency such as the FTC deeply influences the
skill with which it carries out its responsibilities. Jurisdictions can achieve important
gains in economic performance by pressing themselves to achieve an optimal regulatory
design. There is growing recognition within the community of competition policy and
consumer protection authorities that jurisdictions that improve the quality of regulatory
outcomes at the lowest possible cost to society can realize a valuable source of economic
advantage. 61
Structure and organization can affect the performance of an agency’s priorities
directly, for example, by having operational units dedicated to bringing specific types of
cases or examining individual economic sectors, and indirectly, for example, by
facilitating communication and coordination among agency components or having
sufficient flexibility to address changes in rapidly transforming markets. Consumer
protection and competition agencies around the world have a variety of structural
designs. Some agencies have only competition or consumer protection enforcement
authority. Others, like the FTC, combine the functions to meet a broader mission of
protecting the marketplace for consumers. Among agencies with both functions, some
organize their work along industry lines, while others divide along competition and
consumer protection lines. Some agencies have a single commissioner or director, while
others are led by a collegial body. Competition agencies, in particular, routinely include
economists on their staffs, and there are different ways to incorporate economists’ input
into agency decision making.
This chapter examines how the design of the agency, integration of competition
and consumer protection missions, communication, and the dual enforcement and
adjudication functions affect achievement of the agency’s mission.
A.

Current Agency Design

The significant connection between institutional design and agency effectiveness
has led many of the FTC’s counterparts overseas to undertake major efforts to determine
whether adjustments in existing administrative structures and operational processes might
yield superior results and whether the agencies have the components needed to serve their
missions. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, this inquiry entails an assessment
of whether the agency has the necessary human and physical resources to accomplish its
mission.
For the FTC, a logical starting place for the analysis of structure is the
composition of the FTC’s core leadership. 62 The FTC is governed by a college of five
61
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Commissioners, no more than three of whom may be members of the same political
party. 63 A fundamental legislative assumption supporting the FTC’s creation was that
collective decision making would yield policy results superior to those attained by
institutions governed by one official.
From 1914 to 1950, the Commissioners selected their own Chairman, and from
1916 to 1950 they rotated the position annually.64 In 1950, pursuant to Reorganization
Plan Number 8, the President became responsible for designating a Chairman from
among the sitting Commissioners. The Reorganization Plan contemplates an important
allocation of labor among the members of the FTC and other administrative agencies. By
this measure, the board is responsible for setting policy through, among other means, the
selection of cases and the promulgation of rules. The Chairman serves as the agency’s
executive and administrative head. 65 The FTC was one of the first multimember federal
agencies, and its model has since been adopted for numerous other federal agencies, as
well as a significant number of foreign competition and consumer protection agencies. 66
The literature on the FTC and other administrative bodies identifies a number of
conceptual benefits to multimember decision making. These include the application of
diverse backgrounds to problem solving, the capacity of collective discussion to yield
deeper insights into specific issues, and an increase in political legitimacy from having
decisions taken by a board with varied political affiliations. It is also conceivable that,
for purposes of performing various policy functions and reaching external constituencies,
a multimember body can enjoy a form of multiplier effect. If a board can reach common
cause concerning the agency’s mission and means of implementation, each member of
the board can serve as a spokesperson and can reach audiences that a single administrator
might not be able to address.
How much the FTC and other administrative agencies have realized these and
other benefits in practice is a matter of continuing debate. In the public consultations for
this self-study, many participants spoke favorably about the multimember government
structure. Former Chairman Robert Pitofsky endorsed the five-commissioner design in
these terms:
You could argue theoretically in favor of a single
Commissioner structure, or perhaps three Commissioners,
or five, or even seven. The advantage of a multiCommissioner structure, and the limitation that only three
may come from the same political party, generally ensures
a variety of views. Beyond theory, my impression is that in
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recent years (maybe not before 1970) the FTC has been a
collegial body in which members worked together well and
profited from their colleagues’ views. I would leave the
arrangement as it is. 67
Panelists expressed the view that the nature and political balance of the body of
Commissioners fosters discussion of new ideas and provides restraint on the political
agenda of the agency. Former Commissioner Thomas Leary emphasized the benefits of a
collegial body and urged more discussion among Commissioners:
I think [the FTC] can make and should make greater use of
the ability of the Commission to function collegially
because the Commissioners ultimately are the people who
are going to have to set policy and make these decisions. . .
. In [the Office of Policy Planning] operation [] there were
these background papers being prepared which were going
to be used in support of the Commission’s advocacy role.
And we met simply to discuss these various drafts of
positions that the Commission might take on important
matters of competitive policy, the extent of the state action
exception and things of that kind. And it was not in the
discussion of a particular case or it was not in the
discussion of a particular Congressional hearing, it was
simply to see if we could agree among ourselves on what
the Commission’s policy ought to be ultimately when these
things arise. And I thought that that was tremendously
innovative and a very useful way of making use of the
collective wisdom, if you will, of the people who have been
appointed to run this place. 68
As the remarks of these former Commission members indicate, the logic of
multimember governance assumes extensive interaction among the members of the
board. Communications among Commissioners may take place informally or, more
formally, through meetings. The Sunshine Act imposes significant restrictions on how
these gatherings can take place and what number of Commissioners can participate.69 In
general terms, the Sunshine Act imposes constraints on actions by a quorum of
Commissioners. These limits normally apply to communications among three or more
Commissioners. When a combination of vacancies or recusals leaves only three
Commissioners eligible to participate in a matter, the Sunshine Act limits
communications between any two members.
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The Sunshine Act has major implications for how Commission members interact.
Consider the circumstance where all five members of the board are eligible to participate
in a matter. In effect, the Sunshine Act forestalls all spontaneous discussion by more
than two members of the Commission about most matters of agency business, including
such items as pending law enforcement matters. For example, if two Commission
members who happen to be engaged in a conversation about a proposed case are joined
by a third Commissioner, the discussion about Commission business must cease.
Discussions involving three or more Commissioners concerning agency business can take
place only if notice of such gatherings is made public in advance. The noticed meetings
must be opened to the public unless the subject matter satisfies one of several Sunshine
Act exceptions (which allow, for example, the closure of meetings involving proposed
law enforcement measures). As a consequence, much communication among
Commissioners about agency business takes the form of seriatim, two-by-two
conversations. These are prone to all of the difficulties in comprehension and
interpretation that accompany the sequential transmission of information from one person
to a second, and then to another. The Sunshine Act’s limits do not apply to agents of the
Commissioners. It is common practice for advisors of the Commissioners to meet as a
group to discuss matters of agency business and, in many cases, to formulate common
understandings on behalf of their principals.
Officials from foreign agencies with the multimember commission governance
structure find the Sunshine Act restrictions astonishing. Their intuition is that limitations
severely impede the application of the collaborative decision-making processes that are a
major rationale for the design of a multimember governance system. They raise a
fundamental question about administrative practice in the United States: It is not evident
how the benefits of collective governance that appeared to animate the creation of the
FTC can be realized if the existing limits of the Sunshine Act are unchanged. The FTC’s
experience, especially compared to that of its foreign counterparts, leads one to ask
whether the costs to the quality of deliberation among Commissioners exceed the benefits
of public transparency. 70 The possible modification of the statute would appear a worthy
topic for discussion between the Commission and the Congress in the years to come.
Within the constraints of the Sunshine Act, the Commission has used a number of
approaches to discuss larger issues of policy that arise outside the context of specific law
enforcement actions. The Commission recently revived a practice, used from 1977 to
1982, of holding “policy review sessions,” at which the Commission, with the help of
staff, gathers and discusses how the Commission wants to proceed on particular issues. 71
Even with this method of discourse, the agency must place an account of the discussions
in the public domain, subject to the redaction of material involving certain law
enforcement matters. The effort among Commissioners to discuss sensitive topics in this
format can be challenging.
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Panelists in the consultations for the FTC self study did not discuss the
qualifications of the individuals selected to be Commissioners and other senior agency
officials. Commentators have focused extensively on this issue throughout the FTC’s
history. 72 Most recently, the ABA Section of Antitrust Law’s 2008 Transition Report
recommended that the incoming administration appoint competition officials who have
relevant substantive antitrust expertise and who seek involvement in the administration’s
shaping of economic policy. 73 In a discussion that addressed appointments to the FTC
and to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division, the ABA Transition Report
stated:
[T]he continued appointment of such knowledgeable
individuals, who will be best positioned to gain the respect
of the career staff at the agency, the private bar, [and] the
business community . . . can lead to better [staff] morale,
more credible enforcement decisions, and a greater ability
for the agencies to engage with the private sector regarding
substance and process in ways that improve enforcement
overall. Such officials also would have the stature and
reputations necessary to gain the respect of, and engage
effectively with, enforcers around the world. . . . With such
credibility, agency leadership also may have some success
in obtaining opportunities to provide valuable input
regarding antitrust and consumer protection to economic
policymakers in the new Administration. 74
The discussions with foreign competition and consumer protection agencies
identified a noteworthy respect in which the pattern of appointments to the FTC departs
from the practice of appointments overseas. Many of the heads of foreign competition
and consumer protection agencies are economists. Only once in the FTC’s history has an
economist (James C. Miller III) served as the Chairman. Only three individuals with
doctorates in economics (Miller, George Douglas, and Dennis Yao) have been FTC
Commissioners. Accounting for trends in international practice and reflecting on the
substantial economic dimension of the FTC’s charter, it is reasonable to ask whether the
agency is well served by such infrequent participation by economists at the top
management level of the agency.
Below the Commissioner level, the FTC has three bureaus broadly divided along
mission lines, 75 seven regional offices (one of which has two branches), and several other
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offices, most prominently, in terms of size, the Office of the General Counsel and the
Office of the Executive Director.
The Bureau of Competition (“BC”) focuses primarily on enforcement of the FTC
Act’s prohibition of unfair methods of competition in the realm of antitrust and other
competition laws. BC is divided into nine divisions: four divisions, organized around
sectoral lines, specialize in merger enforcement; one handles health care-related
competition concerns, including but not limited to mergers; one focuses on
anticompetitive practices; one oversees compliance with orders issued in administrative
or court cases brought by the Commission; one focuses on premerger notification; and
one focuses on competition policy.
The Bureau of Consumer Protection (“BCP”) attends to the FTC’s mission
concerning the FTC Act’s prohibition of unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce. BCP has seven divisions, five of which focus on direct law
enforcement and compliance. Those divisions work in the areas of national advertising;
financial practices; deceptive marketing of goods and services; privacy and identity
protection; and enforcement of outstanding Commission and judicial orders, certain trade
regulations and rules, and other targeted initiatives, such as green marketing. The other
two divisions focus on support for BCP programs. One provides litigation support, data
sharing (through the Consumer Sentinel Network) and analysis, and management of the
Consumer Response Center, which responds to consumer complaints; the other division
implements the Commission’s expansive consumer and business education programs.
The agency’s seven regional offices engage in consumer protection and
competition enforcement under BCP and BC oversight. One of those offices, the
Western Regional Office, has branches in two cities (Los Angeles and San Francisco).
The Bureau of Economics (“BE”) supports both the competition and consumer
protection enforcement work of the bureaus and carries out much of the agency’s
research mission. BE has two groups that focus on antitrust matters and one that focuses
on consumer protection matters. It also has an office of applied research and outreach,
which coordinates BE’s policy R&D, advocacy, and international activities, as well as an
office of accounting and financial analysis, which focuses on mergers and other
competition issues. The Commission has always assigned its economists to a separate
unit and, from that unit, the economists provide independent economic advice to the
Commissioners.
The Office of General Counsel represents the Commission in appellate matters
and certain types of court actions, consults with or advises the bureaus on other court
actions, and assists the Justice Department in representing the Commission in cases
within the DOJ’s purview. The office includes a Policy Studies shop that prepares
comprehensive reports on vital legal issues and on major sectors of the American
industry lines (such as the work related to regulated sectors and price surveillance). Similarly, the
European Commission’s DG Comp has engaged in a widespread reorganization into sector-specific project
groups (excluding cartels).
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economy, as well as a Legal Counsel shop that provides legal services to the entire
agency concerning such matters as agency jurisdiction, rulemaking authority and
procedures, employment law, government ethics, agency regulatory obligations, and
information disclosure.
Several other offices perform additional functions that support the Commissioners
and bureaus. These include the Office of International Affairs (“OIA”); the Office of
Policy Planning (“OPP”); the Office of Public Affairs and the Office of Congressional
Relations (both attached to the Chairman’s office); the Office of the Executive Director;
and the Office of the Secretary. The Office of the Administrative Law Judges includes
the Commission’s Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”), who preside at trials at the
direction of the Commission. The Office of the Inspector General (“IG”), an independent
office within the Commission, conducts audits and investigations relating to the programs
and operations of the FTC. The IG conducts audits to find and prevent fraud, waste, and
abuse and to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the agency.
From approximately 1954 to 1960, the FTC divided its staff into bureaus along
functional lines, one consisting of investigational staff and the other consisting of trial
staff. 76 After 1960, the agency was reorganized into, among other units, a Bureau of
Restraint of Trade and a Bureau of Deceptive Practices. 77 In 1970, under the leadership
of Chairman Caspar Weinberger, the agency renamed the operating bureaus to their
current titles of the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection,
respectively. 78 Divisions within BC and BCP have both investigative and litigation
responsibilities in particular subject matter areas. 79 Following the structural changes in
the early 1970s, a number of commentators have noted that the budget for the Bureau of
Consumer Protection substantially increased and BCP focused more heavily on matters
of greater importance to consumers. 80 Likewise, the restructured Bureau of Competition
is regarded as having become more effective and made great inroads in antitrust
enforcement. 81 Also, one commentator stated that, after the restructuring of the early
1970s, the FTC was able to recruit more skilled attorneys than it had previously. 82
On the whole, the FTC’s current structure of operating units has worked well.
The external consultations with foreign agencies revealed many instances in which other
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countries have made organizational changes that directly have emulated features of the
FTC’s existing organization or have been influenced by the FTC’s experience.
More important than the FTC’s organization at any one time has been the
development of a healthy custom that promotes reassessment and adjustment of existing
organizational arrangements in light of past experience and emerging needs. When this
process has identified possibilities for useful modifications, the FTC’s administrative
structure and its organization of bureaus have proven to be highly adaptable and flexible.
New divisions or other subunits can be, and have been, created in response to changes in
marketplace conditions or perceived agency needs.
Four recent examples illustrate how the agency has upgraded its structure in order
to carry out its mission more effectively. In 2004, BCP established a Criminal Liaison
Unit (“CLU”) to work with federal and state law enforcers to facilitate criminal
prosecution of pernicious forms of fraud. In 2006, the Commission established the
Office of International Affairs, mentioned above, to improve the coordination of
international matters within the agency and to provide a clearer focal point for contact by
the FTC’s foreign counterparts. In 2007, the agency altered BCP to form the Division of
Privacy and Identity Protection out of the Division of Financial Practices. This move has
enabled the FTC better to address consumer-related financial-privacy concerns, while
also improving the focus on the issues that remained in the Division of Financial
Practices. In 2008, the Bureau of Economics established a research unit to oversee BE
research that will have impacts across all areas of enforcement. Short-term needs,
moreover, can be met without restructuring, such as when attorneys from one BC
division are assigned to work on another division’s projects when the ebb and flow of
work calls for such assignment.
One roundtable panelist expressed a cautionary note for any agency considering
changing its structure, observing that when agency restructuring takes place, the agency
should seek to resolve existing problems, rather than relocating problems from one
division to another. He explained:
What you’re striving for, I think, in terms of performance is
more about building capacity and capacity to do the old
things in very new, different, agile and better ways. So, I
think you have to think about it in those terms. And in
some cases, it’s going to be about doing new things that
need to be done, as well, things you may not have done in
the past. But, again, traditional restructuring is not going to
eliminate those problems. It’s not going to prevent them
from reoccurring. The restructuring kind of remedy, again,
simply relocates problems from one division or one bureau
or one segment to another. It really is not the solution. 83
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This comment correctly points out that reorganization by itself cannot solve deeper
systemic problems that afflict an organization. Reorganization for its own sake also can
breed cynicism among career professionals who have watched a long series of new
agency managers alter the organization chart in ways that yielded few enduring
improvements in the FTC’s performance.
At the same time, attentiveness to possibilities for structural enhancements can
lead an agency to solve problems that are rooted in organizational flaws and can help turn
even good programs into great programs. This is another area in which the
Commission’s efforts to benchmark itself with other agencies at home and abroad can be
highly useful. Conversations with other federal regulatory commission officials during
the course of the FTC self-study revealed that, even though the federal commissions
confronted many of the same operational challenges, sharing across commissions about
past experience was unusual. This is an area in which interagency cooperation, either
informally or within the framework of a memorandum of understanding, could help the
FTC and other federal commissions share know-how that would improve the
performance of all.
The same can be said of foreign competition and consumer protection agencies.
Many foreign authorities are engaged in exciting experiments with new forms of
organization and new techniques for operational practice. Careful study of the
experiences of foreign agencies with comparable mandates could enable the FTC to
identify potentially useful modifications to its own arrangements. The potential benefits
from interagency information sharing warrant the FTC’s efforts to see that multinational
organizations that address competition or consumer protection issues expand the attention
they give to questions of agency organization and operations.
B.

Looking Ahead: Significant Issues Involving the FTC’s Structure and
Operations

The FTC’s self-study consultations demonstrated that organizational adaptability
and an ethic of continuous institutional improvement are major characteristics of good
agency performance. As the discussion above indicates, a useful way to strengthen the
agency’s effectiveness is to sustain the modern custom of refining the agency’s structure
and operations. As they have in the past, the Commission and its operating units can best
achieve needed refinements through a regular, continuous process of assessment through
which the Commission and its operating units – using such means including budgeting
exercises, leadership retreats, and benchmarking with other institutions – seek to identify
possibilities for improvement.
In this section we present several focal points for refinement. One involves the
integration of competition and consumer protection missions within a single agency. A
related issue, which the dual mission especially implicates, is communication and
coordination across agency components. This is particularly important for the
nonenforcement activities of the agency, which can be effective tools to shape policies
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across practice disciplines. A further significant structural issue is the proper role of
administrative adjudication in the agency.
1.

Integration of Competition and Consumer Protection

Because the core mission of the FTC is to protect consumers by ensuring that
markets work well, the agency must assess how a government agency can aid consumers
and the market through its actions. The ABA Transition Report recently observed,
“Given our free market economy, antitrust and consumer protection should be recognized
as critical parts of any administration’s economic policies, and new agency officials
should not be shy about contributing to discussions surrounding such policies.” 84
Shared authority is a common condition of the FTC’s competition and consumer
protection missions. The Department of Justice has jurisdiction to enforce the antitrust
laws, and agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Federal
Reserve Board have jurisdiction over some consumer protection laws. However, the dual
missions that fall under the “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” and “unfair methods of
competition” standards within the FTC Act make this agency particularly well suited to
address the interplay between consumer protection and competition. 85 The
Commission’s capacity to meld expertise in economics, competition, and consumer
protection is a conscious element of its institutional design and a major reason for its
existence. 86
Former Chairman Muris has described the dual missions as complementary
elements of the same mission: “The policies that we traditionally identify separately as
‘antitrust’ and ‘consumer protection’ serve the common aim of improving consumer
welfare and naturally complement each other.” 87 This is because “competition presses
84
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producers to offer the most attractive array of price and quality options,” and “consumer
protection works to ensure that consumers can make well-informed decisions about their
choices and that sellers will fulfill their promises about the products they offer.” 88
Former Commissioner Leary has described the two missions as complementary missions
that address distortions to the supply side of the market in the case of competition and
distortions to the demand side in the case of consumer protection. 89
The FTC self-study consultations abroad revealed similar perspectives. Sir John
Vickers, the former Chief Executive of the U.K. Office of Fair Trading, observed,
“Consumer policy and competition policy are logically and institutionally intertwined.” 90
Vickers described consumer policy as addressing issues of consumer duress and undue
pressure, prepurchase information problems, and undue surprises postpurchase, and he
described competition as a means to mitigate these problems. 91
A recent symposium on the interplay between competition and consumer
protection policies also focused on the integration of these two disciplines. 92 The
interplay between the two is widely recognized and takes many forms. For example,
some authors have suggested that competition benefits consumers by driving all
information (including adverse information) out into the open under what has historically
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been called the unfolding principle. 93 This happens only if the information is not too
expensive and if consumers demand it. 94
Discussion today about dual-purpose agencies with competition and consumer
protection portfolios focuses heavily on what form of intervention serves to maximize
consumer welfare. One author observes that, although competitive markets generally
provide consumer protection solutions without government intervention, in some markets
consumer welfare is not maximized despite a high level of competition.95 For example,
markets in which some groups of consumers bear the costs of other consumers being
either over- or underinformed, as well as competitive markets in which additional
competitors bring new information that adds to consumer search costs in sifting both new
information and avoiding deceptive claims, may be instances in which competition does
not actually maximize overall consumer welfare. 96 The author suggests that public
intervention could require certain disclosures that would foster price and quality
transparency and correct for identified information gaps. 97 He qualifies this policy
suggestion with the admonition that any such policy should be implemented only after
rigorous study and cost-benefit analysis confirms that such intervention would benefit
consumers. 98
In asserting that competition and consumer protection policy serve the same
purpose, former BCP Director William MacLeod has explained the distinction as being
one of technical form: competition policy seeks to maximize consumer choices while
consumer protection “seeks to ensure that customer choices . . . are not distorted by
deception, misstatements or mistreatment of customers.” 99 This presents challenges in
aligning the two policy areas, and agencies need to make the effort to ensure that
competition and consumer protection policy actions do not run counter to one another. 100
MacLeod states that this ultimately can be achieved when both disciplines place emphasis
first on consumer interests, without taking away the primary focus of competition policy
as protecting competition and not competitors. 101
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Roundtable panelist Sir Jeremy Lever suggested that consumer protection follows
as a result of competition policy, and although competition and consumer protection are
not the same discipline, competent competition agencies may enforce both laws. 102
Lever cited Muris, who has written that the same government agency need not
necessarily handle competition and consumer issues; “[c]ompetition and consumer
protection agencies, however, should recognize the complementary nature of their
missions. Around the world, this recognition is growing.” 103 A recent background note
for an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) discussion
examined the tension that exists in comparing the intellectual underpinnings of
competition and consumer protection policies:
That consumer protection policy and competition policy are
largely interdependent instruments of economic policy,
both aimed at serving a common purpose of enhancing the
efficiency with which markets work, has been stated on
many occasions and is widely accepted. It is also widely
recognized that there can be, and at times are, tensions
between those policies. Moreover, as a practical matter,
there are differences in how those policies work, and in the
nature of the process by which decisions are taken and
implemented. Recognition of these interdependencies and
of the differences leads naturally to a consideration of the
institutional arrangements for these policies and
specifically, of how they should be coordinated. 104
A key inquiry for an FTC self-assessment is what level of integration of
competition and consumer protection activities should exist to best achieve the agency’s
overall mission. On this question, a former bureau director and a former deputy director
both suggested that the FTC has a way to go and that the bureaus are too much like
“silos” – that is, they operate side by side, but do not interact with each other
sufficiently. 105 To resolve this, former BCP Director Jodie Bernstein suggested that BE
take the lead in identifying issues that may involve both of the other bureaus and that an
ad hoc group could be formed to address such issues and come back to the Commission
with a recommended course of action. 106 Similarly, former OPP Director Susan DeSanti
urged that the Commission establish a centralized structure, such as a policy office, to
coordinate the research and policy development taking place in the three bureaus. 107 In
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2007, the FTC did this for international work, integrating the international competition,
consumer protection, and technical assistance functions into the Office of International
Affairs. 108
The experience of foreign counterparts with integration of competition and
consumer protection functions may prove useful for the FTC. 109 At least 30 agencies
worldwide have a mix of these duties. Compared to the FTC, some dual-mandate
agencies have undertaken more expansive organizational measures to integrate the
competition and consumer functions more completely. The most notable is the U.K.’s
Office of Fair Trading, which in 2006 restructured itself to integrate the agency’s
competition and consumer protection investigative and policy divisions, with staff
responsible for both competition and consumer protection matters. Consultations with
the OFT suggest that the integration of functions has led to greater consistency in
outcomes and better use of available tools, with clear benefits in the areas of market
studies and behavioral economics in particular. 110 Other agencies such as the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission integrate competition and consumer policy in
divisions with specific sector responsibilities. The Canadian Competition Bureau
integrates competition and consumer protection by rotating staff between the competition
and consumer protection divisions. Equally important is to examine the agencies moving
away from integration, including the experience of the European Commission, France,
India, and Japan, where the agencies separated (or are in the process of separating) their
consumer protection and competition functions, maintaining linkages only at a policy
level rather than at an operational level. 111
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Regardless of the variety of arrangements throughout the world, the FTC’s dualfunction structure is a core component of its existence. The FTC in some ways may be a
leader in both of these areas. Continuing, useful focal points of the agency’s attention in
the years ahead include (1) whether the dual missions are adequately integrated among
the leaders and staff of the agency, and (2) ways to improve such integration. In
additional to its own internal review, there will be much for the FTC to learn from the
experience of agencies such as Canada’s Competition Bureau and the OFT, both of which
have undertaken ambitious measures to integrate the two functions.
2.

Coordination and Communication throughout the Agency

A longstanding concern of students of public administration is the skill with
which the individual components of an institution share information with each other and
otherwise coordinate their activities. The need to achieve effective intra-agency
information flows and cooperation is a matter of particular importance for the FTC.
Among other reasons, this is a function of the Commission’s dual-purpose mission and its
portfolio of research capabilities and other policy instruments that may be used by
multiple agency units. Whether the agency is consistent in communicating the central
tenets of the competition and consumer protection missions to agency staff and to outside
stakeholders is an indicator of its likely success in achieving its mission.
Foreign counterparts to the FTC have developed innovative mechanisms to
encourage internal information sharing. For example, the U.K. Office of Fair Trading
has a central “Know-How” team to disseminate agency research, policy efforts, and other
work. The OFT also uses a “knowledge sharing board,” which consists of a public folder
in all staff inboxes where staff can post inquiries to determine who at the agency has
worked in particular areas or to obtain sample work product from their colleagues.112
Panelists identified industry self-regulation as an area in which competition and
consumer protection interests will inevitably intersect and where cross-bureau
communication may considerably help in obtaining beneficial policy results. 113
Assessment of the competitive restraints that may flow from self-regulation often turns
on the legitimacy and importance of the consumer protection interest that produced the
self-regulatory initiative. The FTC – given the dual nature of its mission – is in a unique
position to balance the competing interests and promote self-regulation that fulfills the
consumer protection need without unnecessarily harming competition.
Panelists also discussed ways to integrate the agency’s disciplines through
bureaus and offices outside the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer
Protection. For example, former BCP Deputy Director Teresa Schwartz recommended
that the role of economists in the area of consumer protection should be more pronounced
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in practice, if not in the structure of the agency. 114 She also suggested that the FTC
would benefit from improving its economic tools and analysis with respect to consumer
behavior and the application of behavioral economics. 115
These suggestions are consistent with those made by other commentators who
encourage more integration of economists in agency activities. In a recent article, former
BE Director Luke Froeb, current BE Deputy Director Paul Pautler, and former EC Chief
Competition Economist Lars-Hendrik Röller discussed the importance of integrating and
employing BE’s tools in agency decision making at all levels. 116 They note that the FTC
is a functional organization, meaning that it is divided by certain subject areas to
maximize economies of scale. 117 The FTC hires specialized econometricians to analyze
specific problems and relies on staff economists to provide critiques and assessments of
cases, as well as to undertake ongoing research. 118 The authors posit that the
disadvantage of this design is in its potential impact on coordination between lawyers and
economists, which can be fixed with stronger horizontal contacts across practice areas. 119
They concluded that including economists in communication throughout the agency is
essential in coordinating enforcement and policy decisions. 120 Much as Bernstein and
Schwartz said, Froeb, Pautler, and Röller also suggested that incorporating economists
into the mainstream workings of the agency both fosters high-quality economic analysis
and promotes better communication of that analysis to the agency decision makers. 121
Panelists also addressed the diversity of policy offices across the agency. Susan
DeSanti, former Director of Policy Planning and then Deputy General Counsel for Policy
Studies within the Office of General Counsel, explained that there are reasons for the
existence of each policy office and that each one does slightly different things. 122 For
example, some decentralization may ensure that policy work is more directly related to
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the needs of the agency’s operational units. DeSanti, however, suggested that the agency
consider merging all the policy shops together into one. 123
In sum, panelists and other commentators have observed that the FTC can
improve its performance by building stronger links among the bureaus and other offices,
such as between competition and consumer protection staff, as well as by including
economists in all aspects of the agency’s work. Some panelists suggested that a policy
office could play a useful role in improving these links and disseminating important
insights throughout the agency.
3.

Placement of Economists within the Agency

As part of the FTC’s functional organization, discussed above, the FTC’s Ph.D.
economists are organized together within its Bureau of Economics. 124 Except for a sixyear period beginning in 1954, the Commission has had a separate economic unit since
the agency opened its doors, 125 and almost all of the economists have been located in that
organization. It is only since the 1970s, however, that the unit has been staffed primarily
with Ph.D.-level economists. 126
There are now over 100 competition agencies in the world, many of which have
Ph.D.-level economists on staff. The mix of Ph.D.s and undergraduate degree
economists varies substantially across the organizations. The larger and more prestigious
agencies tend to have a more Ph.D.-intensive mix. In some instances, the economists
work for attorneys, and in others they are combined in their own subgroup and report to
economist managers. Economic resources also can be organized in a hybrid form, in
which several economists are located in a head office, but economists also are sprinkled
among the attorney staff with attorney review of economic work. Variants of this hybrid
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form exist at the Federal Communications Commission, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, and the EC’s DG Comp.
As at other agencies with staff economists, economists at the FTC provide case
support; as at some of these agencies, economists at the FTC also provide case evaluation
and litigation support, and work on competition advocacy and policy-related research.
To a considerable extent, the Commission has come to rely on BE to serve as the
principal quality control agent with respect to the assessment of proposed enforcement
measures. BE very capably analyzes the economic strengths and weaknesses of proposed
cases, but it is not well disposed by training and experience to assess litigation risk. The
Commission would be well advised to consider broader use of devil’s advocate panels
within the Bureau of Competition, a device the agency has used from time to time to test
the quality of suggested enforcement matters.
Some agencies separate the case evaluation function to be done by a stand-alone
set of reviewers (sometimes called a “second pair of eyes”). These “scrutiny panels”
ordinarily involve peer review internally by a team of economists and attorneys. Variants
of this approach are employed by DG Comp and the Office of Fair Trading. In others,
like the FTC, the case support and case evaluation are combined in a “two hats” approach
in which case evaluation and case support are both done by the same individual. 127
Froeb, Pautler, and Röller note that the optimal form of economist organization
depends in large part on what the decision makers want and what the task is. Team
organization, which provides the strongest links among the various members, is clearly
optimal for litigation support, where intense focus and speed are often required and
policy analysis is a secondary goal at best. In that situation, the goal is simply to win the
litigation game, which explains why attorney-led teams typically have been used for
litigation.
For case analysis, decisions about bringing cases, and policy R&D, however, the
FTC’s existing model is more likely to provide the ultimate decision makers with highquality economic analysis and relevant information focused on questions of interest to
those decision makers. For these purposes, subordinating the economists to attorney
managers is likely to improve the coordination and agreement between the economist and
her manager, but it is also likely to have deleterious long-run effects of at least four
forms: (1) the loss of influence or “voice” of economics on policy and case selection, (2)
loss of an alternative information flow to the decision makers, (3) poorer staff skill
retention, and (4) inefficient use of economists with specialized skills or knowledge.
The existence of specialized skills – for example, expertise in vertical theory,
game theory, dynamic factors, econometrics, and specific industries – implies that
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economist staff should not be assigned to individual shops. Centralization allows the
agency to make better use of specialized skills across the alternative uses. 128
4.

Administrative Adjudication

Under Section 5(b) of the FTC Act, the Commission may challenge unfair or
deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of competition through administrative
adjudication. 129 When the Commission determines that there is “reason to believe” that a
law violation has occurred, the Commission can vote to issue a complaint setting forth its
charges. If the respondent elects to contest the charges, the complaint is adjudicated
before an ALJ in a trial-type proceeding conducted under the Commission’s Rules of
Practice. The matter is prosecuted by FTC “complaint counsel,” which consists of staff
from BC, BCP, or a regional office. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ issues an
initial decision setting forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law and
recommending either entry of an order to cease and desist or dismissal of the complaint.
Either complaint counsel or respondent, or both, may appeal the initial decision to the full
Commission.
Upon appeal of an initial decision, the Commission receives briefs, holds oral
argument, and thereafter issues its own final decision and order. The Commission’s final
decision is appealable by any respondent against which an order is issued. The
respondent may file a petition for review with any court of appeals within whose
jurisdiction the respondent resides or carries on business or where the challenged practice
was employed. If the court of appeals affirms the Commission’s order, the court enters
its own order of enforcement. The party losing in the court of appeals may seek review
by the Supreme Court. 130
Panelists shared a variety of opinions about the administrative adjudicatory
process, and many suggested modifications to modernize and make the system more
effective. Former General Counsel Stephen Calkins observed that elimination of the
administrative adjudication feature would undermine the Commission’s special role. 131
Calkins explained:
[O]ne of the alleged comparative advantages of the
Commission is that it can be an adjudicative body. And I
do think that it is – it’s important for this agency to get it
128
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right, to make it work, because it’s one of the reasons we
have a Federal Trade Commission. 132
Former BC Director Susan Creighton stated that administrative litigation is
particularly well suited for the most difficult and challenging cases the Commission
faces. 133 Darren Bowie, former BCP Assistant Director, echoed this sentiment, stating:
I think, as technology evolves and consumer protection
continues to evolve, there are new areas that do require . . .
thoughtful application of the Commission’s expertise.
Now, that also assumes that there are ALJs with the
expertise along the lines of some of the earlier discussion.
But I do think there is a place for Part III in consumer
protection in these new areas. 134
Some panelists suggested that administrative adjudication is not the proper forum
for the FTC to pursue cases, as the process of having the FTC both issue the complaint
and then become the appellate tribunal creates an appearance problem. For example,
former BC Director William Baer suggested that there is an inherent problem when the
process appears tilted as there is a reduction of the deference that a court would
eventually pay to the FTC on appeal. 135 Former BC advisor Thomas Krattenmaker said
he generally favors administrative adjudication but is concerned about the system’s
general effectiveness not only to assess critical facts but also to shape competition
policy. 136 He pointed out that there sometimes is an appearance that outcomes are
predetermined because the Commission acts as judge and jury relative to the complaint
that the Commissioners themselves issued. 137
Another criticism of FTC administrative adjudication involves the time it takes to
complete the proceedings. Janet McDavid said that the slow pace of the proceedings
undermines the effectiveness of administrative adjudication.138 Baer suggested that the
process needs to become faster – by eliminating steps, making the Part III process more
focused, and reaching final agency decisions in a more timely fashion. 139 Thomas
Campbell echoed this sentiment, suggesting that the process “takes forever” to yield
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results. 140 Bowie, however, pointed out that federal court consumer protection litigation
also can be very slow for nonfraud cases. 141 Furthermore, despite the time it takes, Baer
stated that Part III as a process is helpful and does affect business practices, regardless of
outcomes. 142 Krattenmaker suggested that the agency modernize Part III adjudication by
adopting a policy of issuing narrow complaints with several determinations of fact
already in place, setting strict instructions to ALJs to resolve specific disputes on facts,
and keeping the process on a tight time frame. 143 Krattenmaker offered that modifying
the system by narrowing the scope of the factual questions in cases may make it a more
useful policy device. 144
The Commission recently has adopted wide-ranging amendments to its rules of
practice intended, in part, to expedite administrative litigation. Among other things, the
new rules set a default time line (subject to modification in appropriate cases),
anticipating that cases will go to trial within eight months of the Commission’s
complaint, with merger cases in which the Commission sought a preliminary injunction
going to trial within five months. The rules also set a timetable for the Commission to
decide cases within the former scenario within 100 days after the ALJ’s initial decision,
and the latter within 50 days. 145
Panelists also discussed ALJ expertise in handling the types of administrative
cases before them. Baer explained that the selection process is not designed to choose
experts in competition or consumer protection law, but rather to appoint independent fact
finders that may actually have little expertise in the areas of FTC enforcement. 146
Campbell expressed concern that the lack of relevant expertise on the part of the ALJs
created a lack of confidence in their findings by the Commission. 147 He claimed that,
unlike a federal or state court judge who is given deference on findings of fact, ALJs are
not necessarily afforded such deference, as there have been several cases in which the
Commission has outright rejected the ALJ’s findings of fact. 148 This observation
supports the sentiment expressed by other panelists that the issues presented to ALJs
should be narrow questions of fact rather than expansive legal and policy questions. 149
Former BC Director Richard Parker echoed concern over ALJ selection and offered a
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solution to improving the ALJ ranks by drawing on antitrust and consumer protection
attorneys to act as ALJs. 150 It bears noting, however, that the ALJ selection process is
dictated by government-wide requirements and not by FTC rules or policy.
Looking ahead, the agency should determine what role Part III adjudication
should play in advancing competition and consumer protection law enforcement and
policy. In particular, the agency should consider when administrative adjudication is
most appropriate, as well as ways to improve the adjudicatory process.
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III.

Agency Resources

The FTC’s ability to achieve its mission depends in significant part on its
allocation and management of personnel, capital, and information resources. As one
commentator recently observed, “The failure to maintain adequate financial and human
resources impedes the [FTC’s and DOJ’s] activities on a number of fronts.” 151 This
chapter examines how these three factors can broadly affect agency performance.
A.

Personnel

How the FTC approaches recruiting, training, and retention of talented and
competent personnel bears significantly on the agency’s ultimate success. As roundtable
panelists and commentators have discussed, a recurring topic in agency assessments is
the caliber of the agency’s professional staff. 152 One panelist emphasized the importance
of having a competent staff 153 and observed that the agency needs to be “on top of [its]
game” in hiring. 154 FTC leadership has made recruiting highly competent staff a high
priority for the agency. 155 In recent years, the agency also has established new programs
to provide individual career development counseling to enhance the skills of its attorneys,
economists, and administrative professionals.
A related issue is determining by what criteria one should assess candidates for
FTC employment. There does not appear to be any single objective criterion to
determine whether or not staff is highly competent and skilled, although the factors likely
include some combination of educational background, relevant industrial or practical
experience, willingness to receive training, and a strong interest in the subject matter of
the agency’s work. Determining the ideal balance of these criteria has been the focus of
recruiting efforts at various times in the FTC’s history, and it has been altered at times to
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address specific needs relative to the agency’s agenda. 156 Given the evolution of
competition and consumer protection policy, and changes in the tools of economic
analysis, any self-assessment should consider how the agency can recruit and retain welltrained personnel in relevant areas of expertise, as well as how the agency trains and
educates its existing staff to remain current in such areas.
One challenge to the agency’s ability to recruit and keep professional staff is that
the FTC, as a government agency, faces significant competition from private sector
employers who typically can offer higher wages. The agency should continue to engage
Congress in a discussion about the possibility for augmenting the existing federal pay
scale to enable the FTC to make salary-based departures to the private sector less
frequent. There is serious question about whether the Commission’s capacity, and that of
other public agencies in the United States, can be sustained at acceptable levels if
compensation levels are not increased substantially.
To offset this pay disparity and recruit talented professionals, many panelists
suggested that the FTC employ a combination of first-rate training and ample
opportunities for staff to apply their skills and knowledge in interesting and innovative
legal and policy areas. Former BCP Deputy Director Teresa Schwartz discussed how it is
important to encourage staff to learn new things and to afford them opportunities to apply
their skills. 157 Staff exchanges, as discussed in Chapter IV.D, are an extremely effective
tool to exchange best practices, solidify bilateral relationships, and strengthen
enforcement cooperation with foreign counterparts, as well as add to an employee’s
knowledge base and skills. Many foreign counterpart agencies use staff exchanges
extensively as a way to promote staff development. 158
Likewise, former BC Director Molly Boast suggested that creating a strong
training and development program will not only help the FTC recruit talent, but it will
also serve to improve staff morale and retain talented attorneys and economists at the
agency. 159 The Commission has an extensive training program, including an agencywide annual training program for new attorneys and economists. BCP also has
implemented its own annual two-day training for new BCP attorneys to help them
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understand everything they need to know to bring successful BCP cases. Annually, BCP
also conducts a two-day litigation seminar at which staff discuss topics such as recent
cases, litigation developments, electronic discovery, ethics, and other significant
litigation topics. BCP management also encourages staff and management to take
additional courses as needed. Additionally, BCP established a specialized “training
academy” for staff that work on financial practices matters to teach topics such as the role
of federal and state regulators of financial institutions, the mortgage business,
fundamentals of credit reporting and credit scoring, payment cards and payment systems,
and the legal framework of credit discrimination. Similarly, the Bureau of Competition
sponsors ongoing annual classes for training staff attorneys, which are led by BC
attorneys, economists and accountants from the Bureau of Economics, and private
attorneys from around the country. The coursework includes classes on substantive
topics such as the merger guidelines, statistics, and accounting, as well as intensive twoto-four-day practice sessions on depositions, evidence, and trial advocacy. BE has a
seminar series that brings in academics doing work on topics of interest to the
Commission, as well as occasional intensive courses for its staff, such as a recently held
econometric course. Also, BE staff are encouraged to pursue research on topics of
interest to the Commission and to present that work in professional settings, both of
which serve to enhance staff skills.
Former BCP Assistant Director Paul Luehr projected that, over time, the
importance of technical expertise for FTC staff will become more pronounced. 160 In
particular, Luehr foresees an increased demand for attorneys with technical expertise:
I think it’s going to be more technical in terms of the level
of skills that’s going to be required of the investigators and
attorneys. That’s where the marketplace is going and that’s
going to be a requirement despite all those kids who went
to law school to avoid math. I think they’re all going to be
numerically and technically oriented. 161
Luehr forecast that the FTC will grow both in size and stature as a neutral broker with
respect to consumer data and market analysis, likely resulting in better overall regulation
and enforcement. 162 Another panelist encouraged the agency to direct resources to
ongoing training to inform staff about complex issues of consumer protection as well as
technological advances, to stay current on new scams, and to improve investigative
skills. 163
In the same vein of ensuring staff keep their skills current, former BC Director
William Baer encouraged better use of the performance evaluation process, suggesting
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that the agency consider whether it is a meaningful way to promote the knowledge and
skill development of staff. 164 He favored using the process not solely to reward excellent
performance but also as an opportunity to promote development in areas in which staff
performance is “sub-excellent.” 165
The London roundtable involved much discussion about developing talent within
the agency. Former General Counsel Debra Valentine advocated that, rather than relying
too heavily on outside academics to pursue research relevant to the FTC’s mission, “it is
the agency’s obligation to develop a lot of that talent in-house and not farm it out.” 166
Having economic strength in-house is critical, as former OFT Chief Executive Sir John
Vickers suggested, for no other reason than to have the ability to appraise critically the
economic theories brought before the agency by outside parties. 167
External consultations yielded several recommendations on how to improve the
recruiting, training, and retention of skilled professionals at the FTC. How the agency
meets the ongoing challenge of recruiting and retaining talented professionals will be a
key factor in the agency’s success. An important step toward meeting this challenge is to
confront the tension that arises when managers are told to achieve strong short-term
operational results – for example, winning the case of the moment – and to invest in the
long-term development of personnel they supervise. The top leadership of the
Commission must ensure that incentives for managers related to salaries, promotions, and
various agency awards reflect the importance to be paid to the career development of the
professional staff.
B.

Capital Resources

In several respects, an agency’s budget dictates the deployment of its resources
and thus dictates its ability to achieve its mission. Assessing an agency’s central
budgeting concerns and operating principles is an essential component of understanding
agency policy. 168 As one panelist phrased it, “The budget often does . . . associate
outputs to dollars. Frankly, that’s okay because there is a relationship there and that
works.” 169
Bernard Martin has examined how federal agency leadership pursues an agenda
that comports with the expectations of major stakeholders (for example, the executive
branch) and communicates the agency’s agenda to staff and other stakeholders through
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the budget process. 170 Federal funding resources are limited, fiscal pressures are
significant, and the sources for agency funding have become broader and more complex.
Martin makes the point that, despite these pressures and complexities, to be successful,
any agency leader must recognize that the budget – either one set by Congress or one
managed within the agency – and policy are inseparable. 171 For these reasons, a wellplanned and effective budget policy, including allocations within that budget, is essential
for the success of any agency. 172
The budget process is one tool with which to highlight a particular type of agency
activity, such as policy research and development. Former Commissioner Thomas Leary
discussed how various programs have greater priority if given greater prominence in the
agency’s budget. In advocating for a greater emphasis on agency R&D, he stated: “I’ve
always thought if we could rejigger the budget process to make [research and
development] part of our core mission, I’d do it, just to emphasize how important it
is.” 173 Another panelist echoed this sentiment when he discussed making a priority of
internal program reviews and evaluations. 174 He explained that the success of such
internal evaluations and their relevance to understanding what the agency has
accomplished and their impact on future conduct will be directly linked to the budgetary
emphasis they receive. 175 Former Chairman Timothy Muris agreed with such sentiments,
but noted that the budget process is a tool within the Commission that historically has not
been used “effectively” by agency leaders. 176
If, as Bernard Martin has suggested, agency budgets and policies are
inseparable, 177 the FTC’s budget must be able to strike a balance that both reflects agency
priorities, as expressed to staff and external stakeholders, and is sufficiently flexible to
respond to circumstances that require a shifting of budgetary priorities. For example,
allocation of BCP resources among the many tools with which it pursues its mission –
including enforcement actions, rulemaking, consumer and business education, policy
R&D efforts, and promotion of industry self-regulation – has shifted at different times to
meet different agency needs. Muris discussed how under his leadership privacy-related
issues required additional resources, and flexibility to deploy budgetary assets to address
these growing concerns enabled the agency to be on the forefront of many privacy
issues. 178 Baer similarly explained that when he joined the agency in 1995, the FTC had
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suffered a string of defeats in court; he thus sought to shift budgetary funds toward hiring
specialized lawyers and training more attorneys to improve litigation skills. 179
The Commission also can adjust its program priorities rapidly, as needed, to
address new problems in the marketplace triggered or exacerbated by external events.
For example, as the crisis in the housing market deepened, various businesses emerged
with false promises that they could stop foreclosure or obtain a loan modification in
exchange for a large upfront fee; in 2008, the Commission moved quickly to take legal
action against several such operations, and developed needed educational materials to
warn consumers how to avoid being victimized by rescue scams and how to obtain
assistance from legitimate and reliable sources. Former Director of Policy Planning
Susan DeSanti also discussed how budgetary resources could be focused to foster better
sharing of information within the agency to avoid redundancy and ensure that research
and enforcement resources are utilized most effectively. 180
Drawing from the comments of roundtable panelists and commentators more
generally, an analysis of the allocation of capital resources must extend beyond the
simple question of “how much is our budget?” It needs to assess how the agency
identifies areas for policy and enforcement emphasis, how leadership sets the policy
through its budget allocation, and how the agency can adjust to meet challenges presented
when political, social, and economic changes affecting the agency and its stakeholders
occur.
C.

Information

The Commission needs information to detect problems, investigate them, and
then, through litigation or otherwise, address them. Decisions concerning how to allocate
personnel and capital resources are largely dependent on the information the agency
obtains regarding marketplace conduct, mergers and other transactions, and legal,
economic, and technological developments. How well the agency obtains information,
the quality of the information it gets, and how it analyzes this information also must be
considered in connection with the FTC’s effective use of personnel and capital resources.
By the end of the twentieth century, the volume of information coming to the FTC
regarding potential enforcement targets or areas of concern for consumer protection had
increased dramatically. 181 With the proliferation of telemarketing fraud in the 1980s and
Internet fraud in the 1990s, the task of receiving and responding to complaints had
become too large to be handled by attorneys and investigators, whose time was largely
committed to conducting investigations and bringing enforcement actions. At the same
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time, the advent of electronic databases enabled information tracking in a way never
before possible, and the Commission became more active in seeking out information
about new trends or potential problems before they emerged in the form of consumer
complaints.
In response to the changes in the form, substance, and volume of marketplace
information, the FTC opened its Consumer Response Center to fulfill increasingly
important information gathering functions. Today, the agency receives and responds to
thousands of consumer and business complaints or inquiries each week. Complaints are
made available to FTC staff and other law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and
worldwide through the FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network, a secure online database that
includes not only complaints received by the FTC, but also by other selected government
agencies and nongovernmental entities. The Consumer Sentinel Network is accessible
only to law enforcement agencies, and about 1,700 such agencies worldwide are
members.
Additionally, the advent of the Internet not only expanded marketing venues, but
also has greatly facilitated advertising monitoring, particularly with the use of search
tools that can focus on particular products or claims. Internet “surfs” are now a regular
activity for BCP investigators, particularly with regard to claims for dietary supplements
and other health-related products. 182 BCP’s investigative leads also come from
monitoring other media, competitor complaints, referrals by self-regulatory bodies, and
other sources.
The Bureau of Competition gathers information about transactions and ongoing
conduct in the marketplace primarily through specific statutory reporting requirements.
Its main source of information comes from the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 183 requirement that
merging companies file certain data in advance of consummation. In general, a filing
party is required to identify the parties involved and the structure of the transaction as
well as provide certain documents, such as balance sheets and other financial data, and
copies of documents that have been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In addition, the parties are required to submit certain planning and evaluation documents
that pertain to the proposed transaction. To evaluate such proposed transactions, BC
often gathers information not only from the merging parties but also from competitors
and other industry players to discern the competitive status of the industry affected by the
merger. Also, on a much smaller scale, the FTC receives information about certain
settlements between brand-name drug manufacturers and generic drug applicants
pursuant to Title XI of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003. 184
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Apart from statutorily required filings, BC also gathers information to detect and
investigate possible law violations through complaints from, and inquiries directed to,
competitors, suppliers, and consumers. 185 It is not uncommon for lawyers in the antitrust
bar to contact the agency on behalf of clients – sometimes in relation to nonreportable
mergers or other conduct of concern to their clients – and identify conduct that may
violate the antitrust laws. (One panelist cautioned against discounting or categorically
ignoring complaining competitors as a source of case generation, explaining that,
although not all competitor complaints are legitimate, they are a source of potentially
useful information. 186 ) Similarly, members of Congress send constituent complaints to
BC regarding possible anticompetitive conduct observed in their jurisdictions. BC also
uses an email notification system (Antitrust@ftc.gov) and a complaint phone line to
gather complaints that may warrant BC inquiry. FTC staff also have created a program to
monitor competitive conditions in the gasoline industry, and they receive data regularly
regarding prices and other conditions in the industry. 187 In addition, staff can glean
relevant information from public sources. 188
Further, in both the competition and consumer protection areas, the agency gathers
relevant industry and marketplace information by convening conferences, workshops, and
hearings to address current and emerging issues in these areas. Such events have become an
important means through which the Commission and its staff identify problems and develop
appropriate responses. In particular, they have allowed the FTC to solicit the views of
experts and interested parties outside the agency – including those from industry, consumer
groups, academia, and other federal, state, or local agencies – to help the Commission better
understand its role and formulate the most appropriate responses in particular problem
areas. 189
The FTC also obtains information from other competition and consumer
protection agencies, both foreign and domestic. Mutual sharing is facilitated by the
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Commission’s broad authority to share information (including most materials subject to
limits on public disclosure) with domestic law enforcement agencies. 190
As to sharing with foreign agencies on competition matters, the FTC shares and
obtains information from foreign counterparts pursuant to formal and informal
arrangements that are consistent with the FTC’s statutory obligations of confidentiality.
Formal arrangements include bilateral cooperation agreements,191 informal arrangements
under an OECD Recommendation, 192 and agreements pursuant to the terms of the
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (“IAEAA”). 193 Absent an
IAEAA agreement (and the Commission has entered into an IAEAA agreement only with
Australia) or the consent of the submitter (which is usually forthcoming), 194 the
Commission cannot share most of its nonpublic submissions with foreign enforcers.
Nevertheless, in addition to publicly available information that the FTC may share with
foreign agencies, it also shares relevant information that it is empowered but not
mandated to keep confidential. Such information can include the fact that an
investigation is taking place, its subject matter, and agency analysis.
In addition to international information sharing through Consumer Sentinel, the FTC
shares and obtains information from its foreign counterparts in consumer protection and
privacy matters both informally and pursuant to formal bilateral cooperation agreements,
bilateral and multilateral memoranda of understanding and other agreements, and through
networks such as the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network and the
London Action Plan. In 2006, the Commission’s ability to cooperate with its foreign
counterparts was enhanced by the U.S. SAFE WEB Act, 195 which amended the FTC Act.
This law includes provisions that enable foreign law enforcement authorities and private
entities more easily to provide information to the FTC in cross-border matters, including
matters involving assets located in foreign jurisdictions that are subject to recovery by the
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Commission. The U.S. SAFE WEB Act also enables the FTC to obtain information for
foreign consumer protection agencies and to share with such agencies most information
otherwise subject to prohibitions on disclosure. 196
Of course, like other enforcement agencies, the FTC also has enforcement-related
authority to issue compulsory process, such as subpoenas and civil investigative
demands. Apart from a particular investigation, however, the FTC also has unique
powers to obtain information – in both competition and consumer protection matters –
pursuant to Section 6 of the FTC Act. 197 Specifically, Section 6(b) empowers the
Commission to require the filing of “annual or special . . . reports or answers in writing to
specific questions” for the purpose of obtaining information about “the organization,
business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other corporations,
partnerships, and individuals” of the entities to whom the inquiry is addressed. 198 The
Commission’s 6(b) authority enables it to conduct wide-ranging economic studies that do
not have a specific law enforcement purpose. Section 6 also authorizes the Commission,
subject to applicable confidentiality constraints, to “make public from time to time”
portions of the information that it obtains, where disclosure would serve the public
interest. 199 Such disclosure typically takes the form of a report issued by FTC staff or the
Commission.
The FTC used its 6(b) authority in several recent competition research efforts.
For example, former Chairman Robert Pitofsky signed the 6(b) orders in April 2001 that
led to a 2002 report on generic drug entry. 200 Other studies in which 6(b) orders were
used include the 2005 study of pharmacy benefit managers and the impact, if any, of
mail-order pharmacy ownership, 201 and a 2006 report on gasoline pricing manipulation
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and post-Hurricane Katrina gasoline price increases. 202 In addition, the Bureau of
Consumer Protection recently used such 6(b) special orders to obtain data from 44 food
producers to measure the extent of food marketing to children and adolescents, 203 and
from 12 alcohol suppliers to examine the placement of alcohol ads in various media. 204
Whether the FTC uses its 6(b) authority in a particular context depends on
whether there are important policy topics that require investigation that could not be done
with publicly available or voluntarily submitted data. Certainly, responding to
compulsory process requests (or even voluntary requests) may be a costly process for the
respondent firms, and using the process can be time-consuming for the agency. It is,
therefore, not undertaken lightly. Although recent use of the technique has been valuable
to the agency in gathering relevant information, the benefits of any particular study are
hard to estimate. As a result, any cost-benefit analysis involving the use of the agency’s
6(b) powers necessarily involves a careful consideration of the burdens imposed on
recipients of 6(b) orders, as well as the appropriate amount of agency personnel and
capital resources to devote to such efforts.
Roundtable panelists provided several observations and recommendations regarding
the FTC’s information collection efforts. Beyond the formal methods discussed above,
panelists identified other means to obtain relevant information and data on emerging issues in
support of potential enforcement actions. Former OPP Director Susan DeSanti described
how, following a staff meeting at which an information gap in an area under investigation
was identified, one staff member simply reached out to another federal agency (outside the
FTC’s traditional jurisdiction) and forged an agreement to gather the necessary information,
thus allowing the FTC to pursue a particular item on its enforcement agenda. 205 Former BC
Assistant Director Joseph Kattan suggested improving information analysis by linking more
closely the enforcement mission with the research mission, and tapping economics
departments outside the agency to help produce this work. 206 Rebecca Fisher from the Texas
Attorney General’s office discussed how information is shared between the state attorneys
general and liaisons at the FTC, which has helped both entities learn about conduct and share
research and insights relative to issues important to both groups’ constituents. 207
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Information is one of the essential resources of the agency, and, as discussed
above, the Commission has several methods to gather and analyze information needed to
establish and pursue its priorities. Given the ongoing shifts in technology and data
creation, however, the agency must continually evaluate its methods of obtaining the
information necessary to maintain its effectiveness.
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IV.

The Agency’s Relationships

The FTC has significant relationships with various types of external entities,
including stakeholders and enforcement partners. The Commission is subject to
oversight by Congress, which can legislate particular tasks, obligations, or limits on its
activities. In part because of concurrent jurisdiction or related interests, the FTC
interacts, in various ways, with federal, state, and foreign authorities. In addition, the
FTC’s broad jurisdiction over consumer protection and competition matters affects a
wide array of industries and actors, making quite diverse the interests of consumer and
business groups – and individual consumers and businesses – affected by the agency.
Finally, relations with academia can substantially assist the Commission in fulfilling its
mission.
Former BCP Director Jodie Bernstein explained that maintaining relationships
with state agencies, congressional committees, consumer groups, industry groups, and
others is essential to ensuring that stakeholders in the FTC have access to the agency. 208
Panelist Jonathan Breul also observed that networking and relationship building is an area
of growing importance, and the degree to which an agency incorporates good networking
into its practices may signal its ultimate success.209 Breul also suggested that these
relationships can help the agency anticipate surprises and that the FTC should have the
ability to identify the stakeholders on any given issue. 210
Three major policy considerations dictate extensive and augmented efforts by the
FTC to build better links to other agencies. The first is that problems in economic
performance that the FTC observes sometimes may be rooted in the policy choices of
other government bodies. The first-best solution to an observed problem may be an
adjustment in another policy regime. Closer relations with the relevant agencies can
assist the FTC in encouraging other government bodies to make the desired policy
change.
A second consideration involves the fact of shared or concurrent authority for
specific forms of intervention. For the sake of clarity in public policy and predictability
for business managers, it is helpful for agencies with shared responsibilities to converge
on superior analytical techniques and to adopt procedures that minimize compliance
costs.
The third consideration is that collaboration among agencies may achieve results
that initiative by a single body cannot attain. For example, cooperation among
208
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government bodies, particularly in matters of international commerce, may be essential to
address phenomena that cross the boundaries of authority imposed on any single agency.
Information sharing and common planning also may enable government bodies to pool
resources and undertake more ambitious efforts to detect and prosecute improper
conduct, or to diagnose the causes of apparent shortfalls in economic performance.
Effective cooperation can be a major source of improved productivity among regulatory
authorities and may be a necessary means for such bodies to meet the demands they face
today amid intense pressure to achieve more with the same amount of resources.
This chapter examines how the agency can work with all of these actors, as well
as what steps the FTC may undertake to improve and enhance relationships that can build
and maintain support for the FTC’s mission, leverage the agency’s resources by enlisting
others to advance the Commission’s mission, and draw on others to help the Commission
detect competition and consumer protection problems and conduct its own investigations.
A.

Relationship with Congress

As an independent agency created by Congress, the FTC has an important
relationship with Congress as an institution and with individual members of Congress.
Primarily through its Office of Congressional Relations, the FTC works closely with
congressional committees and subcommittees, individual members, and their staffs,
responding to inquiries regarding competition and consumer protection matters, testifying
before congressional panels on FTC policies and programs, preparing reports for
Congress, and providing congressional staff with the FTC’s free consumer publications
for distribution to their constituents.
A number of panelists stressed the importance of the FTC managing carefully its
relationship with Congress. One way to envision the FTC’s work is that its activities
involve either accumulating political capital or spending political capital. In choosing
new programs, the agency must be attentive to the balance of its political capital account.
An agency that chronically runs major deficits is likely headed for trouble.
Panelist Jerry Ellig explained that the success of the FTC lies in maintaining
strong congressional relationships, which can be forged through the FTC explaining to
members of Congress that the success of the FTC’s mission is good politics for the
members. 211 Anna Davis, the former Director of the FTC’s Office of Congressional
Relations, agreed with Ellig regarding the need to inform members of Congress that FTC
success is their success. Davis noted that one of the challenges the FTC faces is
educating congressional stakeholders on the value to consumers of the agency’s
competition mission. Fundamental consumer protection concepts – such as stopping
deception and fraud – are straightforward and their value to constituents is more
obvious. 212 As Davis noted, however, the ways in which consumers benefit from
competition in the marketplace is not always readily apparent:
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One of the favorite calls I ever took when I was in the
Congressional Relations Office was a [congressional] staff
person called up and said, I heard from a constituent and he
is very upset about gas prices. And I said, yes, ma’am, I
know there is a lot of that going around. And she said,
well, he is complaining because he has to drive around all
over the place, all of the gas stations in his city have
different prices and he has to drive around to find the
lowest. Can’t you make them all the same? So, it was sort
of hard to know how to answer that and sound respectful.
But that is a piece of it . . . . 213
Davis also explained that nurturing congressional relationships also requires
managing staff turnover. Her office took active steps to establish and maintain regular
communication with congressional offices to mitigate the possible adverse effects of
disruptions arising from staff and congressional turnover. 214 As an example of the need
to maintain ongoing relationships with Congress, Davis pointed to the efforts her office
made on the U.S. SAFE WEB Act, which involved many years of work with several
congressional staffs to get the bill passed. 215
The maintenance of good relationships with key legislators and committees can
be complicated by the dynamic nature of the political process. Changes in aggregate
congressional preferences over time may mean that the legislators who currently review
and critique the Commission’s projects are not the legislators who encouraged the FTC to
pursue the projects in the first place.216 Past experience suggests the need for the
Commission to carefully monitor adjustments in legislative preferences and to test the
agency’s assumptions about the degree of congressional support for specific initiatives or
programs.
B.

Relationships with Other Federal Agencies

Most of the FTC’s dealings with other federal agencies – like most of the
Commission’s dealings with state and international agencies – fall into two broad
categories: policy matters and enforcement cooperation.
Due to the wide breadth of the FTC’s activities and overlapping jurisdiction in
certain substantive areas of the law, the FTC has numerous policy and enforcement
relationships with other federal government entities, including the Department of Justice,
the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the federal banking regulators,
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the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Communications Commission,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.
Referring to the importance of relationships with other national agencies, a
panelist at the Ottawa roundtable stated:
[Another relevant criterion] is the effectiveness of the
relationships between the antitrust authority or authorities
and other government authorities, especially those in
overlapping sectors, be it telecom, transportation, energy
and so on. It is critically important, in my view, looking at
not just our jurisdictions, Canada and the United States, but
evolving jurisdictions – and China is but one that you will
know quite well – to try to avoid unnecessary duplication
and decisions that may be at odds, in whole or in part, [and]
different processes and uncertainties that result from
parallel government bodies looking at similar conduct or
the same transaction. Ameliorating those differences and
uncertainties is a sign of great success that an authority
should recognize. It is very important to investors and
business communities and stakeholders at large. 217
Through its advocacy program, the FTC advises other federal agencies across a
wide array of areas, such as food labeling, lending practices, and energy regulation. 218
FTC staff also frequently consults informally with other federal agency staff. Through
these formal and informal consultations, the FTC has been able not only to coordinate
efforts with these agencies but also to influence their work – and secure assistance in the
FTC’s work – in ways that benefit consumers and competition. 219
Relations with other federal agencies are important to the FTC’s consumer
protection mission because of the overlapping jurisdiction that exists in certain areas (for
example, the shared jurisdiction over consumer credit with the federal banking agencies)
and the statutory law enforcement relationships in others (for example, the FTC’s
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dependence on the Justice Department to pursue civil penalty cases). The relationship
between the FTC and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is an example of a
relationship that is critical for both entities, as well as for each entity’s stakeholders.
Both the FDA and FTC are committed to protecting consumer welfare and promoting
competition in the food and drug industries. The agencies thus have a longstanding
agreement whereby they coordinate their efforts with respect to the food and drug
markets. 220
A recent example of effective coordination with another federal regulatory agency
was the initiation of parallel actions by the FTC and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) against a company charged with deceptive credit card marketing
targeted to consumers in the subprime lending market. 221 The two agencies worked
together closely, sharing information during their investigations and each using its
respective authority to address the consumer protection law violations uncovered. Both
agencies challenged the practices of the primary credit card marketer (which contested
the jurisdiction of both agencies). In addition, each agency also challenged the conduct
of related entities subject to its particular jurisdiction – banks that issued the credit cards
were charged by the FDIC and a debt collection subsidiary of the credit card marketer
was charged by the FTC. The two agencies coordinated their separate legal proceedings
and ultimate settlements of the cases.
The FTC’s Criminal Liaison Unit is another important aspect of the agency’s
coordination with other government authorities. The program was created in 2003 to
spur an increase in consumer fraud prosecutions through more systematic coordination
between the FTC and criminal law enforcement authorities. The FTC’s CLU reviews
current investigations and recent FTC litigation to select those cases that involve clearly
criminal behavior, provides the relevant information to criminal investigators and
prosecutors, and coordinates joint investigations and prosecutions. Since the creation of
the CLU, prosecutors have indicted 281 FTC defendants, their associates, or others
investigated by the FTC for consumer fraud. To date, 191 of these defendants have pled
guilty or been convicted. Of the 150 defendants who have been sentenced, 38 have
received prison sentences of more than seven years. Moreover, in Fiscal Year 2008, six
FTC defendants have received sentences of more than 20 years.
Participants in the international consultations at the OECD Committee on
Consumer Policy emphasized that collaborative relationships with other governmental
agencies are critical to developing sound consumer protection policies. Many of the
OECD member countries coordinate consumer policy initiatives across their domestic
government ministries and agencies. For example, Finland, Japan, and Korea have
intergovernmental working groups that consult on consumer policy issues and develop
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multiyear programs. 222 Other participants from foreign consumer protection agencies
emphasized the importance of coordination among agencies that have jurisdiction over
consumer-related matters from the consumer’s point of view – after all, to a consumer,
“government is government is government.” 223 Participants in the international
consultations in Mexico City expressed interest in having the FTC serve as an
intermediary with respect to other U.S. federal agencies (including banking agencies, the
Federal Aviation Administration, and the FDA) due to the existence of multiple agencies
in the United States that deal with consumer protection issues. 224 These types of issues in
the international arena point to the importance of strong relationships with other
consumer-related regulators and law enforcement agencies within the United States.
In the competition area, the FTC’s most central interagency relationship on the
federal level is with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. The FTC and
DOJ have significant overlapping jurisdiction with respect to antitrust enforcement and
policy. For example, the agencies share antitrust jurisdiction over most mergers and
business conduct. 225 Given these overlaps, the two agencies have developed premerger
and enforcement clearance and communication procedures to avoid duplicative
enforcement in competition matters. 226
The history of the relationship between the two agencies has been marked by both
agreement and times at which the agencies differed on competition policy. As a recent
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Although the most extensive attempt to improve the process was abandoned in the face of congressional
reaction, see Timothy Muris, Comments on the FTC-DOJ Merger Clearance Process Before the Antitrust
Modernization Commission, at 13-19 (Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Muris, AMC Comments], available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Muris_Statement.pdf (describing criticism
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Michael Denger, Caswell O. Hobbs, Janet L. McDavid & Sylvia H. Walbot, 60 Minutes with the
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(noting the modifications made to the then 45-year-old liaison agreement between the FTC and DOJ
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HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007 (2008), available at
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example of the former, the FTC and DOJ jointly conducted a workshop, drafted a report,
and pursued enforcement actions in the real estate brokerage area. 227 Similarly, the two
agencies conducted hearings and issued a joint report relating to conduct in the health
care industry. 228 Other examples of the agencies seeking to identify common ground in
overlapping enforcement areas include the creation of joint guidelines, such as those
addressing horizontal mergers, collaborations among competitors, and the licensing of
intellectual property. 229 These reports and guidelines were all prepared jointly by the
FTC and DOJ and reflect symmetrical thinking with respect to the best enforcement
policies and practices in these antitrust subject areas.
There also have been areas of disagreement, which have not only become sources
of tension between the agencies, but also have created some uncertainty among other
agency stakeholders. For example, FTC/DOJ discord arose in 2006, when the U.S.
Solicitor General, with the assistance of the Antitrust Division, advocated in an amicus
curiae brief that the Supreme Court deny the FTC’s petition for certiorari in the FTC v.
Schering-Plough matter. 230 More recently, in 2008, after working jointly for several
months in conducting workshops, the two agencies could not reach agreement on a report
relating to Sherman Act Section 2 enforcement. DOJ independently released a report, 231
which the FTC did not join. 232
The international consultations focused on the FTC’s relationship with the DOJ,
and there was consensus that the different approaches (or perceived differences in
approaches) by the FTC and DOJ significantly reduced the ability of the U.S. agencies,
individually or together, to be influential in the international arena. 233 Regarding the
227

See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION IN THE REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY (2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/realestate/V050015.pdf (discussing the workshop and competitionrelated issues pertaining to the real estate brokerage industry).

228
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See, e.g., Bloom, London Tr. at 166 (“There is an impression internationally that the two agencies are
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strength in having different arguments and debating different sides of an issue, but if you are seeking to
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Section 2 report, for example, while a few observers praised the willingness of the
agencies to air differences of opinion, the vast majority viewed the divisiveness as
damaging the efforts of the U.S. antitrust agencies to exercise international leadership. 234
For those within the ambit of both the FTC’s and DOJ’s enforcement
jurisdictions, comity and consistency of views between the agencies is important because
it provides certainty for consumers and market participants. 235 Also, it can allow the
agencies to operate more efficiently. 236 Thus, as the FTC works to improve its
performance, it should consider how to improve its relationship with the DOJ to enhance
the clarity, transparency, and consistency of antitrust enforcement. 237
C.

Relationships with State Agencies

As with federal agencies, the FTC engages with state enforcers and other state
institutions to address overlapping issues in competition and consumer protection
enforcement, as well as policy matters.
On broad policy matters, the FTC often advises state legislatures and agencies
through advocacy filings. 238 Additionally, the Commission sometimes participates in or
helps organize meetings with the National Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”)
to address issues of policy. The first of a series of annual meetings, for example, was
held on September 21, 2006, when the FTC joined with NAAG to sponsor a workshop,
Andreas Reindl also emphasized this point, saying, “if the two agencies cannot agree . . . [t]his undermines
the leadership role of the agencies,” and further suggesting that other agencies do a better job of
minimizing the appearance of differences. Reindl, NY Tr. at 116-17.
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See, e.g., ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 42-43 (discussing how interagency disagreements
exacerbate already difficult issues related to antitrust enforcement).
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See Muris, AMC Comments, supra note 226, at 11-12 (recounting that after the 2003 clearance
agreement was reached, Muris received a memo from Robert Jones, the FTC’s Clearance Officer, who
wrote, “At this moment, for the first time in my tenure as Clearance Officer, perhaps for the first time in the
modern clearance era, there are no pending clearance requests. None, nada, zip. World peace will
undoubtedly follow.”).
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See, e.g., ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 6, 42-43 (advocating that the two agencies reach
accords on enforcement clearance issues and consistency on enforcement policies).
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See, e.g., FTC Staff Comment before the Massachusetts Department of Public Health Concerning
Proposed Regulation of Limited-Service Clinics (Sept. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/10/v070015massclinic.pdf (advising against the imposition of rules that would
prohibit limited-service clinics from advertising, among other things, certain pricing information); Letter
from FTC Staff to the Rules Committee of the Superior Court for the State of Connecticut (May 17, 2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/V070006.pdf (advising against the imposition of rules that may restrict
competition between attorneys and nonattorneys for services that do not necessarily require the skill or
knowledge of a lawyer); Letter from FTC Staff to the Office of Court Administration, Supreme Court of
New York (Sept. 14, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ os/2006/09/V060020-image.pdf (advocating
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benefit). See also infra Chapter VI.B.3.
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attended by more than 50 representatives of state attorney general offices, on key issues
in the petroleum industry.
On the enforcement side, comity with state antitrust and consumer protection
agencies has become increasingly important given state involvement in many federal
enforcement actions. Former Chairman Robert Pitofsky described his experience in this
area as follows:
Building on relations with the state attorneys general that
Janet Steiger had strengthened as Chairman, we recruited
partners for dozens of sweeps targeting such frauds as
bogus scholarship referral services, phony prize
promotions, worthless diet aids, business opportunity
scams, so called “credit repair” services, scams targeting
small businesses, and work-at-home schemes. 239
Offering a state enforcer viewpoint, Rebecca Fisher of the Texas Attorney General’s
office stated that in her experience the FTC has placed significant emphasis on
developing these relationships to the benefit of the states and the FTC. 240 Fisher
explained that, although communication between the federal and state agencies was weak
20 years ago, she now has good communication with the FTC, which helps in her state’s
enforcement work. 241
Other roundtable participants stated that the FTC has worked to build
relationships across boundaries with other enforcement agencies – a natural role for a
federal consumer protection agency.242 One panelist stated that although the states and
the FTC are to a large degree doctrinally consistent in their enforcement approaches, in
his view, the biggest problem is that antitrust enforcement at the state level has become
more interesting to the attorneys general themselves, which means that decisions about
enforcement are made at a “political” level rather than an antitrust staff level. 243 This can
make coordination on substantive law more difficult.
Today, the FTC often conducts investigations jointly with state attorneys general
because both have an interest in the particular merger or conduct at issue. One panelist
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Conversation with Muris and Pitofsky, supra note 27, at 793. See also Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 61
(addressing the importance of law enforcement sweeps: “And you only get that kind of bang for the buck
both in terms of business education and consumer education if you involve yourself in coordinated actions
and realize that those coordinated actions provide you with a teachable moment.”).
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endorsed the benefits of such joint investigations on the ground that state AGs are
uniquely positioned to recover money on behalf of injured consumers. 244 Such joint
investigations may give rise to two possible sources of conflict, however. First, the FTC
and the state AGs may disagree on the substantive law and economic analysis that may
apply to the merger or conduct. Second, the existence of multiple enforcers may result in
procedural conflicts or differences that raise the costs for the parties as well as the
agencies. 245 There are ways to minimize conflict, however. One panelist, a senior
attorney in the Illinois AG’s office, explained that although FTC attorneys involved in
joint investigations are not always experienced in working with states, the FTC usually
makes strong efforts to have someone with experience on such investigations help
coordinate the matter. 246
Some commentators have stated that more should be done to develop FTC-state
relationships. The ABA Transition Report described the present state of these
relationships in competition enforcement as one that “generally works well.” 247
However, the ABA also called for the FTC, DOJ, and the states to place greater emphasis
on coordinating competition and consumer protection enforcement to avoid redundancy
and inconsistent enforcement. 248 The ABA recommended that the agencies make it a
greater priority to establish formal coordination protocols and to resolve differences in
operational procedures, particularly related to merger review. 249
Fisher explained that there are opportunities for the agency to work with state
AGs in consumer and business education and advocated that the FTC take the lead in this
area in the future. 250 The Commission has in fact done so, working both with NAAG as
well as individual states. 251 A New York AG official suggested that potential areas for
future collaboration between the FTC and the states include green marketing, alcohol
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Id. (“States are independent enforcers of federal and state antitrust laws. In the context of merger
review, this overlap in jurisdiction creates the potential for simultaneous investigations of a transaction and
differing and/or inconsistent enforcement outcomes at both the state and federal levels. . . . The federal
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For example, the Commission has worked on consumer and business education with individual states
that are involved in the FTC’s enforcement sweeps and task forces. Among notable and recent examples is
the telemarketing sweep of May 2008, where the Commission provided materials on telemarketing fraud
for its state partners. See infra Chapter VI.B.8.
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marketing, and scrutiny of the relief obtained in private consumer class actions. 252
Former BCP Assistant Director Paul Luehr maintained that there are also new areas in
which the FTC sometimes should allow the states to “move out in front” and bring the
first cases; the FTC could then follow the state actions with a federal injunction to ensure
that there is “a kind of federal bar set across the country.” 253
William Brauch of the Iowa AG’s office suggested that the BCP division directors
make greater efforts to coordinate with AGs’ staff in particular substantive areas. 254
Brauch also discussed how, with respect to specific enforcement actions and general
policy themes, there is a desire to have state agencies brought into the mix earlier,
especially when these matters involve overlapping parties. 255 In this vein, former BCP
Deputy Director Teresa Schwartz also suggested that FTC staff receive training and
broader exposure to other law enforcement agencies, particularly in the area of criminal
law. 256 Fisher also noted that the states have a liaison at the FTC on competition-related
matters, which has been useful for coordination and planning, and suggested that a
designated liaison for the states on consumer protection matters may be useful. 257
Disagreements between government bodies will inevitably arise, 258 but the
Commission’s relations with state agencies, like its relations with federal and foreign
agencies, provide a basis to develop better competition and consumer protection policies
and to advance enforcement through specific cases.
D.

Relationships with Foreign Enforcement Agencies

The FTC has dealt with cross-border commerce for over 90 years; it had an
Export Trade Division in 1918. 259 In recent years, though, building and maintaining
relations with foreign authorities has become an increasingly critical element of the
FTC’s programs, including its enforcement program. In addition to bilateral relations
with foreign counterparts, the Commission has developed and expanded multilateral
relations through such organizations as the OECD, the International Competition
Network (“ICN”), the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network, the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and regional organizations such
as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. This work has been coordinated through
international shops devoted to competition and consumer protection, previously located
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See FTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE
30, 1918, at 37 (1918), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/ar1918.pdf.
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in the Bureaus of Competition and Consumer Protection and the General Counsel’s
Office, and, since 2007, consolidated in the Office of International Affairs. 260
Among other functions, the former Export Trade Division monitored competitionrelated developments in other countries and responded to complaints alleging misconduct
by domestic firms doing business overseas. 261 Today, the Commission engages foreign
counterparts on policy and enforcement matters. As the recent ABA Transition Report
noted, “The importance of international cooperation between antitrust agencies in
ensuring the effective and coherent enforcement of antitrust laws around the world has
never been greater or more complex to achieve.” 262 The Commission’s strong personal
relationships with foreign counterparts facilitate international cooperation efforts, 263
which are important because, as one roundtable participant noted, contact at a personal
level is “a factor that should not be underestimated in how the whole international
cooperation process works.” 264
Given the importance of competition as an organizing principle for economies,
and given such developments as the spread of competition-based regimes around the
world, the growth of international fraud in the era of the Internet, and the increasing
transmission in legitimate international commerce of sensitive data for business purposes,
creating international questions of privacy and data security, the Commission’s
engagement with foreign governments on policy matters serves to inform the policy of
other nations. By describing how the U.S. agencies approach various issues, the FTC
hopes to provide useful information for other nations to consider as they make their own
choices regarding market-based or regulation-based approaches to policy questions.
In addition, given the importance of the exchange of ideas and strategies, these
interactions with foreign counterparts can inform an agency’s domestic agenda and
practices. Consultation participants articulated a belief that agencies become better at

260

See supra note 108.

261
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what they are doing by participating internationally. 265 Close relationships often
encourage both the import and export of best practices. 266
Many of the overseas consultations highlighted the need for agency leadership to
have “empathy” or “emotional intelligence.” 267 Jorge Padilla, for example, explained
this capacity as being able to articulate a message in a way that overcomes the audience’s
confirmation bias; 268 Rachel Brandenburger described it as knowing when to lead and
when to step back and encourage initiatives behind the scenes, stepping on and off the
gas. 269 There was general consensus that when the leadership of the agency has high
emotional intelligence, is personally, directly, and visibly involved, and is willing to deal
with international peers one-on-one, it contributes substantially to the effectiveness of an
agency’s international efforts.
Beyond matters of broad policy, many important FTC cases involve foreign
parties, foreign-located evidence or assets, or parallel review with other agencies. Thus,
effective cooperation with agencies outside the United Sates is a necessity. Mergers and
business conduct frequently have adverse effects on competition and consumers in more
than one jurisdiction. Cooperation among the affected jurisdictions avoids conflicts in
enforcement and leads to effective coordination of measures to eliminate such effects. 270
In the competition area, enforcement cooperation between the FTC and foreign agencies
has occurred most frequently in merger cases; 271 while less frequent, there have been
significant instances of case cooperation in conduct (for example, monopolization)
matters as well. In the consumer protection area, the agency has cooperated with foreign
265
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266

Temple Lang, Brussels Tr. at 120. See also ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 16 (“A key
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authorities on a variety of cases involving cross-border issues, including consumer fraud.
One area in particular – telemarketing fraud – has resulted in considerable cooperation
between the FTC and Canadian authorities. 272 International cooperation also has
emerged as a critical tool for investigations involving spam, spyware, and other online
threats. 273 The FTC has cooperated with foreign counterparts on a number of matters
implicating consumer privacy and data security issues and continues to develop its
relationships with foreign authorities to enhance cooperation in such cross-border
matters. 274
As indicated above, the level and quality of interaction is determined in part by
the rapport agency heads and staff have with their counterparts. Building relationships
that facilitate cooperation and exchange, however, can be complex. As John Fingleton,
Chief Executive of the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading, explained, “The
benefits [of relationships with foreign counterparts] are so diffuse, because they arise in a
case here, a case there[.] [T]hey turn out to be enormously valuable, but in actual fact it
is very difficult ex ante to identify that.” 275 Moreover, these relationships require
significant investment. Fingleton continued, “[A] lot of the work that goes on is not just
about best practice and importing that, but actually having that infrastructure [of agency
relationships]. You need more lattices than the bare essentials to deal with the fact that
people change, and the number 2s and the number 3s need to know each other because
they will be the number 1s in many instances later. So you do need to overinvest I think
in [the] capacity for that, and that is a difficult thing to justify.” 276
Another important way in which the Commission works with foreign colleagues
is by providing technical assistance to both younger and more mature agencies.
Technical assistance projects and programs can allow an agency to improve its
relationships with foreign counterparts and provide a significant opportunity to engage in
272

The FTC is a participant in six mass-marketing fraud enforcement partnerships with other federal, state,
provincial, and local law enforcement agencies from the United States and Canada. One recent example of
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cooperation from law enforcement authorities in Australia and New Zealand. See FTC Press Release, FTC
Shuts Down, Freezes Assets of Vast International Spam E-Mail Network (Oct. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/10/herbalkings.shtm.
274

For example, in 2007, through an OECD Recommendation, the FTC and its foreign partners called for
strengthening cooperation among privacy regulators and law enforcement authorities to promote greater
protection for personal information. See OECD, RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION IN
THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS PROTECTING PRIVACY (2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/28/38770483.pdf.

275

Fingleton, London Tr. at 161.

276

Id. at 158-59. Similar statements were made at the consultation with the Canadian Competition Bureau,
stressing the importance of strong relationships at the case handler level. Consultation with Canadian
Competition Bureau, Sept. 17, 2008.

71

the type of export and import activity that promotes cooperation and convergence. The
FTC has provided technical assistance to countries in the developing world since the
early 1990s, primarily using funds provided by the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency. 277 Much of the FTC’s
assistance has taken the form of placing long-term advisors with newly established
competition and, in a few cases, consumer protection agencies. Through the use of longterm advisors, FTC staff have been able to build professional rapport and be present at
“teachable moments” and provide assistance in the context of real cases. In other cases,
FTC assistance has been in the form of workshops in which we have led officials through
simulated investigations of competition cases typical of those encountered in developing
countries or by sharing the FTC’s experience in the application of market-based
consumer protection law. In many cases, these seminars are coupled with side meetings
that allow experts and recipients to interface and delve deeper into significant issues. The
technical assistance program serves the agency’s mission by promoting sound practice
and policy with other agencies to improve multijurisdictional investigations and actions
and forge better relations at the staff level.
The Commission also participates in exchanges in which staff from one agency
spend several weeks or months at a counterpart agency, and the international
consultations highlighted the value of such exchanges. 278 Staff exchanges were
perceived as an extremely effective tool to share best practices, solidify bilateral
relationships, and strengthen enforcement cooperation with foreign counterparts, as well
as adding to an employee’s knowledge base and skills. 279 Many foreign counterpart
agencies use staff exchanges extensively as a way to promote staff development, and, as
noted in Chapter IV.D, development of its own staff is another value of such exchanges
to the Commission.
E.

Relationships with Consumers and Consumer Groups

Consumers are, of course, one of the key constituencies for the FTC. How the
agency relates to consumers – either directly or through various consumer and advocacy
groups – is thus a significant factor in the agency’s ultimate success. The agency’s direct
interactions with consumers are largely limited to receiving complaints from consumers
and issuing educational materials for use by consumers. A significant means for relating
to consumers is therefore through interactions with various consumer groups.
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FTC advocacy, policy, and education efforts (discussed in greater detail in
Chapter VI) aid consumers directly and often aid nonprofit and other consumer groups
advancing similar policies at local levels. Panelists offered various perspectives on
consumer-focused information provided by the FTC. For example, Michael Kaiser of the
National Cyber Security Alliance (“NCSA”) discussed how his organization benefits
from the “constant flow of information from the FTC.” 280 Kaiser remarked how the
FTC’s policy and advocacy efforts in the identity theft area have benefitted NCSA’s
work with local enforcement agencies, particularly with communicating the serious
consequences of identity theft, which is an issue some other enforcement agencies have
been slower to address. 281 Beau Brendler of Consumers Union stated that his
organization relies on the FTC for information it communicates to its members and
clients, be it through websites, blogs, or other publications.282 Panelist Peter Swire, in his
written comments, also echoed this sentiment and advocated that the FTC continue its
efforts of preemptive advocacy to prevent harm to consumers – especially in technology
areas – before they occur. 283
Kevin DeMarrais, a newspaper journalist, explained how his column – which
relies in part on information from the FTC – is not necessarily meant to solve consumer
problems, but rather to point consumers in the direction of information sources that can
help solve their problems. 284 He sees himself as a conduit both for reporting consumer
problems and communicating the FTC message to consumers. 285 DeMarrais explained
that his readers follow consumer protection issues, but do not necessarily rely on one
particular source for information or particularly care what the source of the information
is. This makes it incumbent upon the FTC to communicate its message through as many
outlets as possible. 286 Kaiser added that many consumers seem to access the FTC only
after something bad happens to them (such as identity theft), and therefore for the agency
to help consumers stay in front of issues, the FTC needs to keep the advocacy groups and
media meaningfully informed. 287
Panelists also stressed the importance of ensuring that the means by which the
FTC provides its information remain up-to-date. Brendler explained that websites
already are becoming passé, and that to remain relevant the agency must not only be in
front of issues, but be present in the media on which people rely for information. 288 This
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means understanding the different gradations or demographics of consumers, the
information media on which they rely, and preparing the FTC message such that it can be
understood in the appropriate format for the targeted consumer. 289 Brendler suggested
that the agency consider social networking because consumers – especially younger
consumers – obtain their information from newer and nontraditional sources. 290 Panelist
Jerry Cerasale suggested that the FTC continue to evaluate ways it can use up-to-date
technology, such as Twitter-type services, to monitor current topics directly from
consumers. 291 Other panelists stated that the FTC is effective in getting its message out,
but cautioned that it needs to be cognizant of the ever-changing media landscape, as it is
easy to fall behind. 292
In addition to getting its message out to consumers, the FTC must consider its
(two-way) interactions with consumers and consumer groups. Panelist Ari Schwartz
opined that the FTC’s outreach to consumer groups has been mixed, at best, and should
be improved. 293 Schwartz went on to discuss how greater transparency of agency
decision making and the inclusion of interested groups in the process would help in
making FTC actions more effective. 294
Despite the time and costs such collaboration may require, former BCP Deputy
Director Lee Peeler suggested that successful enforcement results have significant
impacts, including profound long-term effects on relationships with nongovernment
stakeholders who may not even be involved in a particular enforcement action. 295
Similarly, DeMarrais cited instances in which he has seen FTC and private litigation over
certain issues that expand the exposure of a given consumer problem, and thereby give
the issue greater prominence, staying power, and ultimately more meaning to
consumers. 296
Cerasale discussed how consumers can be incorporated directly into FTC policy
and information gathering through consumer surveys, which not only gather information
regarding potential fraud and other deceptive practices, but also assess how FTC
messages are received. 297 Doing so in collaboration with consumer groups enables the
agency to focus on issues that are priorities to consumers.
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Panelists suggested that having liaisons within the agency to facilitate
communication with consumer groups and industry would be a sensible step toward
building relationships with these constituencies. 298 For example, Ari Schwartz endorsed
the notion of having an “outreach coordinator” to facilitate communications between
consumer groups and the relevant staff at the FTC. 299
The overseas consultations yielded discussions of diverse methods for eliciting
back-and-forth communication and collaboration with consumer groups and other
nongovernment organizations. For example, three times a year, the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission convenes a meeting of its Consumer
Consultative Committee, which includes representatives from 14 consumer organizations.
The ACCC rotates the location city and pays participants a “sitting fee” as well as
transportation costs. 300 Similarly, the Netherlands consumer agency, the
Consumentenautoriteit, holds stakeholder consultations twice a year, with consumer
groups and others, to consult on its annual agenda. 301 Japan uses an innovative approach,
employing approximately 1,100 official “registered consumer monitors” who are hired to
assist the Japan Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”) in understanding public opinion on
consumer protection issues. 302
In many countries, the government provides financial and other types of support
for consumer NGOs, which play an important role in shaping consumer policy, helping
consumers solve problems, and bringing consumer-related legal actions. For example,
the U.K. provides substantial financial support to Consumer Focus (a new NGO that
merged the former National Consumers Council, Energywatch, and Postalwatch), which
plays an active role in studying and formulating consumer policy, as well as providing
advocacy on specific issues such as open markets, consumer services, and disadvantaged
consumers. 303 New Zealand’s Ministry of Consumer Affairs organizes and provides
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training for a network of consumer representatives and also sources nominations for
consumer representatives to join the boards of other government agencies and
committees to promote consumer input into policymaking. 304 It also has published
guidelines on consulting consumers. 305 This level of involvement on both policy and
enforcement issues among government entities and consumer groups is a common model
in Europe as well as Asia and Latin America.
F.

Relationships with Market Participants

Industry stakeholders rely on the FTC for information and guidance on
competition and consumer protection enforcement, regulation, and policy. In turn, the
agency can benefit in its work from the insight, expertise, and cooperation of industry
groups. Panelists discussed whether the FTC offers useful guidance, whether it gathers
industry views and suggestions, and whether it coordinates effectively with industry,
where appropriate.
Brussels panelist Luc Gyselen reported that DG Comp devotes significant
resources to maintaining relationships to conduct industry-sector research and learn more
about industry and anticipate potential competition-related issues. 306 Along these lines,
OFT Chairman Philip Collins suggested that the FTC consider having a liaison with
industries with which it has significant interaction. 307 For example, the ACCC maintains
in its organization business liaisons drawn from outside the agency. The ACCC
organizes these liaisons into six specialized consultative committees: consumers, small
business, franchising, health, infrastructure, and energy. The committees provide
feedback on the ACCC’s performance and other issues within each relevant industry, as
well as a means for the ACCC to communicate with the industries regarding its
enforcement decisions. 308
One key means of coordinating with marketplace participants is through public
workshops and hearings. These events have proved beneficial in collecting relevant
industry information, establishing enforcement priorities, and influencing policy
development. 309 Workshops in a wide range of areas – from spam e-mail to childhood
disabilities and those who are on low incomes or otherwise disadvantaged.” The Ofcom panel has a budget
to conduct research in these areas. See Ofcom, Communications Consumer Panel,
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/csg/consumer_panel/role/.
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obesity – not only provided means to coordinate with industry and consumer
stakeholders, but also allowed the FTC to take a leadership role in resolving concerns
affecting its constituents. 310
Industry stakeholders can provide useful information to the FTC regarding
marketplace conduct and developments. Former BCP Director William MacLeod
emphasized the use of workshops as an effective way to collaborate with industry and
learn “how the marketplace is working in different areas . . . [to] get a much better idea of
where [the agency’s] resources ought to be.” 311 Further, as panelist Jack Calfee pointed
out, competitors are usually quick to provide information about a counterpart’s fraud or
deception. 312 MacLeod also discussed an instance in which the gathering of marketplace
information led to further enforcement action. In the early 1980s, the FTC launched a
survey to assess Truth in Lending compliance among automobile dealers. 313 The agency
subsequently brought several enforcement actions, after which the agency learned that by
simply surveying and warning businesses the level of compliance in the industry had
improved substantially. 314
As discussed in more detail below in Chapter VI.B.7, another important facet of
the FTC’s relationship with market participants is the promotion of appropriate industry
self-regulation, which can serve as an important complement to the agency’s law
enforcement efforts. As Lee Peeler discussed, relative to law enforcement, industry selfregulation can provide businesses with much quicker issue resolution mechanisms. 315 In
the advertising area, Peeler described the FTC’s encouragement and support for selfregulation as essential to the success of the system now in place. 316
G.

Relationship with Academia

Finally, several panelists stressed the importance of reaching out to the academic
community to spur research in areas of interest to the FTC, which can expand the
agency’s research resources as well as benefit the participating academics. 317 North
America has the world’s premier academic infrastructure in disciplines related to
competition law, consumer protection, and economics. Tapping this remarkable asset
more effectively – and availing the agency of the extraordinary collection of superb
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academic departments and research centers around the world – through formal and
informal cooperation can be a source of great advantage to the FTC.
Although outside academics have been useful in certain agency initiatives, 318
panelists expressed some concern that FTC issues are either little known or
underappreciated by the larger academic community. Former BE Director Michael
Salinger explained:
One of the challenges is, particularly if you are looking to
the economics profession to do a lot of this analysis,
because a lot of it has to be done by economists in my
view, the academic wing of the profession is not all that
interested in the policy issues that the agency faces. 319
Thus, research and work that is valuable for purposes of the agency’s enforcement efforts
may not be appreciated by all members of the academic research community. 320
By having its own research agenda, the FTC can potentially stir interest in these
topics by those in the academy. Salinger explained that he saw great value in bringing in
members of the academic community for various events, such as workshops, as a way to
prompt academics both to notify their students and colleagues about FTC issues and to
inspire research into areas in which the FTC is interested. 321 In that vein, one purpose of
the recently established FTC/Northwestern University Annual Microeconomics
Conference is to introduce more academics to the FTC and its areas of interest. 322 The
partnership with Northwestern is a prototype for what could prove to be deeper
integration between the FTC and other academic research centers.
New York roundtable panelist Eleanor Fox suggested that the FTC, as have other
competition agencies, build its relationship with academics to improve analysis of FTC
research and policy positions and to recruit talented lawyers and economists. 323 Former
General Counsel Debra Valentine suggested a greater role of independent academic
experts in developing and analyzing FTC policy. 324 Panelist Nancy Rose observed that
often the attraction for academics to engage with any government agency is to obtain
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access to interesting data. 325 She suggested that in the academic climate today, industrial
organization research has been focused on complex econometric modeling that may not
be ideally targeted to the types of issues facing the agency:
You have to find some way to convince scholars that there
are significant rewards to them as researchers from
undertaking this kind of analysis when it’s not the style
that’s perhaps perceived to generate the greatest rewards
just within academia. I think we’re very driven in
academics by the availability of data and particularly new
data that hasn’t been analyzed and so something like . . .
[the] suggestion that we have some idea about where cases
were in the ranking or what determined which cases were
over the threshold that would let us then look at how
moving that line affects outcomes might be something that
would move researchers in that direction. And it might be
even institutionalizing something like a periodic conference
that really focuses on questions like this. Sometimes that
convinces somebody to jump-start a research project
because they know they’ll be able to present their work at a
hearing, maybe influence policy and have an outlet for it. 326
Former OPP Director Susan DeSanti, echoing many of the sentiments expressed
by other panelists relative to FTC relationships with academia, suggested that to build
relationships with the academic community the agency needs to designate an office to
maintain these relationships. 327 She explained that traditional academics are often
communicators of ideas, and the agency should be thinking about building the
relationships from that perspective as well. 328 She suggested that these relationships need
constant monitoring and maintenance, but when they work they can be extremely
valuable. 329
In some jurisdictions, the consumer protection agency has its own agenda but
commissions research from outside academics as well as internal specialists. For
example, DG SANCO, the European Commission’s Directorate for Health and Consumer
Affairs, often puts out formal tenders for studies in consumer-related areas that are then
conducted by academic researchers. The U.K.’s OFT also has commissioned academics
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to prepare studies on certain topics. This approach, of course, may be limited by an
agency’s resources to fund such research.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission has concluded that to pursue competition
policy effectively requires an active interaction between the academic community and
practitioners, such as the JFTC. To promote this interaction the JFTC established in 2003
the Competition Policy Research Center (“CPRC”) within its General Secretariat to
provide a functional and continuous collaborative platform between outside researchers
and the JFTC staff and to strengthen basic ideas on implementing Japan’s Antimonopoly
Act. The CPRC promotes interaction on four fronts – between academic knowledge and
policy implementation, between academics and policymakers, between law study and
economics, and between Japanese researchers and those overseas. Since 2003, the CPRC
has produced many international symposia, open seminars, reports, and discussion
papers. 330
*

*

*

The FTC has important relationships with several types of outside entities. These
relationships impact the agency’s performance in various ways, and each requires a
slightly different approach by the FTC to maintain the relationship. Some relationships –
such as those with Congress, consumers, and industry – involve interaction and
communication regarding how the agency pursues its mission. Some relationships – such
as those with domestic and international agencies – involve coordination in law
enforcement efforts. Some relationships – such as those with domestic and international
agencies and the academy – involve efforts by the FTC to research, develop, and promote
sound competition and consumer protection policy. In any case, the FTC can benefit
from, and improve its effectiveness with, input from each of these stakeholders.
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V.

Agency Leadership, Strategic Planning, and Policy R&D

The three related topics discussed in this chapter – agency leadership, strategic
planning, and policy research and development – each have a direct and significant
impact on the successful functioning of the FTC. Effective leadership at the top of the
agency sets the tone for how the staff executes the agency’s mission. Strategic planning
is instrumental to effective deployment of the agency’s resources. Policy research and
development, including the setting of a research agenda, allows the agency to make wellinformed enforcement and policy decisions.
In recent decades, the Commission has used a variety of techniques to set plans
for the use of its resources. These include budgeting and policy planning exercises at the
Commission level, bureau-level strategic planning, and the extensive use of public
consultations – workshops, seminars, hearings, and town hall proceedings – to identify
promising subjects for the agency’s attention. The agency has related what it learns to a
framework that identifies the full range of agency policy instruments and seeks to devise
integrated programs that employ all of these capabilities. For example, the agency’s antifraud program in this decade has featured coordinated enhancements of the FTC’s
consumer education program to encourage precaution taking, a bolstering of cooperation
with government prosecutors to encourage criminal prosecution of serious wrongdoers,
improvements in the agency’s Consumer Sentinel database to speed the detection of
fraud, and the use of the U.S. SAFE WEB authority to ensure effective treatment of
cross-border misconduct. In this and other areas, the agency consciously has attempted
to develop integrated strategies to increase the likelihood that misconduct will be detected
promptly, that misdeeds will be prosecuted effectively, that strong sanctions will be
imposed, and that potential victims can increase their capacity to avoid injury.
A.

Leadership

“Leadership can make all the difference in determining whether [an agency will]
accomplish [its] goals and objectives.” 331 Effective leadership involves not only
understanding the agency mission, structure, and the interests of key stakeholders, but
also communicating the mission and priorities to agency staff to motivate them to carry
out the mission of the agency effectively over time. 332 Agency leadership also affects
employee morale, which often dictates agency success. This section discusses areas for
consideration in evaluating how leadership impacts the agency.
Former Chairman Timothy Muris explained that the FTC “either runs with a
strong chairman or it does not run.” 333 Commentators have emphasized the important
leadership role of the Chairman in determining key appointments and setting the
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enforcement and research agendas for the agency. 334 In an interview after his tenure was
complete, former Chairman Robert Pitofsky explained how leadership by his predecessor,
Janet Steiger, included not only standing up to powerful interests in the private sector, but
also a willingness to listen to original and innovative proposals that challenged
conventional thinking. 335 Pitofsky also noted that every Commissioner must bring to
bear his or her own experience, focus, and insights, which for him involved an
appreciation of past agency failures and an understanding of how to get things done
through the agency’s structure. 336 Muris likewise explained that the Chairman must work
with the other Commissioners to achieve the mission, which means balancing different
and sometimes competing interests. 337 This can mean making a priority of interests
promoted by other Commissioners to persuade them to follow the Chairman’s vision for
the FTC. 338
Commentators also have identified continuity as another important factor in
effective leadership, both at home and internationally. Pitofsky posited that competition
leadership is stronger in general due to a decrease in variation from administration to
administration because policymakers have arrived at a “fairly widespread agreement on
premises,” particularly in antitrust enforcement. 339 OFT Chief Executive John Fingleton
described continuity of leadership as important to maintaining strength and credibility
among competition agencies. He recounted a comment by Mario Monti, the former
Commissioner for Competition at the European Commission, that the American system
has a revolving door and that the leadership transitions much too quickly. 340 As change
of personnel is inevitable, leaders’ commitment to relative continuity in policy may ease
some of the concerns over personnel changes and make agency leadership more
effective. 341 However, when those new to enforcement emerge in leadership positions,
there can be delays in getting things done until people are known and trusted in the
334
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competition community, which is a consequence any organization must face in
transition. 342
Complementing leadership at the top, some panelists suggested that the FTC is
effective because staff, possessing both the expertise in competition and consumer
protection law and the relative freedom to explore innovative ways to make progress in
these areas, drive the agency toward stronger leadership. Former BCP Assistant Director
Paul Luehr described this as a culture and management style that focuses on bottom-up
integration of leadership. 343 Luehr said the culture of the FTC involves “taking good
ideas from the staff level and letting those percolate to the top, especially with regard to
the enforcement mission.” 344 Recognition of this bottom-up style of management was
echoed by Teresa Schwartz, who described how former BCP Director Jodie Bernstein
used her staff as a resource, not just to fulfill the mission as she directed them, but to
identify ways to fulfill the mission based on their experience. 345 Schwartz explained that
it took managerial leadership to listen to staff, value their input, and encourage them to
generate ideas on how best to address problems. 346
Effective leadership advances the agency’s mission and positively impacts agency
morale. Greater continuity of leadership can strengthen the agency’s ability to perform
its mission both in the shorter term and as senior leadership of the Commission changes
across administrations.
B.

Strategic Planning

Strategic planning at a government agency involves more than just a
determination of how insightfully to identify and understand problems that arise, but also
a determination of how to pick the right tool or right collection of tools (or even the right
sequencing of tools) to use to address such problems. In the case of the FTC, the agency
must decide, for example, whether to issue guidelines, bring a case, create rules, or hold
public consultations to address the various competition and consumer protection
problems that it faces. 347
This section addresses several issues regarding strategic planning and how the
FTC goes, and should go, about doing it. First, what dictates the agency’s planning?
Does it depend entirely on having wise Chairs, Commissioners, and bureau directors?
That is, is the agency’s planning principally a function of who happens to inhabit these
342
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positions at different times? Second, what is the proper scope of the agency’s strategic
planning? Should it involve bureau-by-bureau planning, or should it be an agency-wide
exercise? Third, should the planning be centralized within the agency? For example,
should there be a research panel or board within the agency to oversee such planning?
Fourth, should there be specific procedures in place to develop strategy? For example,
should the Bureau of Economics take the lead in identifying issues, with ad hoc groups
within the bureaus gathering to address these issues and ultimately going to the
Commission with proposals? 348 Finally, how does the agency ensure the proper
implementation of its chosen strategies?
1.

Importance and Goals of Strategic Planning

The consultations confirmed the importance of strategic planning to the success of
this, or any other, agency. Former Chairman Muris explained that it is insufficient to
have a core mission and to define it well; the agency needs a strategy to implement it.
That strategy requires continual new thinking and innovation. 349 Jodie Bernstein echoed
Muris’ comments, explaining that continual planning and innovation are necessary, citing
as examples of such planning and innovation the expansion of the agency’s international
efforts, the expansion of efforts targeting Spanish-speaking media, and the creation of the
Criminal Liaison Unit. 350 Another panelist succinctly characterized strategic planning as
“absolutely vital.” 351
In addition to innovation, roundtable panelists identified policy continuity as
another important goal of strategic planning. Former General Counsel Debra Valentine
framed the relevant inquiry as follows: “How can you keep an acute sense of the past
and the evolving trends so that you can try to keep some strategies going through time,
notwithstanding the inevitable impulse of the next gang to really want to leave their
mark?” In other words, how does the agency “keep a thoughtful strategy that ties
learnings and lessons of the past with sensitivity to trends of the future?” 352 Valentine
observed that, although each agency chair will want to set his or her own strategic
agenda, policy continuity will provide such chair with “buy-in with the public and the
consumer.” 353 John Fingleton explained that the governance structure of the OFT, which
has a board composed of a majority of nonexecutives, provides “a certain type of
348
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continuity,” as the board is responsible for setting long-term strategy for the agency,
rather than making individual enforcement and policy decisions, which is left to OFT
executives. 354
The goal of policy continuity, however, does not imply inflexibility in strategic
planning. Several panelists emphasized the importance of building flexibility into any
strategic planning efforts. In discussing her efforts in the 1990s, Bernstein explained that
her planning efforts “set out a roadmap so that I had a sense of where we were going.
That didn’t mean that there was not flexibility built into the roadmap so that [when]
things inevitably occur that are not anticipated . . . one would have the ability to deal with
them.” 355 Another panelist explained that “[b]eing able to shift, being able to move and
being able to adjust to market changes and what’s next” is enormously important. 356 An
agency has to have “the agility to move around that may be a little uncomfortable, but
gives [it] the ability to respond as the market and other conditions change.” 357 The
Chairman of the U.K. Competition Commission, Peter Freeman, characterized the need
for flexibility as follows: “[A]s the Duke of Wellington has said, ‘time spent on
reconnaissance was seldom wasted.’ Also, I think he said words to the effect of ‘all plans
collapse on first contact with the enemy.’ I think that neatly encapsulates the position
certainly from our point of view.” 358 Strategic planning, Freeman continued, “cannot be
too rigid and it cannot be too binding. [B]ut everything we do should take place . . .
against a background of priorities and policy consciousness.” 359
2.

Strategic Planning at the FTC

The Commission’s strategic planning efforts include specific enforcement and
policy agendas brought to the agency by Chairmen, Commissioners, and senior staff; the
strategic planning done pursuant to the Government Performance and Results Act and
various other reporting requirements; and senior staff retreats that the Commission has
held for more than a decade. Other examples of strategic planning include “policy
review sessions,” which were used in the 1970s and 1980s to permit the Commission
members and the staff to discuss significant policy issues. 360 The Commission recently
revived this custom in 2008 to discuss how the Commission might address various issues
concerning the financial crisis. Former Commissioner Thomas Leary described how,
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during the early 2000s, the agency used to circulate background papers on advocacy
issues, such as the state action doctrine, that the Commission anticipated addressing.
This was not done in the context of specific cases; rather, it was “simply to see if we
could agree among ourselves on what the Commission policy ought to be ultimately
when these things arise.” 361
Beyond these, perhaps the most intensive form of formal strategic planning at the
FTC largely has taken place in the Bureau of Consumer Protection. The FTC consumer
protection mission has a broad reach, protecting consumers in the myriad ways they
interact with various kinds of businesses. These protections range from requiring that
advertising claims have a reasonable basis of support to ensuring that consumers receive
full disclosure of the terms of financial service transactions. To accomplish its mission
most effectively, BCP targets issues and leverages resources through strategic planning.
Bureau-wide strategic planning began in the mid-1990s, and the process has
become an integral part of how BCP operates. A strategic plan generally covers a 12- to
18-month period. It encompasses both BCP initiatives and matters that are not
discretionary, such as reports or rulemaking proceedings mandated by Congress.
Managers solicit ideas from staff members, who review complaint data, monitor
advertising, survey market literature, and also obtain information from industry,
consumer groups, and law enforcement partner agencies, among other stakeholders.
Ideas also may be generated in connection with workshops or town hall meetings
conducted by the Commission to explore emerging problems or areas of concern. Staff
from the regional offices, as well as the seven divisions of BCP, are included in the
planning process. Some projects cross program lines, requiring coordinated planning by
staff from two or more BCP divisions. Managers of each division develop a plan, and all
of the plans are reviewed by all division managers who provide feedback to each other.
Plans are then submitted to and ultimately approved or modified by the bureau.
They become a basis for allocation of resources, including contracts, travel, and staff
time, and are reviewed during quarterly meetings involving bureau and division
managers. Plans are not inflexible, but can be revised, as needed, to respond to new
issues or problems in the marketplace. Evaluation and assessment takes place at the end
of the planning period, and managers are accountable for their progress in accomplishing
plan goals.
Former Chairman Pitofsky recently described this BCP strategic planning as
follows:
Jodie Bernstein instituted the strategic planning process at
the outset of her term as BCP Director. She involved staff
at all levels of the Bureau and regional offices, giving them
an opportunity to think broadly about consumer protection
issues and use their firsthand experience to propose new,
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more effective ways of doing things. This inclusive
process made the final plan a team effort and one that
reflected the best thinking of our talented staff. The
strategic plan’s benefits were striking. Among them: the
establishment of clear law enforcement priorities; the
identification of the most pressing and the newly emerging
consumer issues and the best approaches to tackling them;
the ability to allocate resources to the most serious
problems; and increased efficiency across the Bureau. 362
Turning to strategic planning undertaken elsewhere in the agency, former BE
Director David Scheffman observed that, even taking into account the resources that must
be devoted to merger review, the agency has “tremendous latitude” in how to allocate its
resources, making strategic planning essential.363 Nonetheless, according to former BC
Director Molly Boast, extensive strategic planning in BC during the late 1990s
necessarily was a victim of the merger wave of that time and the resulting drain on
bureau resources. Even when an agency is not faced with such a significant workload,
Boast observed, strategic planning does “consume considerable resources”; it has to be
balanced against other uses of agency resources. Nonetheless, ad hoc opportunities for
strategic planning can be found in the potential cases that the agency confronts. Boast
cited the example of the pharmaceutical patent settlement cases that first arose in the late
1990s as an opportunity for BC and the Commission to do an extensive analysis of a
particular area of competition law and decide on a particular strategy – even if such
strategy was not necessarily planned in advance. 364
Recommendations for future FTC strategic planning offered by roundtable
panelists involved both the level at which such planning should take place and the inputs
necessary for such planning. Bernstein recommended that the FTC engage in agencywide – not just bureau-by-bureau – strategic planning because it would “energize” both
BCP and BC by letting each bureau see what the other’s ideas are. This would address
the concern Bernstein has with the Balkanization of the agency into bureaus or even
divisions that do not communicate with each other. 365 Former BCP Deputy Director
Teresa Schwartz echoed Bernstein’s recommendation that strategic planning should take
place not only at the bureau level, but agency-wide as well. 366
Panelists identified both internal and external sources of information that are
crucial to effective strategic planning. Bernstein explained that for her one of the
functions that it served was “to open up the Bureau so that I knew what the best thinkers
were thinking, what their experience was and how I could build upon that to construct a
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program that would make good sense . . . .” 367 Schwartz concurred as to the importance
of drawing on the experience and knowledge of staff, which knows “what’s bubbling out
there.” 368 Similarly, Nicholas Hill, Chief Executive of the Commerce Commission of
New Zealand, explained: “[T]he process we are going through at the moment is very
much a bottom up one where essentially I’ve outlined as a new chief executive what I
think the challenge for the organization is at a high level, but essentially put it back on the
staff to say, so how should we deal with this? At the end of the day, the Commission and
[I] will make the calls. But it is very much about engaging them, engaging their minds
and their passion in the organization.” 369
Several panelists, including Bernstein and Schwartz, stressed the importance of
also including outside entities – including state agencies, congressional staff, consumer
groups, and industry – in the planning process in order to anticipate where the next
controversy will be, get relevant information from key stakeholders, and gauge how
much support the agency will have to take action in a given area. 370 Former BCP
Assistant Director Paul Luehr argued that it is also crucial in doing strategic planning to
look at relevant data and have that drive (at least in part) the agency’s agenda. For
example, with the Consumer Sentinel database, the agency can hear from “thousands of
consumers” about what cases to bring, making the agency’s mission “much more
coherent.” 371
3.

Examples of Strategic Planning Efforts at Other Competition
and Consumer Protection Agencies

External consultations revealed several examples of strategic planning undertaken
at other competition and consumer protection agencies. The U.K. Office of Fair Trading
employs several methods in planning and implementing its overall strategy, and has a
dedicated “strategy and planning team,” which is engaged in all parts of strategic
planning development and implementation to help ensure consistency across the agency.
The strategic planning process begins with the Chief Executive developing strategy and
plans in consultation with stakeholders, followed by the OFT’s Board, which functions
similarly to a board of a public company, providing guidance on longer-term policy and
strategy decisions, rather than specific enforcement decisions, which are taken by the
Executive. Each year, the Board approves an annual plan for the agency, providing a
strategic steer and risk assessment that considers the agency as a whole (rather than at the
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level of an individual case or project). 372 The resulting priorities then strongly inform the
decisions of division directors as they prepare annual program plans for their respective
areas. When the division directors submit proposals for resources, the Executive
Committee, a group including the Chief Executive and senior executives, assesses the
overall portfolio of bids against the strategic priorities when deciding how to allocate
resources.
Decisions to undertake new work are guided by four “prioritization principles,”
which the OFT developed following consultation with external stakeholders, including:
(1) impact, which includes considerations of the likely direct and indirect effects on
consumer welfare, deterrence, and efficiencies; (2) strategic significance, which entails
inquiries about whether the given matter fits within the OFT’s strategy or current
portfolio and whether the OFT – or some other alternative, such as private enforcement
or self-regulation – is best placed to act; (3) risk (i.e. the likelihood of a successful
outcome); and (4) resources (i.e. the resource implications of pursuing a particular
matter). 373 Although these principles are neither exhaustive nor applied mechanically,
they create a common descriptive language to assess and compare agency priorities. 374
Closely linked to the OFT’s prioritization principles is the agency’s so-called
effective project delivery (“EPD”) framework. Developed in response to criticism
regarding the length of OFT investigations, the agency applies the EPD framework to
significant projects and cases, in effect, to plan backwards from the desired outcome to
achieve OFT’s strategic goals. Key components of the framework include a clear
definition of the project’s scope, deliverables, and deadlines; clarity in roles,
responsibilities, and resource allocation; and the use of customized steering groups
comprised of staff from across the agency to provide input on each project and to assess
the fit of a particular project within the agency’s entire portfolio of matters. The first
phase of the EPD process, which involves the development of a substantive theory of
harm and an estimate of the impact of agency action, in particular, is influenced by the
prioritization principles driving the agency’s overall strategy. 375
The European Commission’s DG Comp uses an iterative, top-down—bottom-up
planning process to prioritize its enforcement matters and allocate staff resources. As
such, cases are often generated by staff or complainants. DG Comp applies several
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prioritization criteria – including consumer impact, precedential value, and deterrence –
in evaluating prospective cases. 376
One of the ways in which DG Comp attempts to implement its strategic planning
is the use of a peer review system to foster intra-agency debate concerning a particular
matter. A peer review consists of a discussion among the case team originally assigned
to a matter, a “fresh set of eyes,” often including a case manager and a sectoral expert,
and an independent scrutiny officer responsible for submission of a written report to
senior officials. Although these reviews are highly resource-intensive, they allow DG
Comp to engage staff in a meaningful way in implementing its long-term strategies. 377
René Jansen, a board member of the Netherlands Competition Authority,
described the annual strategic planning process that has been in place at his agency for a
few years. The process begins with a broad policy framework – developed by the
agency’s three-person executive board in consultation with the directors of the agency’s
several offices – that addresses significant administrative and policy issues the NMa
anticipates over the course of the coming year. The next step in the process involves
consultations regarding this framework with external stakeholders, including politicians,
industry, the bar, and academia. The final step of the process includes the development
of a working plan – based on the broad policy framework – for use by the agency’s
directors in the following year. The working plan provides the directors with specific
targets in all areas of the NMa’s work, including enforcement and other policy efforts, as
well as internal, administrative areas. Jansen expressed satisfaction with this planning
process, but acknowledged that his agency is continually trying to improve it. 378
The Canadian Competition Bureau recently has engaged in a process involving an
environmental scan that feeds directly into its agenda setting. The Bureau reviews sector
and marketplace developments to identify potential problems relevant to each of its
branches. The Bureau’s senior management team analyzes the results of this scan and
drafts a high-level agenda, which a wider management group then develops in greater
detail. An operational plan is developed for each of the issues identified. The plan may
employ a variety of tools, including law enforcement and consumer education, and
always includes a strategy for measuring success. Finally, a process – managed by a
steering committee – is in place to ensure that resources are matched to priorities and to
identify and present to senior management significant issues in the marketplace that merit
the Bureau’s attention. Staff is able to submit issues and ideas directly to the steering
committee, thus providing bottom-up input into the Bureau’s prioritization practices.
Similar to the situation at the FTC, this process is better developed for the Bureau’s Fair
Business Practices Division (analogous to BCP at the FTC) than it is for its competition
sections. 379
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Any future evaluation of the FTC’s strategic planning efforts ought to consider
the following issues. First, what should dictate the agency’s strategic planning? Should
it be top-down planning through the budget process, bottom-up planning with issues
originating with bureau management or at lower levels of the bureaus, or Chairmandriven planning? Should it be some combination of those means? Second, what is the
proper scope of the agency’s planning efforts? Should strategic planning be done
agency-wide, bureau-by-bureau, or at both levels? Third, should there be a centralized
locus – for example, a review board – for the agency’s strategic planning? Fourth, should
there be specific procedures or protocols in place to develop strategy? Finally, how does
the agency ensure that it is appropriately implementing its strategies?
C.

Policy Research and Development

This section examines the important role of policy research and development at
the FTC. An agency that intends to be thoughtful and to consider its policy actions
seriously must have some ability to analyze the trade-offs inherent in any policy choice.
That capability can be developed through, among other means, academic-style research,
information gathering and report writing, and conferences and workshops that bring
together elements from business, government, consumer representatives, and the bar to
discuss issues related to FTC policy and law.
This section first defines the notion of policy R&D and then discusses the several
goals served by engaging in policy R&D. This section also examines how the agency
sets a research agenda, including the way in which policy R&D topics have been chosen
in the past, how they are currently chosen, and how the process might be improved in the
future. Finally, this section presents a set of specific suggestions for policy research and
development provided in the course of external consultations.
1.

Defining Policy R&D

Activities that reasonably could be called “policy R&D” take many different
forms within the various organizations comprising the FTC. To academic economists,
“research” sometimes means pursuing the answer to an author-initiated research question
using state-of-the-art techniques in the hope of publishing the work in a scientific journal.
That is, however, not the bulk of research at the FTC, or even the bulk of research in the
FTC’s Bureau of Economics. The notion of policy R&D involves much more. Policy
R&D includes answering policy-relevant questions posed by Congress or agency leaders,
as well as addressing issues required by specific statutes. In addition, policy R&D
includes workshops and conferences aimed at competition and consumer protection
policy topics.
Some of the FTC’s policy R&D work is highly analytical in nature; some of it is a
compilation of academic and policy literature; and some is more largely descriptive of
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various informed opinions on policy-relevant questions or the functioning of particular
markets. 380 Some research topics fall into a very specific FTC policy area or an active
enforcement area – for example, the effects of a particular oil merger on prices. Other
topics are related to underlying “academic” questions – for example, scale economies in
some particular industry of interest to the FTC. Most FTC R&D efforts are narrowly
related to the FTC’s competition and consumer protection missions, although a nontrivial
portion of the agency’s work historically has been focused on policies of other
government agencies that have had implications for competition policy, consumer
protection policy, or consumer welfare. 381
Given that the FTC is a law enforcement agency with antitrust and consumer
protection responsibilities, it is easy to think about all nonenforcement activity as policy
R&D, but clearly that would sweep in too much by including conferences or workshops
that bring together industry participants to hear the agency’s view of the state of a
particular area of the law, reports on the agency’s various activities to Congress, and a
host of other activities that have little research content or that clearly are not aimed at
analyzing new policies or variations in current policy. For example, some BCP
workshops, reports, and presentations, such as the many “red flags” hearings, can be
characterized as outreach to the business community and are not necessarily oriented
toward specific policy alterations. Many enforcement-related workshops on debt
collection and international fraud prevention, as well as annually issued reports on
various law enforcement activities, are so directly connected to specific areas of
enforcement that they are probably better thought of as enforcement or enforcement
R&D, rather than policy R&D. However, almost all of these efforts have some R&D
component in the sense that learning from the events might trigger some alteration in law
enforcement policies. Thus, for all intents and purposes, a clear division between
enforcement efforts and policy R&D does not exist at the FTC.
2.

Goals Served by Policy R&D

The FTC has a mandate to undertake certain forms of research based on Section 6
of the FTC Act and the historical report-writing activity of its predecessor entity, the
Bureau of Corporations. 382 That mandate differentiates the FTC from most other
antitrust or consumer protection agencies in the world in that it enables the agency to use
compulsory process to gather data in a context other than law enforcement. From its
380
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inception, the FTC carried on a general investigative function that complemented its law
enforcement activities. The results of the investigations were compiled in reports that
were intended to shed light on various questionable business practices of the day. That
activity was the precursor of what is now thought of as research and policy R&D at the
FTC. As explained below, apart from the primary purpose of answering specific research
questions, the FTC, including its several components, undertakes research for a number
of reasons.
a.

Support for Enforcement, Advocacy, and Other Agency
Efforts

Research and policy R&D is undertaken to improve agency decision making in
specific areas, such as law enforcement, rulemaking, and competition and consumer
protection advocacy. FTC research today is seldom done with an eye toward direct use in
law enforcement activities. Some reports, however, have been generated in conjunction
with antitrust-related activities or have led to follow-on legal activity. The use of
empirical research work to support a complaint in the case of a consummated hospital
merger is an example of the use of research in enforcement. Also, conceptual work by
economists at the FTC has helped support the agency’s merger enforcement efforts in
recent merger litigations. 383 Research also has been done on the value of the Do Not Call
list, when elements of that program were questioned. 384 Empirical policy work on health
claims for foods has provided a firmer basis for FTC policy and for advocacy in the area
of nutrition labeling. For example, several empirical studies done on food health claims
during the 1990s and early 2000s provided the basis for FTC advocacy arguments that
rigid regulatory bans on such claims are not likely to be in the best interest of
consumers. 385 Two consumer research studies of the mortgage market in 2004 and 2007
were likewise important in providing the agency with insight into the problems that exist
in the current federally required disclosures made to consumers about mortgage products
and the terms and conditions of the mortgage debt they acquire. 386 Such studies provided
support for several recent advocacy comments in the consumer credit arena.
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Further, to address the proliferation of spam email, the FTC compiled information
about the problem and possible ways to address it and became a major participant in
fashioning workable legislation. 387 Additionally, the FTC used policy R&D to
complement its recent enforcement efforts to stop anticompetitive conduct designed to
delay entry of generic drugs. This combined research and enforcement agenda also
informed substantive changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act. 388 This type of policy R&D
also is necessary to ensure that FTC actions keep abreast of relevant scholarly learning.
For example, several panelists discussed the role that the research into advertising in the
1970s and 1980s played in informing the FTC’s advertising enforcement. 389 This
research also influenced courts and state policymakers on their approach to the regulation
of advertising. Workshops and research also can demonstrate intellectual leadership.
The FTC’s workshops on green marketing and food advertising and obesity, for example,
have helped to establish the Commission as an international leader in these areas. 390
Policy R&D work also has been used as an adjunct to various self-regulatory
efforts. Bringing information and facts to bear on various policy issues is often an
effective means of moving policy debates forward. On occasion, firms are induced to
alter their behavior in desirable ways if the evidence shows a real problem. On the other
hand, if the evidence indicates that the purported problem is small or nonexistent, then
resources can be redeployed to more pressing issues. For example, recent BCP projects
addressing violence in various entertainment media, 391 the placement of alcohol
advertising, 392 and food advertising aimed at children 393 were an important means of
shining factual light on topics of current policy interest.
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b.

Tool and Skill Development

To operate effectively, the FTC requires a highly skilled staff, who are able to
take on research tasks that are sometimes ill-defined and may require inventive
approaches to problems. Research activities often allow the agency to develop ways to
better analyze problems that can be used in antitrust or consumer policy settings. Doing
such analysis in a law enforcement or litigation environment often is difficult or
impossible; doing it in a research environment is thus necessary. For example, FTC
economists have been doing research work on demand estimation that may pay off in the
application of those techniques in competition cases, where demand estimation is
occasionally a key element in market definition or in predicting the likely effects of a
merger. 394 As another example, empirical research allows the agency to keep up with
data-moving and econometric techniques that are becoming increasingly essential as
enforcement of the antitrust and consumer protection laws becomes more data-intensive.
The ability to handle large data sets and understand how to derive useful implications
from that data are often the keys to making fact-based decisions in such cases. As
confirmed by roundtable panelists, an in-house research capability is important to ensure
that an agency can handle difficult issues that arise frequently in the cases that it
pursues. 395
c.

Development of Industry Expertise

Research topics often allow the agency to gain a better understanding of
industries, including those, such as energy and health care, which feature prominently in
the agency’s law enforcement agenda. For example, the agency’s gasoline and diesel
price monitoring project allows the agency to track changes over time in price-cost
margins and to notice anomalies in prices in various cities or regions. 396 Although
checking for such anomalies is now routine, this effort initially was a policy R&D
project. Policy R&D also has been in evidence at the FTC in the health care area for over
30 years. Recent examples include the 2003-2004 hearings that led to the report,
Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition, 397 as well as a 2006 BE workshop on the
economics of the pharmaceutical industry. 398 These R&D efforts are intended to help the
agency understand whether and how markets can be part of the solution to vexing health
care policy questions.
Other R&D projects are designed to gain information about industries that the
agency expects to be important in its future enforcement and policy efforts. For example,
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the 1999 BE pharmaceutical report 399 describing the industry and its idiosyncrasies was a
precursor to much of the agency’s work in the area of pharmaceutical patent settlements,
which have become a major component of the FTC’s competition law enforcement
program. Work by OPP likewise provided insights into aspects of industries with which
the agency will be dealing for the foreseeable future. These efforts include examination
of the antitrust and consumer protection implications of broadband Internet access 400 and
investigation of the effects of government restrictions on entry into online retailing. 401
d.

Improvements in Economic Learning Applicable across
Markets

Research projects additionally help agency personnel gain insight into the effects
of practices that span many industries and product markets. For example, various BE
staff have undertaken a research project to examine dynamic oligopoly models. 402 Such
models lie at the intersection of both theoretical and empirical economic research on
markets, and understanding such issues may help the agency untangle knotty problems in
the dynamics of gasoline and refined products pricing (for example, the analysis of
asymmetric price variations in gasoline markets). A recent behavioral economics
conference is another example of policy R&D at work. 403 In that conference, the agency
tried to learn from some of the top researchers in that field, while at the same time
providing the researchers with some notion of work that the FTC undertakes in the
consumer protection area that considers (implicitly perhaps) the principles of behavioral
economics. 404
e.

Horizon Scanning

Policy R&D efforts at the FTC serve the important purpose of scanning the
horizon for future competition and consumer problem areas. As discussed in Chapter
III.C, the agency gathers relevant industry and marketplace information by convening
399

FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF, ROY LEVY, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A DISCUSSION OF
COMPETITIVE AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF CHANGE (1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmaceutical/drugrep.pdf.
400

See FTC STAFF, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY (2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/tech/cable/broadband.htm.
401

See FTC Workshop, Possible Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on the Internet (Oct.
2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/index.shtm.

402

See, e.g., Michael R. Baye, Antitrust Economics and Policy: Some Suggestions for Research Agendas,
Keynote Address at the Research Symposium on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy,
Northwestern University Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, at 33-42 (Sept. 26,
2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/baye/080926antitrustnw.pdf.

403

See FTC Bureau of Economics, Conference on Behavioral Economics and Consumer Policy (Apr.
2007), http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/index.shtml.

404

Roundtable panelists discussed the FTC’s behavioral economics work. Lee Peeler indicated that the
Bureau of Economics should have moved sooner to take a leadership role on this topic to avoid an
overemphasis on the area (Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 182-84), while Jack Calfee praised the reluctance of the
FTC to jump into that area too early and with too much gusto (Calfee, 7/30 DC Tr. at 184-87).
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conferences, workshops, and hearings to address current and emerging competition and
consumer protection issues. Such events have become an important means through
which the Commission and its staff identify problems and develop appropriate responses.
For example, since the mid-1990s, BCP has conducted dozens of workshops and
conferences focusing on Internet and consumer privacy issues, keeping the agency closer
to the frontier of a quickly changing marketing environment. Similarly, OPP has chosen
topics for workshops and reporting with an eye toward important future topics. For
example, a recent OPP effort along these lines was a conference on new methods of
health care delivery that examined progress on electronic medical records and the advent
of limited-service medical clinics. 405
f.

Self-Assessment

Another reason the FTC undertakes policy R&D is to examine the outcomes of
certain policy choices and help the agency assess how well it has done. The FTC, via its
Bureau of Economics, has undertaken retrospective studies in the merger area,406 in
resale price maintenance, and in the area of vertical restraints. 407 Also in the competition
realm, the 1999 study of the divestiture process by the Bureau of Competition stands out
as a useful effort to determine whether the process passed at least a minimal standard for
efficacy. 408 As discussed below in Chapter VII.B.2, the FTC’s consumer protection and
competition advocacy program is one of the most self-examined of all FTC activities.
Through the work of one independent researcher and various internal surveys conducted
by the Office of Policy Planning or its predecessors, multiple reviews have been
conducted on the program to examine its value, as measured by surveys of the recipients.
g.

Intellectual Leadership and Learning from Others in
the International Policy Arena

As noted in Chapter IV.D, various Commission efforts – including the
Commission’s participation in international policy-related R&D efforts – allow the
agency to influence sound competition and consumer protection policies through the
import and export of policy views and enforcement practices.
405

See FTC Workshop, Innovations in Health Care Delivery (Apr. 2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/hcd/index.shtm. Other nations are taking an even more direct route
toward predicting future competition and consumer issues. For example, the U.K. OFT recently
commissioned a project to define the upcoming issues that will likely affect consumers. See U.K. OFFICE
OF FAIR TRADING, CONSULTATION ON EMERGING TRENDS: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE OFT BY GFK
NOP (2008), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/about_oft/oft1000.pdf.
406

Retrospective work in the merger area has been done since at least the early 1980s. Several recent
merger retrospectives have focused on various refined products markets in the oil industry and on hospital
markets. See hospital merger retrospectives cited infra note 718.

407

For a discussion of several self-assessments undertaken by the FTC and certain other government
agencies, see William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition
Policy Authorities, 31 J. CORP. L. 505 (2006).

408

See FTC STAFF, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999) [hereinafter 1999
DIVESTITURE STUDY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf.
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A good example of the FTC’s leadership efforts in international competition
policy is the FTC’s work building consensus in the International Competition Network,
an organization dedicated to facilitating dialogue and convergence toward sound
competition policy and enforcement that includes as its members nearly all of the world’s
competition agencies. In the course of developing work product of practical utility to its
members, the ICN collectively studies issues that are susceptible to multiple approaches
so that its members can better understand their implications and seek consensus about
how to address them. The FTC was a founding member of the ICN and dedicates a
significant portion of its international antitrust work to ICN activity. Under FTC
chairmanship, for example, the ICN developed recommended practices on merger
notification and review procedures 409 and today continues work related to their
implementation. These recommended practices, designed to reduce the costs and burdens
of multijurisdictional merger review, have become the international benchmark in merger
review, and more than 40 of the ICN’s members have introduced changes to bring their
merger regimes into greater conformity with the practices since their adoption. The FTC
also co-chairs the ICN’s group dealing with unilateral conduct, which is acknowledged to
be the most controversial area of antitrust policy, and achieved consensus on
recommended practices for the assessment of dominance and on the application of
unilateral conduct rules to state-created monopolies. 410
A prime example of consumer protection work in a multilateral organization is the
FTC’s work on various OECD Council Recommendations, which have had a substantial
impact on the national laws in OECD countries. The FTC took a leading role in the
research and related work leading to the OECD Council’s adoption in 2003 of a
Recommendation on protecting consumers across borders against fraud and deception. 411
The Recommendation was based in part on empirical input provided by the International
Consumer Protection Enforcement Network, which FTC staff took a lead role in
generating. This work has had a substantial impact on national legislation: the
Recommendation and underlying research served as the basis for both the United States
and the European Commission to pass new laws governing cross-border information
sharing and investigative assistance in consumer protection matters, including the U.S.
SAFE WEB Act of 2006 412 in the United States and the Consumer Protection
409

ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER NOTIFICATION AND REVIEW
PROCEDURES (2006), available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mnprecpractices.pdf.
410
See ICN UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GROUP, DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER
ANALYSIS PURSUANT TO UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS: RECOMMENDED PRACTICES (2008), available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral_conduct/Unilateral_WG_1.pdf.
411

OECD, GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM FRAUDULENT AND DECEPTIVE COMMERCIAL
PRACTICES ACROSS BORDERS (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/33/2956464.pdf. This
work was an outgrowth of the 1999 OECD guidelines in the area of electronic commerce. See OECD,
GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1999), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/13/34023235.pdf. The FTC also played a leading role in developing
those guidelines.
412

Pub. L. No. 109-455, 120 Stat. 3372 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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Cooperation Regulation 413 in Europe. Following the issuance of the Cross-Border Fraud
Recommendation, the FTC played a pivotal role in developing the background research
for the OECD Council’s adoption in 2007 of a Council Recommendation on Dispute
Resolution and Redress. 414 Like the Cross-Border Fraud Recommendation, the Dispute
Resolution and Redress Recommendation is serving as a basis for strengthening
consumer redress mechanisms in other jurisdictions. 415
Also within the OECD, the FTC has significantly contributed to work in the
privacy and data security area. For example, the agency worked closely with its
counterparts within the OECD’s Working Party on Information Security and Privacy in
an effort to promote greater cooperation among privacy regulators and law enforcement
authorities to promote greater protection for personal information. This effort, which
began with research, a written report, and a roundtable discussion, led to the 2007 OECD
Recommendation on Cross-Border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting
Privacy, 416 which provides guidance on how to improve cooperation in this area.
The same approach also has been used in the FTC’s bilateral relations with other
nations. Since the early days of their relationship under the 1991 EC-U.S. cooperation
agreement, the FTC, DOJ, and the European Commission have jointly conducted studies
– for example, of merger notification requirements, merger remedies, and retrospective
reviews of merger remedies – to better understand each other’s rules and procedures and,
thereby, foster cooperation and coordination in parallel merger reviews. In 2001, the
General Electric/Honeywell merger case exposed a significant divide between the U.S.
and European approaches to nonhorizontal merger analysis. 417 Rather than allow their
differences to fester and possibly threaten other transactions, the FTC, DOJ, and the EC
jointly embarked on a project to study their approaches to mergers, both substantive and
procedural, with a focus on nonhorizontal issues (where there appeared to be the greatest
potential variance).

413

Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004R2006:EN:HTML.

414

OECD, RECOMMENDATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND REDRESS (2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/50/38960101.pdf.

415

The European Commission, for example, has focused on exploring individual judicial and collective
redress mechanisms for consumers since the issuance of the OECD Dispute Resolution and Redress
Recommendation. A summary of the ongoing work on collective redress mechanisms is available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm.

416

OECD, RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS
PROTECTING PRIVACY (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/28/38770483.pdf.
417

See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department
of Justice, Conglomerate Mergers And Range Effects: It’s A Long Way From Chicago To Brussels,
Address before George Mason University Symposium (Nov. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9536.htm.
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h.

Reporting on Agency Activity

A portion of the FTC’s policy R&D work is focused on describing what the
agency does. Although this work is not always thought of as research, it increases the
transparency of the agency’s processes and decision making. For example, efforts at
providing enforcement guidelines (on the antitrust side) and industry guides (on the
consumer protection side) fall into this category, as do the occasional closing statements
regarding FTC merger cases that are not pursued. 418
i.

Fostering FTC-relevant Academic Research

Finally, as discussed in more detail above in Chapter IV.G, by having an agencyspecific research agenda, the FTC can answer questions not necessarily addressed by
academics, as well as potentially stir interest in such topics on the part of members of the
academy.
3.

Setting a Research Agenda

Given the prominent role of policy research and development at the FTC, having
a systematic means for identifying and planning relevant research is imperative. This
section reviews historical and current approaches to selecting research topics at the
agency, as well as considerations for setting a research agenda. This section concludes
with a review of research topics that were proposed in the course of external
consultations.
a.

Historical Selection of Research Topics

The FTC’s broad jurisdiction over industry implies a very broad array of possible
research areas. In its early years, most general investigations undertaken by the FTC
were based on requests from the President or from Congress. Even after the Commission
began to initiate numerous studies on its own, many investigative reports continued to be
undertaken based on congressional requests. The pattern of external requests changed in
the post-World War II era, when many more reports were begun under Commission
auspices. Whatever the cause, 419 congressional requests decreased and the Commission
418

Guidelines and industry guides are discussed in more detail in Chapter VI.B.5; closing statements are
discussed in more detail in Chapter VI.B.1.

419

At a 2003 BE history roundtable, two former BE directors discussed the decline of congressional and
presidential requests for reports. Michael Lynch argued that the decline was likely the result of competition
in report writing from an increasing number of congressional staffers and from the advent of other
organizations which operated in areas of traditional FTC focus, such as oil, meat packing, and agricultural
products. BE History Roundtable, supra note 125, at 175-77. Organizations such as the Government
Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office, and the Energy Information Agency have economic
analysts and other researchers who can undertake microeconomic research and are available to Congress to
write reports. An alternative theory for the decline in presidential and congressional requests, put forward
by Willard Mueller, was that an increase in industry influence resulted in a reduction in such requests. Id.
at 177-79.
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itself became a larger source of ideas for studies in the 1940s and the level of reporting in
general fell.
Ideas for research topics from within the FTC have come from many sources.
Several studies have been essentially staff-initiated; many have been projects promoted
by the agency Chairman or the Commission; and others have been sponsored by multiple
bureaus. It is often difficult to identify a single source of a research idea. Often the
specific ideas come from staff, but with encouragement from agency leaders who may
have identified general areas for investigation. Other times, ideas for studies follow from
previous projects. In other instances, congressional interest, if not a direct congressional
request, might instigate a study.
b.

Current Approach to Research Topic Selection

As was true historically, in more recent times FTC research ideas have come from
a variety of sources. One apparent change, however, has been a recent increase in the
number of congressional mandates for research of various types. During the past few
years, a large portion of the research work has been generated by presidential or
congressional requests for examinations of various competition and consumer protection
issues. Such work has included, for example, competition in the contact lens
marketplace, 420 the levelness of the playing field for the U.S. Postal Service and its
private market rivals, 421 grocery retail slotting allowances, 422 and media violence. 423
Beyond these external requests, much recent FTC research has been initiated by
the agency’s Chairs. Such Chair-initiated work has included policy R&D efforts
involving the implications of the state action doctrine for competition law enforcement
and regulation, 424 health care competition and information issues, 425 and various efforts
to improve the transparency of the merger review process by releasing data on recent
merger decisions and analyses of such data. 426 The 1996 reports on competition and

420

See FTC, THE STRENGTH OF COMPETITION IN THE SALE OF RX CONTACT LENSES: AN FTC STUDY
(2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/contactlens/050214contactlensrpt.pdf.
421

See FTC, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWS THAT APPLY DIFFERENTLY TO THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
AND ITS PRIVATE COMPETITORS (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/080116postal.pdf.

422

See FTC STAFF, SLOTTING ALLOWANCES IN THE RETAIL GROCERY INDUSTRY: SELECTED CASE STUDIES
IN FIVE PRODUCT CATEGORIES (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/11/slottingallowancerpt031114.pdf.
423

See 2000 MEDIA VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 391.

424

See FTC STAFF, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf.
425

For a description of some of the FTC’s policy R&D efforts in the health care area, see
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/research/behealthcare.htm.

426

See, e.g., FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER INVESTIGATION DATA, FISCAL YEARS 1996-2007 (2008),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/12/081201hsrmergerdata.pdf.
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consumer protection policy in the twenty-first century in a global, high-tech marketplace
were other notable Chairman-initiated endeavors. 427
Non-Chairman Commissioners also have participated extensively in the
formulation of policy R&D projects, such as the examination of the municipal provision
of Wi-Fi Internet connectivity technology, 428 a recent workshop on the appropriate scope
of the “unfair methods of competition” language in Section 5 of the FTC Act, 429 and a
workshop on vertical restraints currently in development. 430
As has been true throughout the history of the FTC, many recent agency research
projects have been staff-initiated. 431 A few recent examples include comparisons over
time of television-based food marketing to children, 432 the effects of various regulations
on the provision of information in food advertising, 433 and a customer survey of rent-toown transactions. 434
In the recent past, the research production process within the agency largely has
been handled independently by each economic or legal organization. The choices of
topics and the approach to the research problem are generally decided within each group.
For example, within the Bureau of Economics, research projects are sometimes initiated
by economists who have been given small grants of time to undertake undirected
research. This research is monitored twice each year, but the review is intentionally
light-handed. As the projects within BE get larger and more formal, more review is
undertaken. For example, if an economist wanted the FTC to purchase relatively low427

See FTC STAFF, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH,
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc_v1.pdf; FTC STAFF,
ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: CONSUMER PROTECTION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc_v2.pdf.
428

See FTC STAFF, MUNICIPAL PROVISION OF WIRELESS INTERNET (2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/10/V060021municipalprovwirelessinternet.pdf.
429

See FTC Workshop, Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/index.shtml.
430

See FTC Press Release, FTC Announces Public Workshops for Next Year on Resale Price Maintenance
(Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/10/rpmwksp.shtm.

431

Staff-initiated projects are often influenced generally by overall agency preferences for research. For
example, without naming a particular research area or research question, a Chairman who indicates an
interest in research in broad areas of policy can induce effort by the staff to find projects that fit in those
policy areas.

432

See FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF, DEBRA J. HOLT, PAULINE M. IPPOLITO, DEBRA M.
DESROCHERS & CHRISTOPHER R. KELLEY, CHILDREN’S EXPOSURE TO TV ADVERTISING IN 1977 AND 2004:
INFORMATION FOR THE OBESITY DEBATE (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/cabecolor.pdf.
433

See FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF, PAULINE M. IPPOLITO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, ADVERTISING
NUTRITION & HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM FOOD ADVERTISING 1977-1997 (2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/advertisingfinal.pdf.
434

See FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF, JAMES M. LACKO, SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN & MANOJ
HASTAK, SURVEY OF RENT-TO-OWN CUSTOMERS (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/renttoown/renttoownr.pdf.
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cost data for a project, then the research would be reviewed by an ad hoc research
committee prior to initiation of the project. Parties outside BE, however, usually would
not be consulted. As projects increase in scope, the BE director and the Chairman’s
office eventually get involved. If data were to be obtained via compulsory process of
some sort, the relevant legal bureau and the General Counsel’s office also would become
immersed in that aspect of the project.
Similarly, other agency units – such as OPP, the BC Policy and Coordination
Office, and the General Counsel’s Policy Studies group – generate, monitor, and produce
their own research products. Even if the policy R&D projects are assigned to the
organization rather than internally generated, the plans for the project are typically
reviewed only within each organization (apart, of course, from informing the Chairman
and any organization leadership). The organizations typically do not turn to others for
review of their proposals or methods. Certain large projects might involve staff from
other organizations – particularly economists if data manipulation or analysis is involved
in the study – however, there would not typically be much cross-organization review of
the study proposal or study methods. 435
c.

Considerations for Setting a Research Agenda Going
Forward

There are several steps in the research process, including defining the broad topic
areas of interest for research, generating interesting, policy-relevant, and achievable ideas
within a topic area, and producing and monitoring the research. As discussed in the
previous section, in the recent past these tasks largely have been handled within each
FTC bureau or office. In principle, these tasks could be accomplished either in such a
decentralized manner or through a more systematic, centralized process involving the
simultaneous collection of research ideas from multiple sources, coordination of topic
choices, and then monitoring of output. 436
The selection of an optimal research process likely depends on the type of work
and output envisioned, as well as the effects on researcher incentives. Those staff
members who do research and have good research ideas typically are the most motivated
to aggressively pursue those ideas. Therefore, it is useful to allow staff members with

435

Top managers in each organization in the FTC learn about the existence and status of policy R&D
projects from the materials produced for semiannual management retreats and through monthly and weekly
reports prepared by the various organizations describing those activities.

436

Those roundtable panelists addressing the issue of appropriate sources for research ideas seemed to
think that good ideas might come from anywhere and that there is no reason to limit the sources of such
ideas. See, e.g., DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 128; Rubin, 7/30 DC Tr. at 176. The U.K. OFT recently used a
Web-based moderated dialogue approach to determine areas of current policy interest among academics,
business leaders, and others who might have useful ideas for pursuing policy R&D. The EC’s DG SANCO
also has recently undertaken extensive surveys in its Consumer Markets Scoreboard project to identify
areas of consumer dissatisfaction across the EU, which effort may be useful as a means of defining areas
ripe for policy R&D.
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interesting and feasible research ideas to pursue such ideas. 437 A process that solicits
ideas that are then taken from the idea generator likely will produce only very general
ideas. Such a process might be useful, however, if it is not costly and if general ideas (as
opposed to specific research plans) are the desired output.
Some roundtable panelists discussed the policy R&D process and suggested rather
different approaches. Former BE Director Michael Salinger, for instance, argued that
combining the agency’s policy groups might be sensible, but that the Bureau of
Economics research work should remain independent of the legal policy shops and that
the research process should remain decentralized. 438 One rationale for such a view would
be that the attorney-led organizations tend to produce top-down, workshop-intensive
studies of a similar type, while BE tends to produce more academic products with a
bottom-up orientation. In contrast, two former heads of legal policy shops, Susan
DeSanti 439 and Joseph Kattan, 440 favored a more centralized approach under which ideas
from a wide variety of sources would be vetted early and production would be centrally
controlled through an agency-wide committee (which presumably would report to the
Chairman or the Commission). The goals of such an approach would be to better control
the chosen topics – for example, to select projects that relate more closely with current
enforcement or advocacy priorities – and to coordinate resource deployment across
several relatively autonomous groups.
Two panelists independently described a staff/academic collaborative model of
research that would pursue a systematic research agenda based largely on agencyprovided data on competition issues. 441 The thrust of the argument in favor of this model
was that the FTC could gain by inducing collaboration from academics and their graduate
students through a data-provision scheme, in which academics gain access to the
agency’s internal and external data for research purposes in exchange for their research
efforts. Such collaboration might be furthered through visits from academics during
summers and sabbaticals. 442 Former BE Director Luke Froeb also discussed the
possibility of devising a general agenda by asking three questions: (1) What do you want
437

At least one panelist argued that allowing bottom-up research to occur was essential to maintaining a
research program. See Rubin, 7/30 DC Tr. at 176-77.
438

Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 168-69.

439

DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 128-31, 153.

440

Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 167-68.

441

See Nevo, Chicago Tr. at 277-88; Rose, Boston Tr. at 134-36. Aviv Nevo’s general argument for
stronger academic ties was also made by Nancy Rose, who suggested annual or biennial conferences with
academics on topics of interest, such as retrospectives, as well as expanded use of visiting academics and
developing ties with the National Bureau of Economic Research.

442

The Bureau of Economics currently has some ties to the academic community through its seminar series
and through its visiting scholars program – which brings in academics to the bureau for year-long visits –
and occasional joint research projects. BE also has recently joined with Northwestern University’s Searle
Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth and Northwestern’s Center for the Study of Industrial
Organization to co-sponsor an annual microeconomics conference to strengthen those academic ties. See
supra note 322.
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the information for?; (2) What do you want to know? (And can we know the long-run
effects?); and (3) What can we learn that will alter what we do? 443
On their face, these suggestions present very different notions about the best
mechanism to produce research. However, depending on which projects are included in
the centralized scheme, these visions may not be as different as they initially appear. If
one is searching for policy ideas to be explored in workshops or hearings, then a
formalized topic selection process and report production scheme may be feasible.
Obtaining ideas from a large set of sources might provide a richer choice set. Some level
of coordination of the large externally and Commission-driven projects also might be
appropriate. Currently, those projects are controlled by an assigned group, but higherlevel coordination almost always occurs and centralization might make that process
proceed more smoothly. Whether such coordination needs to entail centralized control of
production is a more difficult issue, as that may unfavorably alter incentives. As
discussed above, individual staff members and organizations may not devote substantial
resources to developing good projects if those projects are then taken over by other
organizations. In addition, a centralized model would not make much sense for the
smaller, bottom-up research projects because centralization would add little value and
discourage development. Central planning can identify broad areas of interest, but it is
very unlikely to produce specific achievable project ideas. The ideas for any interesting
projects likely will have to be done on a less prescribed basis. Furthermore, the impetus
for some of the best policy-relevant economic research is often the recognition of a new
data source or method of analysis that could be used to shed light on questions
surrounding a particular policy. A high degree of centralization may cause such
opportunities to go unrecognized.
Based on discussions with managers in various other governmental economic
policy shops, research – particularly bottom-up economic or scientific research – seems
to be a decentralized activity in many government organizations. 444 For a segment of the
research work, researchers tend to generate their own ideas within relevant bounds and
pursue the topics with little oversight. Another segment of policy R&D work is directed
or top-down research and the production of those outputs is more heavily monitored.
Even in that context, however, the monitoring appears to be handled within a relatively
small group, rather than coordinated across groups.
To generate useful policy R&D topics for large projects, without imposing
unnecessary costs on smaller, more research-oriented projects, perhaps a review process
that differs by level of resource commitment might be the best schema. This might
443

Froeb, 7/30 DC Tr. at 214-17, 269. Froeb ultimately, however, did not think a broad systematic agenda
would be very helpful and suggested narrow efforts to examine opportunistically the outcomes of market
events.
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Interviews regarding the research process and policy work at DG Comp, the Federal Reserve Board, the
Congressional Budget Office, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the DOJ
Antitrust Division’s Economic Analysis Group were conducted in June and September, 2008. Each of
those agencies makes use of economists and each produces some policy outputs. However, the FTC
appears to undertake more noneconomist research and policy work than do the other organizations.
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maintain flexibility and reduce bureaucracy at the low end, while improving monitoring
at the upper end. Recent FTC Chairmen have used a combination of weekly and monthly
reports and semiannual senior management retreats to review the progress of ongoing
projects and to promote potential new ideas.
For relatively smaller projects – such as those proposed by the economics staff
that do not require significant data purchases and that have working papers or private
publication in journals as the envisioned output – little review or monitoring is required.
For instance, the Bureau of Economics currently handles such undirected research via a
time grant process and periodic monitoring by managers in its recently established Office
of Applied Research and Outreach. 445
Occasionally, staff propose projects that may require significant time and some
data expense, but not require compulsory process or expensive data purchases. For such
projects, proposal preparation by the author and bureau/office review has been the norm.
Managers within the organization have provided oversight of the project.
Projects that require major data purchases or that grow directly from the agency’s
agenda, projects requiring compulsory process, and congressionally requested projects
may warrant more monitoring and control than do the smaller projects discussed
previously. Such large project proposals could be made subject to an intra-agency review
process, if such a process would add value or allow for better resource allocation
decisions. The cost would be some loss of autonomy and responsibility for the individual
group leading the project and perhaps for the individual authors, but that price may be
offset by gains in coordination or in improved topic selection. 446
d.

Selected Research Ideas Identified during External
Consultations

Roundtable panelists provided a wide array of specific suggestions for research
topics. The most frequently mentioned area for research was examination of outcomes
following merger reviews – that is, merger retrospectives. 447 As discussed below in
Chapter VII, however, there was a significant divergence of opinion regarding the value
of such work. Related to the merger retrospective work, the testing of merger simulation
445

Each of the interviews with other government organizations indicated that offering at least some amount
of this type of research time was important to meet the market for research-capable Ph.D. economists,
especially for newly minted Ph.D.s.
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One approach to idea generation might entail use of a research staff person who occasionally (perhaps
annually) collects general policy R&D ideas from across the agency and from informed outsiders, and culls
that list down for further consideration. Those general ideas that have the most merit could then be
forwarded to organizations within the agency for preparation of specific project proposals. The best
proposals might then be chosen for action, with the specific shop that generated the chosen idea/proposal
being given responsibility for production. The staffer could monitor and report on progress, but would not
necessarily control the production process.
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See, e.g., Ghosal, 7/30 DC Tr. at 242-43, 273-74; Picker, Chicago Tr. at 166-69; Scheffman, NY Tr. at
79-80.
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models also was proposed as a project. 448 Such efforts would be aimed at determining
whether any of the theoretical models of oligopoly behavior that drive the simulation
results fit actual merger outcomes. Some such work has been undertaken recently by two
FTC economists, as well as an economist at DOJ. 449
Beyond merger retrospectives and simulations, several other competition topics
were suggested. Perhaps the leading topic currently among antitrust-focused academics
is bundled discounts, including so-called “all units” discounts. 450 The London roundtable
produced suggestions for research on two-sided markets and the implications of
behavioral economics for competition policy, 451 as well as consumer goods and services
monopolies that produce consumer “lock-in” in the aftermarket stage. 452
Studies of the effects of resale price maintenance and single-firm market power
also were mentioned, although not everyone was confident such work could actually be
done in a convincing fashion. 453 Retrospective work on remedies also was proposed. 454
Several participants proposed studies of regulatory effects, particularly in the
telecommunications arena. Two economists described a previous BE staff study of the
Federal Communication Commission’s must carry rules as a model for future efforts to
find natural experiments to test theories of exclusion. 455 The idea of looking for natural
experiments (that sometimes occur in locally regulated industries) was a theme that
reappeared several times during the external consultations in various guises. 456
Calls for generalized studies of industry also were forthcoming. Salinger lauded
such studies as being helpful to get to essential factual issues of conduct affecting an
448

See Wickelgren, Nevo, and Carlton, Chicago Tr. at 231-41.
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See Matthew C. Weinberg & Daniel Hosken, Using Mergers to Test a Model of Oligopoly (University
of Georgia Department of Economics Working Paper, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/microeconomics/docs/mweinberg.pdf; Craig Peters, Evaluating the
Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry, 49 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2006).
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See Werden, 7/30 DC Tr. at 267-68.
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See Vickers, London Tr. at 78-79.
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See Fingleton, London Tr. at 61-62.
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Compare Werden, 7/30 DC Tr. at 247-50, with Carlton, Chicago Tr. at 255-57.
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See Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 89-90; Leveque, Paris Tr. at 112; First, NY Tr. at 78.

455

See Froeb and Hazlett, 7/30 DC Tr. at 259-60, 269-70. The panelists discussed Michael G. Vita, Must
Carry Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Empirical Analysis, 12 J. REG. ECON. 159 (1997). The
natural experiment in Vita’s paper was the elimination of the must carry rules in the late 1980s on First
Amendment grounds. This exogenous change in the regulatory regime gave cable systems discretion as to
which (if any) local stations they would carry; it allowed clean testing of various hypotheses about the
rationale for cable system carriage decisions. Nevo echoed Froeb’s call for opportunistic use of data to test
the effects of various competition policy choices. Nevo, Chicago Tr. at 284.
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Two participants indicated that China’s new competition law may provide a fertile area for opportunistic
examination of the effects of antitrust generally in that nation. See Shapiro and Carlton, Chicago Tr. at
208, 212.
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industry. 457 Sector studies were suggested, as were broad studies of issues that cut across
sectors, such as entry. 458 OFT Chief Executive John Fingleton discussed the importance
of long-term sectoral studies as tools for relationship building, which can serve as
effective means of both staying informed of industry conduct and providing a softer
means of enforcement. 459 Simon Pritchard of the OFT said that sectoral relationships
built through ongoing studies are very important to achieving regulatory outcomes by
preventing or deterring anticompetitive conduct in advance, which is a positive result
reached at much lower costs to the agency. 460 During the OFT consultation, staff
discussed how a sector study enables the agency to obtain baseline data relevant to
competitive conditions, which can prove useful in subsequent investigations. 461 At the
Tokyo roundtable, panelists discussed how, for the last 10 years, the JFTC has performed
and published about 30 such sector studies, which have enabled the agency to better
grasp the state of affairs in the marketplace. 462
One panelist proposed studies that would identify the types of evidence that
appear to be persuasive to federal judges in antitrust litigations. 463 Another participant
suggested that the FTC examine the effects of the substantial changes in U.S. antitrust
policy over the past 20 years. 464
On the consumer protection side, roundtable panelists mentioned advertising and
the regulated professions as useful areas for re-examination. Regarding advertising,
suggested areas for study included an examination of how well disclosures in advertising
really work – that is, are they seen, read, and comprehended, and how might one evaluate
the meaning and message of ads without text? 465 In addition, one participant noted the
proliferation of anti-aging claims of various sorts aimed at the aging Baby Boomer
generation, suggesting that those areas might provide fertile ground for studies. 466
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Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 139-40.
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See Leveque, Paris Tr. at 112; Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 94-95; Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 116-17;
Consultation with DG Comp, Oct. 21, 2008.
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Fingleton, London Tr. at 55-56.
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Pritchard, London Tr. at 99.
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Consultation with OFT, Sept. 11, 2008. OFT staff explained that by gathering the baseline data through
a market study, the agency may obtain more information relative to the limited set of data that is obtainable
through a particular investigation. Id.
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Tokyo Roundtable, Oct. 7, 2008.
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See Swire, NY Tr. at 86.
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See Rose, Boston Tr. at 94.
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See Greenbaum, NY Tr. at 194-96 (addressing disclosures); Swire, NY Tr. at 198-99 (addressing ads
without text).
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See Levine, NY Tr. at 197.
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Similar to the calls for more advocacy-related research, examination of the effects
of regulations by non-market-oriented regulatory agencies also was proposed. 467 In
addition, critically examining the implications of behavioral economics in market settings
was discussed. 468 Study of online behavioral advertising also was proposed as a useful
addition to the FTC research agenda. 469
*

*

*

Agency leadership must motivate the staff to pursue the agency’s mission, both
by clearly communicating that mission to staff and by listening to staff’s input on how
best to achieve the mission. Strategic planning allows the agency to identify competition
and consumer protection problems on the horizon, as well as determine which tool or
tools with which to address such problems. Policy R&D is a necessary foundation for
tackling the challenging competition and consumer protection policy issues that the
agency has been tasked with addressing. The FTC’s efforts in these three areas –
leadership, planning, and research – significantly impact the agency’s ability to deploy its
resources in an effective manner. The following chapter addresses how the agency
currently deploys its resources, as well as how it might improve on such deployment in
the future.
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MacLeod (7/30 DC Tr. at 177-80) and Calfee and Rubin (7/30 DC Tr. at 171-76) argued that the best
FTC research historically was that focused on policies of other regulatory agencies (for example, those
involving restrictions in the areas of advertising, optometry, and legal services). Supporting that view, a
panelist at the Paris roundtable noted that the FTC study on the effects of advertising on the practice of
optometry is over 20 years old but remains the best in its class. Philips, Paris Tr. at 131-32.
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See Rubin, 7/30 DC Tr. at 171-72, 187-89; Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 183; Calfee, 7/30 DC Tr. at 184-87.
In addition, Peter Swire suggested that the FTC more thoroughly examine the connections between
behavioral economics and experimental economics and their implications for online commerce. Swire, NY
Tr. at 198-99; Written Submission of Peter P. Swire, Oct. 29, 2008, at 6-7.
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See Swire, NY Tr. at 198-99.
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VI.

Deployment of Agency Resources

This chapter discusses the FTC’s deployment of resources in pursuit of its
competition and consumer protection missions, identifying considerations that might
guide such deployment. Section A addresses general issues involving the allocation of
resources across the agency’s many functions. Section B reviews the FTC’s resource
deployment options, illustrating the many tools – such as enforcement, advocacy,
research, and education – available to the agency.
A.

General Issues Involving Resource Allocation

An agency’s allocation of its scarce resources undoubtedly is one of the most
significant determinants of its ultimate success. Once it identifies a desired outcome –
for example, a reduction in the number of deceptive weight-loss claims – a successful
agency will make optimal use of its tools to achieve that outcome
Resource allocation, then, is to a large extent a matter of picking the right tool or
tools from the FTC’s existing arsenal – or adding new tools to that arsenal – to best
address the matter at hand. At the Chicago roundtable, then-BE Director Michael Baye
framed the analysis in terms of being at the right point of “a production possibilities
curve that doesn’t have guns and butter on it but has all the different outputs that the
Federal Trade Commission can produce.” 470 A roundtable panelist suggested that,
assuming the FTC seeks to deploy its resources in such a manner as to maximize
consumer welfare, the agency should engage in efforts that produce “the biggest gain to
marginal consumer welfare.” 471
Resource allocation decisions also should consider the potential costs, to the
public as well as the agency, of pursuing particular activities. A senior OFT official
observed that an agency’s tools vary in terms of the risk and cost associated with each of
them. The OFT, he continued, is able to achieve certain outcomes at a lower cost by
employing “softer enforcement,” such as building relationships with key stakeholders and
other advocacy efforts, rather than “swinging heavy tools around at high costs.” 472
Another panelist cautioned that, when deciding where to devote resources, an agency
should consider more carefully the cost of making a wrong decision in bringing a case or
taking some other action. 473
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Baye, Chicago Tr. at 268.
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Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 25. Another roundtable panelist maintained that the resource allocation issue
should be framed more broadly, explaining that “the question should not be how the FTC can allocate its
resources, it should be how the United States should allocate its resources. You’re sub-optimizing if you
simply look at what the FTC can do to make the best of the resources it has.” Angland, NY Tr. at 26.
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Pritchard, London Tr. at 97-98.
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See Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 110 (“If you had reason to believe that with some reasonable probability,
maybe only 30 percent, permitting [a] merger could lead to wonderful things for the economy, in a
circumstance like that, you might want to think twice before bringing the case.”).
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Tool selection, much like strategic planning, should include a certain amount of
flexibility. 474 It may be the case, for example, that business education and policy R&D
efforts such as workshops are the best tools to address a relatively new and complicated
issue in the marketplace. However, if there is an insufficient response on the part of
industry to such efforts, it may be that enforcement actions are necessary to more
effectively accomplish the agency’s objectives on such issue.
In addition to general praise for the FTC’s allocation of its resources,475
roundtable panelists had specific suggestions for such allocation. Most significantly, a
fairly broad consensus formed around the idea that, although law enforcement is a
primary function of the FTC, the Commission needs to remain more than just an
enforcement agency. As former Chairman Timothy Muris explained, on the antitrust
side, to be recognized as really doing your job, it is necessary, but not sufficient, to bring
cases. 476 According to former BC Director Susan Creighton, the mission on both sides of
the agency is to preserve the effectiveness of markets. The overall priority of the agency
thus is to determine where there are instances of market failure and to address those.
Sometimes the best tool to do that will be enforcement; sometimes, however,
enforcement is not the right tool.477 Former BC Director Richard Parker noted that in
pursuing a particular policy, the agency cannot rely solely on law enforcement because
the right cases may not present themselves; it may be that other tools, such as guidelines,
for example, will need to be used to pursue the desired policy. 478
Panelists also offered various suggestions as to how the agency should make
resource allocation decisions. One panelist cautioned against focusing on a particular
area or issue merely because it is novel. According to the panelist, the FTC has focused
474

See, e.g., Pritchard, London Tr. at 105 (“We don’t hesitate to switch tools[;] . . . if we find that actually
there is a nut that does not crack with some hammer then we are not wedded to sticking to the original
tool.”).
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See, e.g., Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 98 (“I think that whatever their resources happen to be, they’re
allocating them reasonably nicely.”) (complimenting specifically the agency’s efforts in the competition
advocacy and international arenas); Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 114-15 (“I think that the things you
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Wilks, London Tr. at 37-38 (characterizing the agency’s nonlitigation efforts – including, for example,
competition advocacy, consumer education, and competition R&D – as having been “extraordinarily
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Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 54. See also Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement
at the Federal Trade Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 213-14 (2005) (“Another important change in
the Commission’s approach to regulation, contributing to its enhanced status, involves the recognition that
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Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 75-76.
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Parker, 7/29 DC Tr. at 118. See also T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 48 (arguing that, although law
enforcement plays an “important part” in the agency’s mission, it should include more than just
enforcement); Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 53 (suggesting that the agency ought to be “beating a drum at the
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111

resources on “new and burgeoning” areas, and there are benefits to that course, including
“sending a message of deterrence right at the outset where you see the potential for
fraud.” He cautioned, however, that the agency should not address an area simply
because it is new; it must be important as well. 479 Another panelist suggested that the
agency’s resources might be focused “more on what the FTC can do distinctively because
that may be where the biggest marginal gains are.” 480 In other words, asked the panelist,
what can the FTC do that neither the DOJ nor private antitrust actions can do? 481
Similarly, another panelist asserted: “In an era of limited resources, the focus of the
agency should be where two criteria are met: (1) a topic has important effects on
consumers; and (2) the FTC has a significant advantage in effectiveness compared with
other possible ways to address the topic[, including, for instance,] state enforcement,
enforcement by agencies in other countries, self-regulation, or reliance on market
forces.” 482
Finally, former General Counsel Stephen Calkins complimented the simultaneous
use of agency tools within a specific area. Citing the example of recent FTC (and DOJ)
actions in the real estate brokerage industry, Calkins argued that “that actually is an
example of the whole process working well because the agencies are litigating and doing
advocacy and doing [policy] R&D and using a whole panoply of their resources, which I
tend to think is when things work best. . . . My guess is that that linking together is what
really works.” 483
B.

The FTC’s Many Resource Deployment Options
1.

Law Enforcement/Litigation

The FTC’s law enforcement authority encompasses both consumer protection and
antitrust. The basic consumer protection statute enforced by the Commission is Section
5(a) of the FTC Act, which declares unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.” 484 Drawing on a 1980 Commission policy statement, Congress in
1994 defined “unfair” practices as those that “cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
479
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Written Submission of Peter P. Swire, Oct. 29, 2008, at 3. See also Swire, NY Tr. at 161-63
(recommending that the agency “go after important issues and especially focus on things that other
[enforcement agencies] aren’t going to do very well” and identifying forensics and new technologies as
areas in which the FTC likely has a comparative advantage over local enforcers).
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Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 74. See also Boast, NY Tr. at 31-32 (“[T]here are . . . wonderfully unique things
about the FTC and the history of the statute and the agency that allow it to deploy multiple sets of tools to
the advantage of consumers.”).
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15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). The basic prohibition (though initially limited to acts or practices “in commerce”)
was added to the FTC Act in 1938; previously, the Commission had challenged what would now be called
“consumer protection” violations as unfair methods of competition.
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outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” 485 In addition,
the Commission enforces a variety of specific consumer protection statutes – for
example, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Truth-in-Lending Act, Fair Credit Reporting
Act, the Cigarette Labeling Act, the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
of 2003, the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003 and others 486 – that prohibit specifically defined trade practices and generally
specify that violations are to be treated as if they were “unfair or deceptive” acts or
practices under Section 5(a). The Commission enforces the substantive requirements of
consumer protection law through both administrative and judicial processes.
The Commission enforces various antitrust laws, most significantly Section 5(a)
of the FTC Act and provisions of the Clayton Act, through its Bureau of Competition.
Section 5(a) of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition.” 487 Unfair
methods of competition include any conduct that would violate the Sherman Antitrust
Act. The Clayton Act prohibits, among other things, corporate acquisitions that may tend
substantially to lessen competition 488 and certain forms of price discrimination. 489 As
with its consumer protection responsibilities, the Commission uses both administrative
and judicial processes to enforce antitrust law. 490
Enforcement Goals. In allocating resources to its law enforcement efforts, the
agency should first consider the goals that underlie such efforts. As discussed in more
detail in Chapter VII.B below, among the most important goals of the FTC’s law
enforcement mission are providing guidance to industry, developing sound law, and
obtaining consumer redress. Deterrence of unlawful conduct, however, is the lodestar of
the agency’s law enforcement efforts. Former BCP Assistant Director Paul Luehr
expressed the view that the FTC’s role as an enforcer – particularly since the early 1990s
– “has really given the agency added heft. No longer [is it] considered just the nanny on
Pennsylvania Avenue full of regulations, rules related to the frosted cocktail glass, and
things like this. But now [it is seen as bringing] real cases in federal court against real
wrong doers and I think that has had a real deterrent effect and many other salutary
effects on the market.” 491 According to former BCP Deputy Director Lee Peeler, an
485
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Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 25-26. See also id. at 46-47 (“So in terms of allocation of resources, I don’t think
that too much can be said about the effect of real federal cases.”).
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active enforcement program provides the agency with credibility – “street cred” – when it
goes to another government agency, a state, or a consumer group and advocates a certain
approach to consumer protection. 492 Another roundtable panelist explained that “the
notion of demonstrating to the bar and the business community that the cop is really on
the beat is a really important part of the agency’s enforcement mission.” 493
Caseload. An important consideration in allocating resources to law enforcement
efforts is the appropriate number of cases to pursue at any given time. As former
Chairman Muris has written, an agency that takes on commitments that significantly
outrun its capabilities does so at its own peril:
Agencies can create a serious problem by taking on so
many matters that the agency lacks the human capital to
execute them well. Again the overambitious case load in
the 1970s overtaxed the agenc[y’s] capabilities, thereby
raising doubts about the FTC’s ability to handle the matters
successfully. The Commission would have been far better
off choosing a smaller number of matters and handling
them well. 494
Resource allocation and caseload are also considerations when requests for
cooperation are received from foreign counterparts. Although it has not been a problem
to date, as more and more FTC investigations and cases – for both missions – involve
foreign elements, the agency as a whole may need to consider the resource implications
of cooperation with foreign counterparts in investigations and litigation. In a number of
instances, the investment of FTC resources on behalf of a foreign government may
encourage foreign agencies to invest their resources to support FTC enforcement matters.
This ingredient of reciprocity warrants attention in deciding how to allocate FTC
resources.
Case Generation. Another consideration in evaluating the agency’s law
enforcement efforts is the amount and type of case generation in which the agency
492
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McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 53 (“Most antitrust enforcement in this country, and I think around the world,
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conference rooms in our law firms, where we tell the clients the risks that attach to the conduct that they are
proposing . . . . And our ability to get the attention of the business people and have them take us seriously
when we tell them, you are close to the line or you are over the line, is directly correlated to the things that
do happen [at the agency] and in your enforcement mission.”). See also Written Submission of Tim
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of FTC enforcement policy. In essence, the agency cannot afford to shrink from putting its money where
its mouth is.”); Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 85 (“To get companies and individuals to take seriously the impact of
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and enforcement].”).
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engages. Former BC Director Richard Parker recommended that the agency be
innovative in the area of case generation, citing trade press – particularly in fungible
commodity industries with few sellers – and trade association bylaws as sources of
potential cases. 495 Former BCP Assistant Director Darren Bowie argued that an approach
of generating cases and seeing which ones percolate to the top is not effective. Instead,
the agency fares better when everyone – including the Commission, managers, and staff –
understand what the enforcement strategy is and why the agency is bringing the cases that
it is bringing. 496
Case Selection. Perhaps the most important consideration in evaluating the
enforcement efforts of the FTC is its case selection. Such evaluation should consider
where the agency decides to focus its enforcement efforts. For example, should that
focus be where potential consumer benefits and/or redress are largest? Should the focus
be on areas involving the greatest amount of commerce? How much of the agency’s
enforcement efforts should be devoted to developing or clarifying competition and
consumer protection doctrine? Does the agency have the right mix of high risk/high
reward or cutting-edge cases, on the one hand, and low risk/low reward or traditional
cases, on the other? Is the agency properly calibrating its litigation risk? How should the
agency incorporate investigative and case cooperation commitments to foreign
counterparts consistent with resource constraints?
External consultations confirmed the importance of focusing enforcement efforts
on significant portions of the national economy, including health care, energy, and retail
markets. In deploying enforcement resources, according to former BC Director William
Baer, it would be reckless not to take a hard look at what is important in the economy
generally, such as health care, information technology, and Internet commerce. He
cautioned, however, that such a focus will not necessarily result in most of the agency’s
cases being brought in those areas; rather, the agency has to go “where the money and the
problems are.” 497 Another panelist agreed that the agency ought to focus on significant
sectors of the economy; however, he added that the agency needs to “use a number of
different tests and see whether the result of applying more than one leads [it] to the same
conclusion.” 498
Former BC Director Susan Creighton has remarked that the agency should “fish
where the fish are.” 499 Specifically, she cited two instances of market failure in which
enforcement can be the right tool. The first instance involves legal failure – that is, areas,
such as the state action and Noerr-Pennington doctrines, in which the development of
495
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the things you catch are likely to be fish.”).
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antitrust law appears to be going in the wrong direction. The second instance is where
there are no other proper plaintiffs whose interests coincide with the public interest,
perhaps due to a collective-action problem. 500
According to roundtable panelists, the agency also should consider focusing its
law enforcement efforts in such a manner as to both leverage its resources and exploit its
comparative advantages. Baer recommended that the agency select areas in which the
agency can leverage its resources by, for example, serving as a model for local and state
officials to emulate, with the end result being “more cops on the beat than just the
FTC.” 501 Luehr suggested that the number of consumers injured – not just the amount of
potential redress – should be taken into consideration because few entities other than the
FTC can take on high-volume consumer cases. 502 Similarly, another panelist observed
that, unlike in Europe, the U.S. has a “parallel system” of private enforcement that may
provide the FTC with the opportunity to forego certain cases that may be better suited for
such private enforcement. 503
In addition to the more traditional leads for investigations (such as complaints or
merger notifications), some foreign counterparts such as the U.K. OFT increasingly are
adopting a more intelligence-led, proactive approach to case selection. The OFT has
committed significant resources to idea generation, establishing a horizon scanning team
to coordinate generation of new project ideas within the office, as well as a monthly
project ideas group that brings together individuals from across the office responsible for
researching and developing ideas for new work. All OFT investigations, independently
of their source, are prioritized according to their likely impact and strategic significance,
balanced against the risks and resources needed. 504 This prioritization framework is
applied at group and area management levels with escalation to the senior management
team when necessary. 505
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Factors considered include: (1) specific deterrence (i.e. to stop a repeat wrongdoer); (2) the need for
judicial interpretation of a specific legal principle; (3) prevention or correction of conduct; (4) general
deterrence; (5) awareness/promotion of compliance; (6) addressing particularly flagrant or egregious
conduct; and (7) meeting the Bureau’s obligations to law enforcement partners. Consultation with
Canadian Competition Bureau, Sept. 17, 2008.
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Another relevant factor in selecting cases is the litigation risk attendant to
pursuing any given case. In the various external consultations, there was a fairly uniform
view that the agency ought to be less risk-averse in bringing cases. Parker bluntly stated
that “if you weigh the risk of losing too much, you are never going to bring a case.” 506
Former BC Assistant Director Joseph Kattan remarked that “the function of the agency as
an enforcement agency is to get the right answer. It is not to win cases for the sake of
winning cases.” 507 Another panelist argued that, although the agency has to win “a
reasonable proportion” of the cases that it brings, “you also have to recognize that at least
from time to time you’re going to have to bring cases to try to establish the law where
either it seems to be wrong or it isn’t sufficiently clear or you want to push the
boundaries, to some extent, and . . . you can’t guarantee [that you will] win cases of that
kind.” 508 A panelist at the Tokyo roundtable argued that the FTC would make the most
of its human resources – particularly its economists – by pursuing difficult cases and not
being overly concerned about winning or losing a particular case. 509 Bruno Lasserre, the
head of the Conseil de la Concurrence, noted that a well-reasoned opinion dismissing a
complaint can be as valuable in developing legal standards as an opinion that finds
liability. 510
Similarly, Bowie explained: “The Commission’s reputation is strong enough that
it can afford to take some risks in the right cases where there is a clearly defined
consumer harm that the agency can articulate and that outsiders and insiders can
understand. In those cases, it is worth taking some risks and the Commission can afford
to do more of that.” 511 Former BE Director David Scheffman characterized the agency
staff as “very conservative” in bringing cases, identifying as one of the causes the fact
that litigation losses tend to be felt primarily by career staff, who continue to be at the
agency when adverse decisions are rendered, rather than senior staff and the
Commissioners, who may have departed the agency by such time. 512
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Fora. The FTC is able to pursue its law enforcement mission through both
administrative processes (in so-called Part III proceedings) and judicial processes (in
federal district court). The agency must make a determination as to the proper forum for
the various enforcement actions that it pursues, and primary considerations may be that
the Commission’s authority to obtain redress, disgorgement, and other equitable remedies
is well established only in a judicial setting, while the agency has more opportunity to
apply its expertise in an administrative setting.
Remedies. Another significant factor in making law enforcement decisions is the
appropriate remedy that the FTC should seek in any given case; as noted above, this may
be key to selecting a judicial or administrative forum.
A relevant consideration is whether the agency is using its remedial powers –
including conduct, structural, and monetary remedies – properly and effectively. Several
panelists commended the FTC’s 1999 merger remedies study 513 for helping to refine the
agency’s pursuit of appropriate remedies. 514 Panelists also addressed the FTC’s authority
to pursue disgorgement as a remedy for antitrust violations of the FTC Act. One panelist
touted the benefits of disgorgement, arguing that injunctive remedies, such as cease and
desist orders, and even structural remedies, often are inefficient and ineffective; by
comparison, disgorgement can take away the benefits of the unlawful conduct from its
perpetrator, thereby providing much greater deterrence of those violations in a more
efficient manner. 515 Others, including former Commissioner Thomas Leary, argued
against the imposition of such “retrospective consequences in the antitrust field.” 516
Whatever the remedy sought in any particular matter, such remedy should be
identified as early as possible in the course of the matter. If no workable remedy is
possible, the agency might reconsider pursuing such matter. As one panelist framed the
issue, “[It is] very important, before ever taking an individual case on, . . . to ask yourself
a question[:] if I had to put a remedy in place, what would it be and will it make things
better or worse? . . . [T]hat is a very important discipline to take on before one gets
involved in an individual case.” 517
A larger consideration for the agency is whether its existing remedial powers are
appropriate, given its competition and consumer missions. As one example, the FTC has
very limited authority to pursue civil penalties for violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
The Commission has testified before Congress that there are categories of cases in which
“restitution or disgorgement may not be appropriate or sufficient remedies” and thus
513

1999 DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 408.
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See, e.g., McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 87; Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 89.
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See Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 61-63.
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Leary, 7/29 DC Tr. at 24.
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Venit, Brussels Tr. at 14-15. See also Koponen, Brussels Tr. at 22 (“[O]n the Section 2 side of things, I
think we’ve seen, not least here in Europe, some big question marks around remedies that have been
imposed or have been considered in those types of cases.”).
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“civil penalties could enable the Commission to better achieve the law enforcement goal
of deterrence.” 518
Settlements and Closing Statements. The vast majority of cases pursued by the
agency – much like those pursued by private parties – are settled prior to or during
litigation. In addition, the agency recently has issued statements in connection with the
closing of certain matters, generally discussing the reasons for not pursuing such matters.
Consent decrees and closing statements are thus examined by industry and the bar for
guidance as to the agency’s enforcement stance in a given area of competition or
consumer protection law. Relevant considerations in this area include whether the
agency is making proper use of consent orders and closing statements and, more
specifically, whether the agency can provide more information and reasoning in such
documents than it currently does.
Kattan explained that the public analyzes consent orders because “this is how the
Commission broadcasts to the world what its enforcement priorities are. So long before
there was a Rambus case, there was a Dell case[,] . . . which was a consent order, [in]
which the Commission laid out a policy regarding patent ambush.” 519 Luehr claimed that
FTC staff does not realize the extent to which companies look at final orders – bullet-bybullet – to determine what they need to do to ensure that they are in compliance with the
consumer protection laws. 520 Another roundtable panelist, however, questioned the value
of FTC consent decrees – particularly in the merger context – characterizing them as
“articles of surrender” signed by CEOs wanting to get their mergers approved and stuffed
full of “exotic theories” held by the Commission. 521
Roundtable panelists consistently favored the concept of issuing closing
statements, describing them as “very useful,” 522 “excellent,” 523 and “one of the great
innovations of the last five or six years.” 524 One panelist extolled the “transparency that
comes from things like some of the very informative closing statements that the Federal
Trade Commission pioneered a while back.” He specifically cited the statement issued in
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Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization: Hearing on the Federal Trade Commission
Reauthorization Act of 2008 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 110th Cong. 10-11
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connection with the closing of the Cruise Line matter, 525 saying that it was “very good
because it not only informed people, . . . but it also allowed people to debate things
publicly, and that is something that helps lead you towards a better answer.” 526
Similarly, former BC Scholar in Residence Joshua Wright observed that an agency may
be more careful in its analysis of a particular matter if it anticipates issuing a closing
statement in such matter. 527 Another panelist made the point that closing statements are
particularly important in highly visible matters, observing that “part of deterrence [is] to
be out there showing how [the agencies are] thinking about cases that are visible and
important[,] . . . [b]ut if you’re not bringing the visible case, maybe you should explain
why not.” 528
There are, of course, various concerns raised by the practice of issuing closing
statements and agency transparency more generally. Former BC Project Director for
Intellectual Property Hillary Greene identified the following concerns: resource
constraints, confidentiality, undermining agency discretion in future cases, and explaining
decisions that are based on administrative considerations or that involve “mixed
motives.” 529 A former Canadian competition official explained how he encountered
significant resistance to his decision “to not only explain on the public record those cases
where we were challenging but, in high profile matters, reasons why we decided in the
end not to challenge the matter.” As he explained, his counterparts in the United States,
in particular, warned him of potential litigation over such closing statements. 530
2.

Policy Research and Development

As discussed in more detail above in Chapter V.C, policy research and
development at the FTC includes a broad array of activities designed to inform the
agency’s pursuit of its competition and consumer protection missions. These activities
include workshops, hearings, studies, reports, and ex post assessments of agency
initiatives and actions.
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Consultations with various outside parties and representatives from other
competition and consumer protection agencies identified significant support for the
FTC’s allocation of resources to its policy R&D efforts. Former Chairman Muris
characterized such efforts as “part and parcel of the [agency’s] mission.” 531 Former
Commissioner Leary described the policy R&D program as more than just a “support
service of the Bureaus,” stating that he would make the program part of the agency’s core
mission. 532 Former OPP Deputy Director Jerry Ellig, who is involved in government
agency review efforts at the George Mason University Mercatus Center, offered that he
tells other government agencies that they can learn from what the FTC does in the policy
R&D area. He described such R&D as “a crucial input into the [FTC’s] good decisionmaking.” 533 Another roundtable panelist opined: “The FTC’s special mission in the
policy area, I think, has been extraordinarily valuable.” 534
In addition, the ABA Transition Report recently made the following
recommendation: “The U.S. agencies should devote substantial resources to providing
intellectual leadership and increasing transparency through policy research and
development. . . . Although they can be resource-intensive, ‘policy research and
development’ efforts such as empirical studies, hearings, reports, and literature surveys
can play a vital role in the development of [antitrust] standards that strike the proper
balance between under- and over-deterrence.” 535
3.

Advocacy

As an important complement to its law enforcement mission (and as a component
of its relations with other domestic agencies, as discussed in Chapter IV.C), the FTC
engages in competition and consumer protection advocacy before other policymakers,
including state legislatures, regulatory boards, and officials; state and federal courts;
other federal agencies; and professional organizations, such as bar associations. In
response to requests or where public comments are sought, the FTC issues advocacy
letters, comments, and amicus briefs, providing policymakers with a framework to
analyze competition and consumer protection issues raised by pending governmental
actions or ongoing judicial disputes. Advocacy can play a particularly important role in
addressing governmentally imposed restraints on competition, where (unless a state body
acts outside the proper confines of the state action doctrine), other tools may be
unavailable. 536
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External consultations confirmed the important informational purpose served by
the agency’s advocacy efforts. Panelist Ken Heyer explained that “one of the reasons
why regulations and laws that are harmful or anticompetitive in some way manage to
flourish . . . is because the costs associated with them are not obvious to people who don’t
spend their lives studying them.” 537 Competition advocacy, Heyer continued, helps “to
illustrate the costs associated with certain types of policies. And, at that point, you have
to leave things up to democracy to decide. But at least you’re clarifying and highlighting
what the costs of certain [policies] are.” 538 Similarly, another panelist stated that
advocacy letters to state legislatures are “quite useful” because often the only source of
information regarding a particular bill is the advocates of such bill, including the
industries that stand to benefit from the bill’s passage. 539
There was strong support among those consulted for the FTC’s advocacy efforts.
Several panelists expressed the view that the agency’s advocacy efforts entail both
relatively low costs 540 and potentially significant benefits. 541 As a result, advocacy tends
to be on net a productive use of agency resources. 542 Joseph Kattan described
competition advocacy as “one of the more important things that the Commission
does.” 543 Another panelist opined that, in certain situations, effective advocacy can be
more successful or productive than litigation. 544
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Roundtable panelists commented on the scope of, and the legal and economic
theories underlying, the agency’s advocacy efforts. Former OPP Director Susan DeSanti
stated: “I think that because your advocacy letters do not tend to be spread out all over
the place, but rather they are focused and targeted, there is a better chance that you are
actually having an impact . . . especially when you do it in conjunction with workshops
and the reports that then come out of the workshops.” 545 Joshua Wright argued that, in
contrast to our understanding of certain areas of antitrust law, such as monopolization,
our understanding of the harmful competitive effects of certain categories of state
regulation is relatively strong. As a result, the allocation of resources to competition
advocacy in these areas is a “no-brainer.” 546 Former BC Associate Director Fred
McChesney stressed the importance and usefulness of having empirical data and analysis
to back up the agency’s advocacy efforts. 547
Other panelists discussed the value of advocacy before certain policymakers.
Susan Creighton asserted: “[N]obody is going to be an advocate for markets with other
government agencies like this agency can be.” 548 Another panelist recommended that the
FTC “press more to have a seat at the table and to be consulted more before other areas of
the government take action that is truly anti-competitive . . . .” 549 McChesney argued that
in certain cases of regulatory capture at another agency, it is helpful to have a
disinterested outsider, such as the FTC, provide input on proposed regulations. 550 Former
BC advisor Thomas Krattenmaker acknowledged, however, that there may be “a real
political risk” in undertaking advocacy – particularly in front of other federal agencies. 551
This potential concern stands in sharp contrast with the situation in South Korea, where
all government agencies wishing to implement a program or activity are obliged to
submit the program or activity first to the Korean Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”) for
review based on competition considerations. 552 Another panelist stressed the importance
of FTC advocacy before Congress. Specifically, the agency ought to reiterate to
Congress that competition works and should not be supplanted by antitrust
545

DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 152.

546

Wright, Chicago Tr. at 161-63.

547

See McChesney, Chicago Tr. at 197.

548

Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 76-77.

549

Fox, NY Tr. at 96.

550

See McChesney, Chicago Tr. at 164.

551

Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 68.

552

Agencies are required by statute to consult the KFTC, but they are not required to implement the KFTC
advice. Consultation with Korean Fair Trade Commission, Sept. 4, 2008. In Mexico, the government and
regulatory agencies are required to consult with the Federal Competition Commission on draft legislation
and regulations that affect competition, and if the agency offers formal advice, to follow it. Mex. L. Fed.
Econ. Competition, Art. 24, §§ 6-7. Similarly, a Paris roundtable panelist contrasted the role of the FTC
(and DOJ) with that of the Competition Commissioner in the European Union, who “is part of the cabinet
and is involved and has some kind of say in every political decision that’s made in the EU about transport,
energy, communications, et cetera[,] . . . rather than being some kind of outside advocate in a slightly
remote agency, perhaps, who after the decisions have been made gets some sort of right to make a
submission.” Fels, Paris Tr. at 18-19.

123

exemptions. 553 A panelist at the Tokyo roundtable recommended that the FTC and DOJ
advocate the importance of competition before the U.S. International Trade
Commission. 554
External consultations yielded several recommendations for the agency to
consider in the advocacy area. At least one roundtable panelist recommended increased
advocacy efforts by the FTC, explaining that “there is enormous value in expanding the
competition advocacy program.” 555 Krattenmaker offered the following advice: “I
would like to see in the competition advocacy work more extensive and rigorous
economic work being done right alongside the legal.” 556 One panelist recommended the
building of lines of communications between the antitrust agencies and other federal
agencies involved in economic decision making but that do not have the economic staff
that the FTC and DOJ do. 557 Another panelist suggested that the FTC reconsider its
invitation-only approach to advocacy, by which it typically issues advocacies only in
response to invitations by other policymakers. 558 Finally, a Canadian government official
recommended that a greater proportion of the FTC’s advocacy efforts be conducted in the
agency’s own name, as opposed to speeches and statements by individual officials which
are disclaimed as representing only their own views. 559
4.

Rulemaking

Returning to questions of enforcement, the Commission’s strongest policymaking
tool, in addition to litigation, is rulemaking. Through rulemaking under the FTC Act, the
Commission can prohibit or mandate actions to remedy unfair or deceptive acts or
practices; through rulemaking under certain other consumer protection laws, it can
prohibit or mandate actions to address other proscribed conduct. Further, similar to its
authority to seek civil penalties for violations of orders entered through administrative
litigation (or settlements in lieu of such litigation), the Commission has had broad
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authority, since 1975, to obtain civil penalties for violations of rules issued under the FTC
Act and many special statutes. 560
The Commission’s use of rulemaking has undergone significant changes through
the course of agency history. 561 From its early years until the 1960s, the Commission
adopted a series of interpretive or advisory rules, known as Trade Practice Rules
(“TPRs”). These were formulated through procedures known as trade practice
conferences, initiated by members of an industry, authorized by the Commission, and
presided over by a Commissioner. Typically, each TPR addressed in detail the products
and practices of a particular industry, in effect setting standards for that industry. TPRs
were an effort to achieve compliance with the FTC Act by having industry members
agree to eliminate specific practices considered to be unfair methods of competition.
Rules that were approved by the Commission included Group I rules, which constituted a
statement of intent by the Commission as to its interpretation of the FTC Act with regard
to those industry practices. 562 Most TPRs were rescinded by the 1970s. 563
During the 1960s, the Commission began to exercise its rulemaking authority
pursuant to Section 6(g) of the FTC Act. 564 These Trade Regulation Rules (“TRRs”), as
they came to be known, could be relied upon in an adjudicative proceeding to establish
that a practice was unfair or deceptive, thus removing this element from the complaint
counsel’s burden of proof. Between 1963 and 1975, the Commission adopted more than
20 TRRs. Each addressed a discrete problem within a particular industry or service
sector, often by requiring the disclosure of information to the consumer. The majority of
these TRRs became outdated and ultimately were repealed, a result of the Commission’s
ongoing program of regulatory review and reform.
In 1975, Congress granted the Commission express authority to issue substantive
rules, which included the ability to bring enforcement actions in federal court and to seek
civil penalties up to $10,000 per violation.565 Magnuson-Moss rulemaking, as this
authority is known, requires more complex procedures than those needed for rulemaking
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pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 566 including two notices of
proposed rulemaking, prior notification to Congress, opportunity for an informal hearing,
and, if issues of material fact are in dispute, cross-examination of witnesses and rebuttal
submissions by interested persons. A number of rulemaking proceedings were
undertaken in the late 1970s as a result of this new grant of authority; only a few of them,
however, ultimately resulted in a rule.
During the past 15 years, 17 rules have been promulgated by the Commission,
and several existing rules have been amended. In addition, three new rulemaking
proceedings are in progress. Most new rules have been enacted based on specific statutes
that authorized the use of APA rulemaking procedures. Many of these rules have been a
response to issues generated by new electronic forms of consumer sales transactions –
first telemarketing and later Internet sales – and by the personal information privacy
issues that inevitably attend electronic marketing. One of the most important and
successful Commission rulemakings in the agency’s history established the Do Not Call
Registry, 567 whereby consumers can protect their privacy by electing not to receive
commercial telemarketing calls. Since the Registry was opened in 2003, approximately
177 million telephone numbers have been registered, and compliance with the rule has
been high.
Rulemaking proceedings since the early 1990s often have used an innovative
procedure known as the public workshop conference. Such conferences bring together
representatives of those who have a stake in the outcome of the proceeding, including
affected industries, consumer advocates, and other federal or state government agencies.
Moderated by a facilitator, the conferences enable roundtable discussion of the issues
without the formality of an administrative hearing. The discussion is transcribed and
provides a useful supplement to the written record of comments.
While one significant question about rulemaking is when the agency should adopt
a rule, an equally important question may be whether it should retain or modify a rule.
During the past 15 years, the Commission has made regulatory review and reform a high
priority. Recognizing that over time some rules and industry guides may become
obsolete or unnecessary or simply need updating in light of new technologies and
marketing techniques, the FTC initiated a program to review its rules and guides at least
once every 10 years. As a result of this systematic review, more than 50 percent of the
Trade Regulation Rules (i.e. those not mandated by statute) and guides have been
rescinded. Many of the rules and guides retained have undergone revision to streamline
or update them.
External consultations addressed the agency’s rulemaking efforts. A roundtable
panelist explained a potential perception problem associated with those efforts.
According to the panelist, many outsiders do not understand the rulemaking process and
requirements and thus expect the agency to issue rules very quickly. Others understand
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the process, but believe that the FTC has failed to work with Congress in a more
collaborative manner to try to address some of the constraints on the agency’s ability to
be more aggressive in the consumer protection area. This, according to the panelist, can
lead to a perception of unresponsiveness on the part of the agency. 568
Panelists offered conflicting views regarding the agency’s use of rulemaking.
Two former BCP senior staff members, Jodie Bernstein and Teresa Schwartz,
commented that the agency should make greater use of its rulemaking authority. 569
Schwartz explained that, although the agency got into “trouble” during the late 1970s for
engaging in rulemakings on particular matters, such as advertising to children, the agency
today should be more willing to consider rulemaking because it is an effective means of
enforcement and the agency has a good process in place to gather stakeholder input on
proposed rules. 570 Another former BCP staff member, however, argued that the FTC
should wait for Congress to give the agency specific authority to issue rules in a given
area because that approach not only provides political cover for the agency, it also results
in “clearer direction” to the agency’s audience.571 In addition, Jerry Cerasale cautioned
that rulemaking should be “a last resort” that is pursued only after other ways to address
the problem at issue, such as self-regulation, are exhausted. 572
Roundtable panelists also made specific recommendations for future rulemaking
by the FTC. Data security, for example, was identified as one area in which the agency
should consider rulemaking. 573 Two panelists, including a former BCP Director,
suggested that the agency consider doing rulemaking not just in the consumer protection
area, but in the competition area as well. 574 In addition, panelists confirmed the
importance of periodically reviewing the agency’s rules and updating them to ensure that
they take into account developments in the marketplace, such as new technology. 575
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See A. Schwartz, 7/29 DC Tr. at 180. Schwartz did offer praise regarding the CAN-SPAM rulemaking:
“I hear very little complaints in general from the industry or consumer groups about the decisions that were
made. Either people did not like CAN-SPAM or liked CAN-SPAM, but there were very little complaints
about how the rules came out.” Id. at 205.
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See Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 52-53; T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 68-69.
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T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 68-69. See also Feigenbaum, NY Tr. at 185-86 (recommending additional
FTC rulemaking – particularly in the deceptive advertising area).
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Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 66-67.
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Cerasale, NY Tr. at 177-78.
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See Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 98-99 (stating that, given the multiplicity of state laws addressing responses to
data breaches and the relatively ambiguous standard of “commercial reasonability” in the FTC’s consent
orders in this area, additional guidance in the form of rules may be useful).
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See Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 53 (“[T]here are areas in both bureaus where there are opportunities for
the use of rule-making.”); Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 25-26. But see Greene, Boston Tr. at 38-39 (raising the
question of whether the agency has statutory authority to do rulemaking in the competition area).
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See, e.g., Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 67-68. See also Cerasale, NY Tr. at 159-60 (commending the agency
for holding workshops and undertaking other information gathering efforts to better understand changes in
technology prior to issuing new regulations).

127

5.

Guidelines, Guides, and Advisory Opinions

In proposing a trade commission in January 1914, President Woodrow Wilson
emphasized the guidance the Commission could provide to business: “And the business
men of the country desire something more than that the menace of legal process in these
matters be made explicit and intelligible. They desire the advice, the definitive guidance
and information which can be supplied by an administrative body, an interstate trade
commission.” 576 Consistent with Wilson’s intent, the Commission’s tools include
guidelines, guides, and advisory opinions. Though none has the same force of law as a
rule or order, all of these alert businesses to the legal standards the Commission intends
to apply, or the modes of analysis that it intends to use, in analyzing possible law
violations.
Guidelines. To promote transparency and encourage compliance with the law, the
FTC issues guidelines, typically in conjunction with the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division, to provide guidance regarding the application of the U.S. antitrust laws. These
guidelines explain competition policy in specific areas, such as horizontal merger
review, 577 collaborations among competitors, 578 licensing of intellectual property, 579 and
health care. 580 In the merger context, the agencies took the additional step of issuing
commentary on their merger guidelines, providing examples of the application of the
guidelines in specific matters. 581
During external consultations, Hillary Greene succinctly identified the various
purposes and audiences served by such guidelines: “Their express purpose is obviously
to explain the reasoning and analysis underlying the agency’s exercise of the [its]
prosecutorial discretion.” For such purpose, the audiences of the guidelines include the
agency staff, as well as businesses and their counselors. The “implicit purpose” of
guidelines is “to provide a commentary on the law, to be a sort of an ongoing editorial . . .
on gaps and ambiguities in the law.” For such purpose, the intended audience is the
courts. 582
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H.R. DOC. NO. 625, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1914).
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See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (rev. 1997), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/hmg080617.pdf.
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See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
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See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0558.pdf.
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See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENTS OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/policy/hlth3s.pdf.
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See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/CommentaryontheHorizontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf.
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Greene, Boston Tr. at 17-18. See also Hillary Greene, Agency Character and the Character of Agency
Guidelines: An Historical and Institutional Perspective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1039 (2005) (recounting the
FTC’s historical approaches to antitrust guidelines).
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Roundtable panelists expressed many differing opinions on the value of agency
guidelines. Several panelists questioned the usefulness of such guidelines, citing the fact
that there are other forces, such as private plaintiffs and foreign antitrust agencies, that
will counter or even overwhelm the influence of the agency issuing the guidelines. 583
Another failing of guidelines cited by panelists is the “bland and relatively
uninformative” nature of the final product that is made public. The perception is that, in
an attempt to compromise, guidelines can strike a middle ground without clarifying
doctrine. 584 Yet another issue is the perception that in issuing guidelines the agency is
concerned about “every last possible contingency” and what some party might be able to
cite against the agency at some point in the future. 585 Several panelists raised the
legitimate concern that any agency guidelines could be subsequently used against the
agency – particularly in litigation. 586
Notwithstanding disagreements with specific guidelines or provisions of
guidelines, panelists maintained that “guidelines are an exercise in agency
transparency,” 587 and the “appetite of the private bar for guidance[ and] guidelines is
inexhaustible.” 588 Many expressed generally favorable reviews of the FTC and DOJ
horizontal merger guidelines. Given the dearth of Supreme Court and other case law in
the merger area, the merger guidelines are viewed as necessary to provide interested
parties with information regarding the agencies’ merger review process. 589 As one
panelist explained, “Merger law . . . is at best opaque and maybe completely and totally
incomprehensible. . . . [I]f you can avoid the coin flip that you often get in the district
court and figure out ahead of time what the likely result of the enforcement agency is,
you’re way ahead of the game.” 590 Hillary Greene noted that the Herfindahl-Hirschman
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See Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 146 (“[U]nless they can influence policy outside the FTC in a profound way
– and that is a very difficult thing to do – it strikes me as an exercise in futility.”); DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at
148 (“[I]t is not like businesses are going to only look at what the FTC has to say.”).
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See DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 146-47 (“[T]oo many times they end up being bland and relatively
uninformative. No matter what people’s intentions were at the beginning to actually clarify things,
inevitably disagreements arise and you go towards the middle rather than actually make progress in
clarifying things.”).
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See Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 158-59.
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See Greene, Boston Tr. at 32-33 (identifying the concern that guidelines will be used against the agency
in court, with judges giving the guidelines “undue deference”); Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 37 (echoing concern
that the courts will use guidelines against an agency, for example, by assuming that that which is not
prohibited in the guidelines should be allowed); Harrop, Chicago Tr. at 140-41 (arguing that a potential
danger of issuing guidelines is the prospect of having defendants and even judges turning the guidelines
into a kind of checklist, each step of which the agency must satisfy, even if it is not analytically meaningful
to do so).
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Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 143.
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Fenton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 220.
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See DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 147; Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 143.
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Harrop, Chicago Tr. at 137-38. See also McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 81-82 (“The framework that was
established by the merger guidelines is applied almost universally today.”) (arguing that any specific
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Index had been presented to courts before it was incorporated into the 1982 merger
guidelines, but received a hostile reception until the guidelines were issued. 591 Along
with the publication of merger data, 592 the guidelines are a valuable source of
transparency to the outside world.
Other guidelines received praise for various reasons. The agencies’ IP licensing
guidelines received praise from those generally critical of guidelines based on their
inclusion of new thinking not yet reflected in the case law at the time of their issuance. 593
The health care statements, according to a former state enforcer, “provided enormous
value to those of us who were advising our clients regarding the enforcement intentions
of the agencies and had a spill-over effect upon the states in terms of what they were
likely to do.” 594 According to Stephen Calkins, the process of writing the competitor
collaboration guidelines helped the agency respond to the California Dental 595 decision
and helped contribute to the ongoing discussion about how to evaluate competitor
collaborations. “This was an area where the agency was going to be bringing cases and,
so, it did matter.” 596
A central issue involving agency guidelines is one of timing – including the
appropriate times at which to issue and, if necessary, update any given set of guidelines.
Greene identified the “central tension” in formulating guidelines as follows: waiting until
there is a sufficient consensus in any particular area of the law, on the one hand, and
providing certainty and guidance in such area of the law, on the other hand. 597 Several
panelists argued that guidelines are more valuable if there is a “strong consensus” in the
area of the law addressed by the guidelines. 598 Others argued that an agency should not
failings within the guidelines – for example, the lack of discussion of potential competition and vertical
mergers – do not “undercut the value of the fundamental structure for thinking about how one analyzes a
merger”).
591

Greene, Boston Tr. at 20.
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Panelists expressed strong support for the agencies’ publication of merger review data as having
“greatly enriched our understanding of what the agencies are actually doing and then greatly enriched the
discussion about what the agencies ought to do.” Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 86. See also McDavid, 7/30 DC
Tr. at 86 (“And those merger data are incredibly useful in walking a business person through the likelihood
that their particular merger will or will not be challenged.”).
593

See DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 147.
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Langer, Boston Tr. at 34.
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Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
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Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 84.
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Greene, Boston Tr. at 31.
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See, e.g., Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 79-80 (“I think there’s a stronger consensus behind horizontal merger
policy, for example, and I think the guidelines there have been of value . . . . To my mind, issuing
guidelines on things like vertical mergers and . . . Section 2, which none of us fully understand anyway,
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practice at issue); Harrop, Chicago Tr. at 147 (agreeing that agencies should not issue guidelines absent a
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wait until there is consensus; otherwise, the guidelines will not achieve their primary goal
of providing guidance. 599
Similarly, the proper timing of any necessary updating of guidelines is an issue
that agencies must consider carefully. As Greene explained, at some point, there exists a
lag between a given set of guidelines and the agency’s current thinking on the subject of
such guidelines. It is a “very difficult balance” to know when that lag is sufficient to
justify an updating of the guidelines. “And we’ve seen instances in the past in which the
gap between reality and the guidelines is [such] that the guidelines . . . should actually be
abandoned.” 600 Participants in the Tokyo roundtable recommended that the agencies
revise their competitor collaboration and international guidelines. More specifically, it
was suggested that the agencies expand the collaboration guidelines to include additional
examples of their application and to broaden them to apply to conduct among competitors
that transcends joint ventures. 601 Another panelist recommended that the agencies update
their international guidelines to reflect the increased number of countries with
competition laws, as well as the increasingly important roles of multinational
organizations such as the ICN. 602 Susan Creighton also cautioned against updating
guidelines via specific enforcement actions, explaining that a more systematic approach
is desirable. 603
External consultations yielded several suggestions regarding potential FTC
guidelines. Among the subject areas in which the agency was advised to issue or revise
guidelines are: clinical integration, 604 vertical mergers, 605 mergers involving intellectual
property, 606 monopolization, 607 interlocking directorates, 608 resale price maintenance, 609
and “topics that are unique to the FTC,” such as unilateral conduct that is not necessarily
a Section 2 violation. 610 Finally, Greene suggested that, “because the guidelines are so
significant amount of experience in a given area); Drauz, Brussels Tr. at 12-13 (“I think you should never
make a guideline before you have really sufficiently looked at individual cases.”) (noting that a reason why
it took so long for the European Commission to issue Article 82 guidance was the lack of a sufficient
number of “valuable precedents”).
599
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604

See Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 142.

605
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See Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 26.
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clearly geared towards framing the terms of the debate and influencing courts among
others,” it would be beneficial for agencies to identify and clarify within guidelines where
they diverge from existing law. 611
Guides. With the rescission of most Trade Practice Rules in the 1970s, 612
industry guides, which are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, or C.F.R.,
became a vehicle to inform businesses how the Commission would apply Section 5 of the
FTC Act in specific situations. Industry guides are advisory in nature – that is, they are
not an independent basis for enforcement actions, and violations do not give rise to civil
penalties. However, they serve to inform businesses about practices that could be
considered unfair or deceptive. Industry guides typically focus on particular problematic
practices in advertising, marketing, or labeling. Promulgation of guides does not require
formal rulemaking proceedings, but, in recent years, the Commission has solicited public
comments, and may hold a hearing or workshop, before adopting or substantively
amending guides. Like rules, industry guides are subject to review every 10 years.
The agency’s “Green Guides,” for example, are an important illustration of the
use of industry guides to give advice to businesses making certain types of marketing
claims. Issued in 1992 and updated in 1996 and 1998, the Guides for the Use of
Environmental Marketing Claims 613 serve to help marketers avoid making environmental
claims that are unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The Green Guides
are currently under review, and the agency has both requested comments and conducted a
series of public meetings to discuss various green marketing issues. 614
Concerns were expressed by some roundtable panelists regarding the length of
time involved in the review of some guides. One participant noted the need for greater
transparency in connection with these reviews, suggesting that the Commission publicly
announce its next steps in the process or even an approximate time frame for completion
of the review. 615 Others stressed the importance of rescinding guides that the agency
considers no longer relevant. 616
Advisory Opinions. The FTC’s efforts at providing guidance to industry also
include advisory opinions concerning proposed conduct provided in response to requests
for advice. On the competition side, BC staff render so-called advisory opinions, which
often involve issues in the health care field. On the consumer protection side, BCP staff
611

Greene, Boston Tr. at 76-77.

612

See discussion supra Chapter VI.B.4.
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See 16 C.F.R. § 260.
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Additional information regarding this review of the Green Guides is available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/energy/about_guides.shtml. See also Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 88
(noting the value of the Green Guides review process to businesses in that market); Greenbaum, NY Tr. at
184 (same).
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render so-called staff opinion letters, which typically address proposed interpretations of
FTC rules and regulations. Commission advisory opinions, which are issued relatively
infrequently, are intended to address substantial or novel questions of fact or law or
subjects of significant interest. 617
The subject of advisory opinions did not garner as much attention during the
external consultations as the subject of guidelines. However, roundtable panelists did
express support for the agency’s efforts at issuing such opinions. According to one
panelist, advisory opinion letters, much like safe harbors in guidelines, are valuable in
that they provide industry with “some confidence” regarding proposed business
arrangements or courses of conduct – particularly those that require confidence in their
legality to succeed in the first instance. 618
Several panelists, however, called for the Commission – rather than staff – to
issue more advisory opinions. Stephen Calkins recommended that the Commission issue
more formal advisory opinions, explaining that, although staff advisory letters can be
useful in narrow areas in trying to understand “hopeless” laws, such as the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, an advisory opinion from the Commission is extremely valuable because
it entails a discussion and consensus reaching among the Commissioners. Thus,
according to Calkins, the agency should establish a system for providing more
“collective, official Commission advice” in the form of formal advisory opinions. 619
Other panelists remarked that the general public likely does not appreciate the fact that
advisory opinions typically come from staff and are not issued by the Commission. 620
6.

Consumer and Business Education

Like guidelines, guides, and advisory opinions, business education is yet another
way to facilitate compliance with the law by firms that want to comply with the law.
Consumer education is a way to alert consumers to their rights and help them avoid harm,
including harms from fraudulent operations with little interest in complying with the law.
During the past 20 years, educating consumers and businesses about their rights
and responsibilities in the marketplace has become an increasingly important part of
fulfilling the agency’s consumer protection mission. Enforcement efforts to combat fraud
617

See generally 16 C.F.R. § 1.3.

618

See Picker, Chicago Tr. at 145 (citing example of patent pools). See also Langer, Boston Tr. at 35
(stating that advisory opinions have been valuable in providing businesses with certainty regarding their
proposed courses of conduct). The Commission does reserve the right to revisit any advice, see 16 C.F.R. §
1.3(c), although, where the Commission itself gave the advice, the rules provide assurance that “[t]he
Commission will not proceed against the requesting party with respect to any action taken in good faith
reliance upon the Commission’s advice under this section, where all the relevant facts were fully,
completely, and accurately presented to the Commission and where such action was promptly discontinued
upon notification of rescission or revocation of the Commission's approval.” Id. § 1.3(b).
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See Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 85. See also DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 149 (recommending that the
Commission issue an advisory opinion regarding clinical integration).
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See Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 148-49; DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 149-50.
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are enhanced by informing consumers how to recognize and avoid becoming victims of
fraudulent marketing practices. 621 For example, educating consumers not to respond to
emails that “phish” for financial account information can be a more effective tool to
combat this practice than bringing successive enforcement actions against numerous
perpetrators. The Commission also integrates enforcement with consumer and business
education. Law enforcement actions often are partnered with an education component
that is announced at the same time and, when the Commission works with other
enforcement agencies on a sweep, the Commission also works with its law enforcement
partners to develop the educational component. Information for consumers might include
how to recognize, avoid, and report a similar scam; for businesses, it might include how
to avoid running afoul of the law.
Educating businesses about their legal obligations under a variety of FTC rules
enhances compliance, and to that end, the Commission issues clear, plain-language
guides – in print and on video – that pose numerous examples of required or prohibited
conduct. For example, when the dietary supplement industry began to grow and
advertise heavily as a result of new legislation (the Dietary Supplements Health and
Education Act of 1994), industry representatives requested and received specific FTC
guidance regarding substantiation for advertising claims. 622
The Commission’s increased recognition of the importance of consumer and
business education has resulted in the transformation – within the Bureau of Consumer
Protection – of a small office to a Division of Consumer and Business Education
(“DCBE”) with a staff of 19. DCBE plans and implements public education campaigns
for consumers and industry through communications and outreach programs that involve
the use of print, broadcast, and electronic media, special events, and partnerships with
other government agencies, consumer groups, industry and professional associations,
businesses, and other organizations.
More recently, the Bureau of Competition has initiated consumer education
campaigns designed to inform consumers about the value of competition and the antitrust
laws generally. Issued in March 2007, the publication Competition Counts informs
consumers about the benefits of competitive markets, including lower prices, higher
quality, and greater choice of goods and services. BC’s Guide to the Antitrust Laws
contains an in-depth discussion of competition issues for those with questions concerning
the antitrust laws. 623
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See Conversation with Muris and Pitofsky, supra note 27, at 778 (Pitofsky describing how, in the area of
misleading health and safety claims, the FTC “combined law enforcement with a multifaceted education
program – including brochures, special Web sites, public service announcements, news articles, and
bookmarks – to give consumers the basic information they need to make sound decisions and to protect
themselves from misleading marketing practices”).
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These competition guides are available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/guidance.shtm.
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External consultations yielded widespread expressions of support for the agency’s
consumer and business education efforts in the consumer protection area. 624 Several
roundtable panelists agreed that such efforts can be more effective than enforcement
actions. 625 In order to maximize the impact of such efforts, however, it is important to
convey consumer education messages to outside entities that are in turn able to amplify
such messages to a wider audience. Lee Peeler, former BCP Deputy Director and current
President and CEO of the National Advertising Review Council, stressed the importance
of amplifying the agency’s consumer and business education messages by, for example,
reaching out to consumer groups and self-regulatory organizations, respectively, and
having those entities spread the messages to their constituencies. 626
Panelists also offered several recommendations regarding the agency’s education
efforts on the consumer protection side. One panelist identified two issues that the
agency should take into account in preparing consumer education materials. First,
according to the panelist, the types of media to which consumers will be most responsive
going forward are not necessarily going to be text-based, as they have been in the past.
As a result, consumer education should be delivered via video and audio, as well as
text. 627 Second, the panelist recommended that the agency’s education efforts take into
account the latest learnings from the area of behavioral economics in determining which
mechanisms are most useful in changing consumer behavior. 628 Another panelist
suggested that business education be targeted at small businesses, which may be less
sophisticated and unable to hire legal counsel to help oversee their compliance efforts. 629
At the U.K. consultations, some consumer representatives recommended
consumer education efforts that are targeted and provide information to consumers at the
time they need it. The consumer representatives further noted that much consumer
education does not work for consumers because “people don’t go out seeking information
until things go wrong, and businesses don’t like to talk about things going wrong.” They
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See, e.g., DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 162 (remarking that, on the consumer protection side, the FTC has
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to change consumer behavior, not just bring cases against phishers); Wilks, London Tr. at 38 (noting that
consumer education can have more of a “societal impact” than individual law enforcement actions).
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See Swire, NY Tr. at 197-98. See also Brendler, NY Tr. at 236-38 (touting video on phishing and
auction scams created by Consumer Reports WebWatch and noting that younger consumers increasingly
want their news or information to “come through organic means,” such as through social networking sites,
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suggested that insights into consumer behavior, through social marketing and behavioral
economics, might assist in developing new types of consumer education.630
Panelists disagreed as to the proper role of FTC consumer education on the
competition side. Susan DeSanti recommended that the agency consider how it might
better convey to its various constituencies the value of competition, which may not be
well understood. “If there is an agency that has a mandate that would include education
on that subject, it is this agency.” 631 Others, including former BE Director Michael
Salinger, however, raised concerns regarding the agency’s expenditure of scarce
resources on such efforts, suggesting that the agency “think about getting others to do this
for the Commission rather than having the Commission devote a lot of resources to it.” 632
7.

Encouragement of Appropriate Industry Self-Regulation

Meaningful self-regulation is an important complement to the Commission’s law
enforcement efforts – particularly in the area of deceptive marketing practices. For
example, the program administered by the National Advertising Division/National
Advertising Review Council (“NARC”) arm of the Council of Better Business Bureaus
(“CBBB”) has worked well to obviate the need for Commission action in some instances.
In cases where the process does not reach a successful conclusion, the matter is referred
to the Commission with much of the underlying investigative work already
accomplished. The Electronic Retailing Self-Regulation Program – established under the
auspices of NARC in 2004 to handle allegations of deceptive advertising in TV
“infomercials” – has served as an important adjunct to this program.
In addition, self-regulatory programs have been helpful in areas where the
Commission has advocated seller restraint in promotions directed to children. In 2006,
the CBBB launched the Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative to
encourage major food marketers to impose voluntary limitations on their advertising to
children. This effort followed a workshop and report by the FTC, which strongly
encouraged self-regulation to address the childhood obesity problem. 633 The marketing
of violent entertainment products (such as movies, music, and video games) to children is
another area in which companies have been encouraged to adhere to industry codes by
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DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 163. See also AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 150, at 186 (“To increase
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successive FTC reports documenting the results of self-regulation. 634 As former
Chairman Robert Pitofsky has observed, industry self-regulation can be particularly
suitable in areas, such as advertising, in which governmental restrictions raise substantial
First Amendment concerns. 635
External consultations revealed little, if any, objections to the FTC encouraging
industry self-regulation. As former BCP Director William MacLeod asserted, asking
whether it makes sense for the Commission to encourage self-regulation is “like asking
the cop on the street if it makes sense to encourage people to abide by the law. Of
course, it does.” 636 Another panelist opined that “the FTC’s done an amazing job of
recognizing what a valuable tool self-regulation is in enhancing and complementing [its]
role in terms of consumer protection.” 637 Implicit in the support expressed for the
agency’s promotion of self-regulation is the notion that it is a complement to – not a
substitute for – the agency’s law enforcement efforts. 638
According to roundtable panelists, the precise role of the agency in encouraging
self-regulation matters. Former BCP Assistant Director Darren Bowie argued that that
role should be a limited one, with the agency setting forth “broad objectives,” while
leaving it up to industry to devise the implementation of such objectives. If the agency is
too prescriptive, according to Bowie, it tends to defeat the purpose of self-regulation,
which is to allow industry to come up with the best way to accomplish certain
objectives. 639 Addressing advertising self-regulation, another panelist attributed the
success of that program to both the FTC’s support and its measured involvement. In
other words, “[t]he FTC understands that you need to keep the ‘self’ in ‘selfregulation.’” 640
Roundtable panelists provided commentary on efforts by the FTC to initiate and
support self-regulation in specific areas. Lee Peeler praised the agency’s efforts in the
634
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government regulation. It can be particularly suitable in this area where government restrictions, especially
if they involve partial or total advertising bans, raise very substantial First Amendment issues.”).
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area of advertising self-regulation, 641 while William MacLeod identified the area of food
marketing to children as an example of effective self-regulation. 642 Another panelist,
however, criticized the agency’s efforts in the area of behavioral advertising, in which the
agency’s efforts are sending “a very confusing message” to industry: behavioral
advertising is a new and emerging area, in which the agency has brought some cases,
implying that it may bring more; yet, the agency is issuing self-regulatory guidelines,
implying that it believes industry should self-regulate. 643 This concern was echoed by
some consumer representatives at the U.K. consultations. They emphasized, however,
that self-regulation is an important tool if regulators use it in a timely and proportionate
manner – that is, if they do not use a graduated approach such as voluntary guidelines
followed by a mandatory code of conduct when there is significant consumer detriment in
the market that can be stopped by government action – and view it as one of a mix of
tools that will produce good outcomes for consumers. 644
8.

Partnership and Outreach with Domestic Agencies

Another important tool available to the FTC is outreach to domestic agencies.
The Commission’s engagement with domestic agencies involves efforts at the policy
level, including advocacy. 645 It also encompasses enforcement cooperation, facilitated by
the Commission’s broad authority to share with domestic law enforcement agencies
nonpublic information otherwise subject to prohibitions on disclosure. 646 Enforcement
cooperation can facilitate the Commission’s own investigation, where a federal or state
agency shares expertise or provides investigative assistance. It also can leverage the
Commission’s limited resources, by enlisting other agencies in undertaking efforts that
advance the FTC’s mission.
The FTC often seeks to maximize its enforcement impact on the consumer
protection side by coordinating “sweeps” – multiple legal actions filed at or near the same
time by multiple authorities. Cooperation with domestic (and foreign) enforcement
agencies is an integral component of these sweeps. In 2008, for example, the
Commission announced “Operation Tele-PHONEY,” the agency’s largest sweep
targeting telemarketing fraud. More than 180 cases were filed by the FTC and law
enforcement partners that included more than 30 federal, state, and local law enforcement
641
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agencies, as well as Canadian authorities at both the national and provincial level. These
telemarketing cases were both civil and criminal, targeting various kinds of fraudulent
schemes that had snared thousands of consumers and resulted in losses of many millions
of dollars. 647 An earlier 2006 sweep, denominated “Project FAL$E HOPE$,” was
directed at fraudulent business opportunity and work-at-home schemes. That effort
included more than 100 law enforcement actions filed by the FTC, the Department of
Justice, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and agencies in 11 states. 648 Consumer
education constituted an important component of both sweeps.
9.

International Partnerships and Outreach

As discussed in Chapter IV.D, and for reasons discussed therein, the FTC
recognizes that a competition and consumer protection agency cannot limit its activity or
vision to its own borders; the FTC devotes significant efforts to international activity,
coordinated by its Office of International Affairs. As with the Commission’s dealings
with domestic agencies, these efforts include engagement on policy initiatives and
practices as well as enforcement cooperation. An important component of the policy
engagement, discussed in Chapter IV.D, is the FTC’s technical assistance program.
To obtain the best results from its engagement with foreign enforcers, both in
bilateral and multilateral contexts, an agency with an effective international program
develops short-, medium-, and long-term strategies that guide participation in these fora,
with a clear idea about when the agency wants to take a leadership role and when the
agency plans to take a more passive or “importing” role. The best-designed program
identifies areas for teaching, and those for learning, recognizing that the two roles are not
mutually exclusive.
Some examples of the FTC’s cooperation on enforcement matters are discussed in
Chapter IV.D. As examples of the FTC’s efforts to engage in policy matters in bilateral
settings, the FTC (together with DOJ) regularly forms working groups and holds highlevel and staff-level discussions with the EC’s DG Comp on a range of issues. The U.S.
agencies also have participated in working groups with competition agencies in Mexico,
Canada, Korea, and Japan on issues including intellectual property and conduct by
dominant firms. The international consultations confirmed the importance of these
bilateral initiatives, and also suggested that more efforts could be directed toward the
development of additional working groups, 649 joint sponsorship of workshops and
conferences, 650 and better sharing of research agendas. 651 In the consumer protection
area, the FTC engages in bilateral policy-related dialogue with counterparts on a wide
647
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range of issues, including fraud, consumer redress, privacy, and data security. This
dialogue includes face-to-face consultations, as well as telephonic, video, and written
exchanges. For example, the FTC routinely comments on both policy and legislative
proposals from other jurisdictions on various consumer protection-related issues. 652
At the multilateral level, several organizations facilitate dialogue and doctrinal
and procedural convergence, including the International Competition Network, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International
Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network. 653 Many agencies, including the FTC,
dedicate many, if not the majority, of their international efforts to activities in these fora.
Because of the costs of participating in multilateral organizations and meetings, 654 the
consultations stressed that a good international program must prioritize its multilateral
efforts. The agency must first decide what percentage of resources will be devoted to this
activity, and then the agency must give careful consideration to where or on what topics
resources will be spent. 655
To obtain optimal results from agency-to-agency technical assistance programs,
the consultations suggested that such programs are most effective when the focus is on
the practical aspects of law enforcement. More specific indicators offered by panelists
focused largely on program design. For example, a good technical assistance program in
competition either is part of a larger technical assistance program or otherwise clearly
contributes to the improved performance of an economy. 656 It is provided on a
cooperative and consensual basis 657 and appropriately tailored to the recipient’s needs, 658
and the advisors have a working knowledge of the local conditions. 659
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On the enforcement side, the Commission’s work with its foreign counterparts
facilitates its ability to obtain meaningful and timely cooperation from foreign
counterparts for FTC-generated investigations and litigation matters. Another critical
dimension is the agency’s ability to influence the enforcement agenda and priorities of
foreign agencies through notifications, consultations, and other bilateral mechanisms. A
third dimension is the FTC’s capacity to provide assistance, in appropriate cases, to
foreign authorities when they request the FTC’s assistance or refer complaints involving
U.S. businesses.
10.

Other Innovative Approaches to Addressing Specific Problems

The FTC pursues other innovative approaches to address specific problems. As
an example, an innovative approach to business guidance has been to enlist the help of
the media to ensure that deceptive advertising claims are not disseminated. A survey of
ads for weight-loss products revealed that about half of them contained at least one claim
that was facially false. In response, the Commission published a guide – appropriately
titled Red Flag Bogus Weight Loss Claims – describing seven claims for nonprescription
weight-loss products that should raise red flags because they are always false. FTC
Commissioners met with members of the media and asked that they “do the right thing”
by refusing to run ads containing these false claims. Although many initially resisted this
request, it appears that some have complied. In a follow-up survey, FTC staff found that
the incidence of “Red Flag” claims had declined significantly. Thus, the Red Flag project
essentially combined business education with promotion of self-regulation. 660
Former Commissioner Leary characterized this approach as “innovative,”
discounting the notion held by some that it was legally risky under the antitrust laws.
Leary emphasized that this tactic does not violate the antitrust laws, properly construed.
He further commended the program for attacking the supply side (i.e. the advertisers) of
the fraud equation, not just the demand side (i.e. consumers). 661
11.

Using Multiple Tools to Address a Problem

In pursuing outcomes that benefit consumers, the FTC can use multiple tools to
address a particular problem. For example, the agency has used such a multifaceted
approach in dealing with the issues of rising obesity rates and false or deceptive
advertising claims about weight-loss products. In addition to the innovative Red Flag
project mentioned above, the agency has conducted or co-sponsored several public
workshops to address: the impact of advertising for weight-loss products and programs;
the information consumers need to evaluate such products; and food marketing to
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children. The FTC has issued reports on these topics; conducted surveys of weight-loss
advertising; engaged in multimedia education directed to both consumers and businesses;
and encouraged industry self-regulation and international cooperation. 662 Of course, the
FTC conducts litigation as well, having sued companies that promote their products with
false or deceptive claims. 663 As in other areas of FTC enforcement, often several weightloss cases are announced simultaneously in order to maximize the deterrent effect of the
enforcement activity.
The FTC also has used an integrated approach to preventing anticompetitive
increases in the price of petroleum products, including oil, gasoline, and diesel. Given
the crucial role that the petroleum industry plays in consumers’ lives and the U.S.
economy generally, that industry receives the highest level of scrutiny from the FTC.
Utilizing its law enforcement authority and resources, the FTC has filed actions to enjoin
petroleum mergers deemed to be anticompetitive. 664 The FTC’s enforcement work in
this area also includes challenging possibly anticompetitive conduct by firms in this
sector of the economy, 665 aided in significant part by the gasoline and diesel price
monitoring project that was begun in 2002. 666
In addition to enforcement, the FTC engages in significant policy R&D efforts in
the petroleum area, holding workshops, engaging in relevant research, and drafting
congressionally requested reports. 667 Another tool used by the FTC in this area is
outreach to domestic agencies and consumers, as exemplified by the agency’s efforts
following the September 2008 landfall of Hurricane Ike in the U.S. Gulf Coast. In the
aftermath of the storm, the FTC established a task force comprising staff from throughout
the agency, with the mission of closely tracking gasoline price trends and supply
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information, and developing ways to be as responsive as possible to state authorities and
to individual consumers who might need the FTC’s assistance. 668
*

*

*

As discussed above, the FTC has many tools in its arsenal with which to pursue
its competition and consumer protection missions. Identifying the appropriate tool or
tools with which to address each of the many challenges facing the agency in its pursuit
of those missions is crucial to the agency’s effectiveness. In many instances, law
enforcement will be the most useful tool; in many other instances, nonenforcement tools
will be more effective. In some instances, the simultaneous or serial use of several tools
will yield the best results for consumers.
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PART 3: MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FTC ACTIONS
VII.

Measuring Agency Effectiveness

As noted in Chapter I, there is widespread agreement about the agency’s core
mission, as set forth in its strategic plan:
To prevent business practices that are anticompetitive or
deceptive or unfair to consumers; to enhance informed
consumer choice and public understanding of the
competitive process; and to accomplish these missions
without unduly burdening legitimate business activity. 669
For assessing agency performance, as also explained in Chapter I, there should be a close
nexus between what is measured and fulfillment of an agency’s mission. Further,
performance measurement should focus on outcomes for consumers rather than agency
output. 670 In any event, metrics chosen should ideally answer the question: “what would
have happened in the absence of [FTC] intervention and in the absence of [FTC]
activity?” 671 If the answer is that consumers are worse off in the hypothetical world of
no FTC action, such action can be said to have affected consumers positively. 672
With an understanding of the value of particular FTC actions, agency heads can
evaluate whether the resource costs of undertaking certain activities – which are known –
justify the benefits achieved for consumers or whether the FTC could have achieved
these benefits more efficiently. 673 Further, given scarcity of resources, understanding the
value of competing programs can help identify the full opportunity cost of forgone
alternative actions. Knowledge of opportunity costs can help prioritize actions both
within the FTC and across government agencies.
Unlike agencies that produce a readily measurable output directly to
consumers, 674 the vast majority of FTC actions are not aimed at consumers directly, but
rather toward parties – typically business and sometimes government – in an effort to
stop conduct that threatens to harm consumers. 675 For example, the FTC sues businesses
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for taking actions that violate the consumer protection and competition laws and engages
in advocacy with governments to discourage anticompetitive regulation. Thus, there is an
indirect link between FTC action and changes in consumer welfare: the FTC helps
consumers primarily through its ability to reduce the occurrence of conduct that violates
consumer protection or antitrust laws or otherwise reduces consumer welfare. Ideally,
one could measure the direct impact of FTC actions on consumers. 676 When this type of
direct measurement is not feasible, however, it is necessary to look for proxies for the
impact of FTC actions on consumers, such as the outcomes of enforcement actions and
the influence of nonenforcement activity on courts and government policymakers.
This chapter considers a range of possible measurement metrics that are or could
be used to assess the FTC’s performance. Section A addresses the possibility (and
challenges) of measuring directly the impacts of the Commission’s actions, as well as the
possibilities (and challenges) of accounting for impacts that may be less direct but more
important, such as the deterrent and precedential effects of agency litigation.
Section B discusses several proxies for measuring the degree to which FTC
actions further its mission. Specifically, this section describes some of the metrics the
FTC currently uses in its annual Performance and Accountability Report and also
examines other performance metrics, including the outcome of enforcement actions, the
deterrent effect and precedential value of these actions, the FTC’s intellectual leadership,
the agency’s transparency and guidance (which can facilitate compliance with the law
without the costs of litigation), and the burdens the FTC places on industry.
Section C addresses the agency’s relations with its core constituencies. In
addition to outcomes that are directly or indirectly measurable, having a reputation as an
agency that can solve problems is important, although not usually readily measurable. To
maintain its relevancy, a successful agency needs to understand and take action –
consistent with its mission – on the issues on which the public, Congress, and the White
House are focused – areas of political value. 677 As one panelist explained, organizations
that are “deaf” to these issues, find themselves “as part of the problem, and not really part
of the solution.” 678

targeting messages directly to consumers to inform them of these actions can reduce the occurrence of
fraud and deception.
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A.

Direct Measurements of Welfare

Given widespread acceptance of the FTC’s consumer-focused mission, direct
measurement of the increase in consumer welfare as a result of FTC actions would be
ideal. 679 There was broad consensus among roundtable panelists that the FTC should aim
to measure its benefits by assessing welfare and avoid incorporating improved or
increased “fairness” as a goal or an objective that should be counted as a benefit of FTC
enforcement. 680 Others opined that such decisions between welfare and other objectives
(fairness or otherwise) were better left to the political process and elected officials rather
than government agencies. 681
Although there is general recognition that welfare is the appropriate measure for
evaluating the benefits of FTC actions, how best to define “welfare” remains subject to
much debate. This debate falls along familiar lines of “total” welfare (producer plus
consumer surplus) versus “consumer” welfare (consumer surplus alone). 682 Some argue
that total welfare is the appropriate standard because it focuses attention on maximizing
societal welfare. 683 Further, producers ultimately are consumers as well (although of
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other goods), 684 and in the long run, gains to producers eventually may accrue to
consumers in the form of lower prices. 685 Others argue that a consumer welfare standard
is most consistent with the antitrust laws and helps ensure consumers are protected by the
antitrust laws. 686 Some suggest that a middle ground is appropriate – that is, a
“weighted” surplus standard that would ensure consumer welfare is increased, but not at
the expense of preventing significantly larger gains to aggregate welfare. 687 No panelists
suggested that the welfare standard used to evaluate FTC actions should differ depending
on the nature of the action at issue. Likewise, none of the panelists suggested that the
standard should differ depending on the industry at issue or other characteristics of the
given matter. Although the debate is an important one, in the vast majority of instances,
consumer welfare and total welfare align. 688 As a result, there only infrequently is a
conflict between advancing each goal.
As a practical matter, direct measurement of welfare effects entails comparing
price and output in the relevant markets before and after the FTC action. 689 For example,
consumers pay higher prices and purchase fewer goods or services than they otherwise
would in the case of an antitrust violation. As a result, consumers suffer direct financial
losses, and also forego the satisfaction they could have received from additional
purchases, had the price been set at the competitive level. Calculating the magnitude of
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these two types of loss – and thus the benefits from FTC action – requires an estimate of
the shape and position of the demand and marginal cost curves for the product, as well as
an estimate of the equilibrium price and quantity absent the anticompetitive conduct.
Turning to consumer protection, deceptive advertising makes consumers willing
to buy more at any given price than they would had they not been misled about the
quality of the product or the level of substantiation for performance claims. 690
Consequently, unlike in the case of anticompetitive conduct, deceived consumers are
harmed because they generally will buy more of the product (and may pay a higher
price 691 ) than they would if they knew the product’s true attributes. Calculation of
consumer injury from deception is straightforward in the extreme case of outright fraud,
where a seller claims performance capabilities for a product that is in reality worthless. If
consumers knew the truth before purchase, they would be unwilling to pay any price for
the product, and all of the expenditures they actually make can be considered injury. In
addition, scarce resources have been diverted from genuinely productive uses, with a
resulting loss to society equal to the value of those resources. Therefore, the short-run
economic benefit from the Commission’s fraud program, for example, can be measured
directly as the quantity of money consumers would have continued to spend on products
that FTC enforcement action effectively has removed from the marketplace.692 Further,
any restitution for consumers that the FTC is able to secure from fraudulent sellers also
enhances consumer welfare.
Assessment of consumer injury and the immediate benefit of Commission
intervention is generally much more complex in cases where there is not outright fraud
but rather where firms do not substantiate advertising claims or where they omit
information important to a purchase decision. Although the advertising claims may
exaggerate the effectiveness of the product, or tout capabilities that do not exist, many
consumers might continue to purchase the product in the absence of deceptive claims,
albeit in smaller quantities (and possibly at a lower price). The gap between the demand
for the product with accurate information and the demand fueled by deceptive claims
would, in most cases, be extremely difficult to estimate with any precision. A fully
rigorous analysis would have to take into account the magnitude of the reduction in
consumer demand if consumers obtained accurate information about product
performance. Further, if consumers erroneously view a product as having fewer
substitutes than it actually does, they will be less sensitive to price increases than they
otherwise would. Finally, as in the case of fraud and anticompetitive conduct, any study
would have to construct the market price and quantity absent the deception.
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Technically, anticompetitive conduct causes a movement along the demand curve to a higher price and
lower output level, whereas deception causes the demand curve to shift outward, causing output to rise and,
depending on the shape of firms’ cost curves, price perhaps to rise.
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The extent to which the price for a product rises with an increase in demand depends on the shape of the
underlying marginal cost curves of the relevant firms.
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The primary longer-term benefit, as discussed below, is deterrence.
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Of course, events unassociated with FTC actions also affect cost and demand
conditions and, hence, observed prices. To isolate welfare changes resulting from the
FTC’s competition and consumer protection actions, it is important to control for other
factors that also affect market outcomes and that occurred during a similar time frame. 693
This exercise requires constructing a hypothetical control market that is identical to the
one in which the FTC intervened. One way to construct a control group is to identify
markets – similar geographic or product markets not subject to the FTC action – to serve
as benchmarks and then to control statistically for any remaining differences between the
treatment and control groups. Panelists noted that this type of before-and-after study may
not be feasible for broad national actions because there would not be an adequate control
group to serve as a benchmark. 694 Such studies, however, may be feasible for narrow,
targeted efforts concentrated in a single geography or industry. 695
Several panelists addressed the promise and problems associated with direct
measurement of market outcomes after FTC action in the context of merger
retrospectives. Because mergers make up a large portion of the FTC’s competition
caseload, the ability to evaluate the effect of mergers on consumers would go a long way
toward direct evaluation of the FTC’s competition program. The Government
Accountability Office recently released a report that calls for more retrospective work on
the oil industry. 696 These discussions, moreover, are illustrative of the methodological
issues surrounding direct measurement of welfare effects from FTC actions more
generally. 697
There generally was widespread agreement that reviewing merger enforcement
decisions ex post potentially could shed light on the value of FTC merger enforcement to
consumers. 698 Panelists, however, also spoke extensively about the limitations of such
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As discussed above in Chapter VI.B.7, the FTC promotes industry self-regulation where appropriate.
Professor Chris Hoofnagle submitted an online comment recommending that the FTC “develop standards
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See, e.g., Wright, Chicago Tr. at 171; Carlton and Nevo, Chicago Tr. at 216-17, 220-22. Perhaps the
most positive voices regarding retrospective work were Ghosal (7/30 DC Tr. at 242-44, 273-74), who sees
such work as one of many ways to get potentially useful information about antitrust effects, Picker
(Chicago Tr. at 166-69), and Scheffman (NY Tr. at 79-80). In addition, Padilla (Brussels Tr. at 80-81)
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studies. 699 For example, it can be hard to devise controls for the counterfactual (“butfor”) world for allowed and blocked mergers, which can affect the inferences that can be
drawn from merger retrospectives. Further, studying only challenged mergers is likely to
lead to conclusions that the agency makes more errors than it actually does, because
liability in those matters tends to be the least clear cut and therefore most prone to agency
error and, moreover, may result from aggressive enforcement intended to enhance
deterrence. 700 One commenter, however, noted that retrospective results can be valuable
especially if they indicate that prices rose after the parties consummated an unchallenged
merger, because this result would run counter to this “selection bias.” 701 The extent to
which any retrospective could be generalized beyond the merger (or mergers) evaluated
is also unclear, given that each merger is unique both factually and analytically. 702 One
also can criticize selective self-assessment work due to potential researcher bias, which
may be one reason to have assessments conducted by those outside the FTC. 703 Finally,
participants noted that the retrospective approach cannot measure the most important
aspect of antitrust – the value of deterrence. The benefits of deterrence, moreover, may
be dispersed through many markets, making their measurement even more difficult. 704
Dennis Carlton proposed that a more effective way to conduct a merger
retrospective may be to use internal agency predictions as the benchmark rather than

effects, see Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
433 (2008). For an example of work done on 10 horizontal mergers for the U.K. OFT, see Eric Morrison &
David Elliott, PwC Economics, Ex Post Evaluation of Mergers: A Report Prepared for the Office of Fair
Trading, Department of Trade and Industry, and the Competition Commission (OFT Economic Discussion
Paper, 2005) [hereinafter OFT/PwC, Ex Post Evaluation], available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft767.pdf. For a broader description of pre-2002
work on merger retrospectives, see Paul A. Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions, 48 ANTITRUST
BULL. 119, 166-84 (2003).
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Werden, 7/30 DC Tr. at 212-13, 228-29, 252-55. See also Dennis W. Carlton, The Need to Measure the
Effect of Merger Policy and How to Do It (Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. EAG 07-15,
2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/228687.pdf (calling for ex ante predictions from
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innovation).
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regulators and may cause agencies to choose the wrong strategies. See Damien Neven & Hans Zenger, Ex
Post Evaluation of Enforcement: A Principal-Agent Perspective (DG Comp Discussion Paper, 2008),
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Several panelists mentioned that assessments of outcomes (particularly merger retrospective work)
might best be done by those outside the agency to avoid such potential bias problems. See Salinger 7/29
DC Tr. at 143-44; Crandall 7/30 DC Tr. at 203, 271; Werden, 7/30 DC Tr. at 272. Consultation
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See Wright, Chicago Tr. at 135
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merely to rely on pre- and postmerger data to construct a hypothetical but-for market. 705
This approach would require the agency to make more explicit predictions about the
likely outcome of mergers, as well as explain the basis for those predictions, and it would
permit the agency to determine not only whether its predictions are accurate but also
whether particular economic modeling techniques are accurate or whether there is bias.706
In Carlton’s view, such an approach would result in more robust conclusions than merely
taking a sample of mergers to determine whether competition seems to have been harmed
or improved. 707
The Office of Fair Trading recently has pursued retrospective work by performing
an ex ante analysis that results in estimates and baselines for the assessment of
mergers. 708 The ex ante estimates assist in any ex post evaluations. Although it has not
frequently performed ex post evaluations, OFT usually uses external parties to conduct
those evaluations in order to avoid possible bias.709 For example, OFT, along with the
Competition Commission, commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”) to review
mergers cleared by the Competition Commission to determine whether the clearance
decision was correct. 710
Other proponents of merger retrospectives argued that they need not all be pricefocused, state-of-the-art empirical projects, but rather they can be useful if they provide
replicable measures of postmerger performance on any of several dimensions. For
example, former BE Director David Scheffman noted the relative ease of doing merger
retrospectives based on customer surveys. 711 In addition, Nancy Rose and former
Commissioner Dennis Yao proposed doing more merger retrospective work focused on
the attainment of predicted merger efficiencies. 712
Apart from the conceptual concerns with merger retrospectives, several panelists
highlighted the difficulty of obtaining useful data as a constraint on any efforts to perform
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enforcement decision was correct; in the other nine cases, the decision was found to have been correct. Id.
at 2.
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retrospective studies. 713 As one panelist explained, “as an academic to get data, and
especially these days, is very difficult. . . . [T]he conditions under which private parties
hand academics data is an enormously controversial subject these days.”714 Further,
although the FTC may have the ability to obtain information before the merger and turn it
over to academics for analysis in some circumstances, 715 this does not alleviate the
problems with obtaining postmerger data. As Carlton noted, “even if you can get the
DOJ and FTC economists to give you data, it’s not obvious you can get it from the
industry after the merger has closed. . . . I think that’s been one of the difficulties with
doing retrospective studies.” 716 Some suggested that conditioning access to data as part
of resolving an inquiry may be one way to obtain useful information for a retrospective
study. 717
Although reliable data for merger retrospectives is difficult to obtain, getting the
data is possible if one is willing to bear (and impose) the substantial acquisition costs.
For example, the FTC recently released three economic working papers that examine the
after-effects of four hospital mergers in three areas: (1) the east bay area of San Francisco
in 1999; (2) the northern Chicago lakeside area in 2000; and (3) Wilmington, North
Carolina in 1998. 718 Each paper measures price effects of the merger based on
information from local insurers who pay for the hospital care and uses econometric
modeling and multiple different control groups of hospitals to obtain reliable
comparisons. The results across the markets are quite diverse and, therefore, of interest.
As can be seen from the discussion above, directly measuring the change in
consumer welfare from FTC actions is fraught with difficulties. Even if done perfectly,
moreover, these techniques probably would fail to capture the full deterrent and
precedential effects from competition and consumer protection enforcement. As
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discussed in more detail below, these benefits are likely to be more important than the
direct impact of stopping particular anticompetitive, unfair, or deceptive conduct. For
example, accurate measures of the price and quantity effects of a successful antitrust
action will capture the direct impact of preventing the particular anticompetitive conduct
in question, and depending on the time frame, it also may capture some of the deterrent
and precedential effects (to the extent there are any) flowing from FTC enforcement.
This measurement, however, would fail to capture improvements in consumer welfare
from deterrent and precedential effects that spill over into different product and
geographic markets. To capture fully such improvements in consumer welfare would
require identifying the spillover markets and then measuring price and quantity effects in
each of these markets.
Directly measuring the change in consumer welfare due to research and advocacy
is likely to be even more difficult than measuring the full impact of enforcement actions.
These important FTC tools affect consumer welfare in subtle ways, and often in diffuse
markets. For example, past research on optometric business practices and the real estate
brokerage industry likely has influenced state laws regulating these industries. To
capture fully the welfare effects of this research, however, would require isolating both
the marginal impact of FTC research on state regulation and the impact of positive
regulatory changes on price and output in the relevant markets. Further, as with
enforcement actions, research and advocacy are likely to have spillover deterrent effects
in related markets. For example, successful advocacy in one state may prevent other state
regulatory bodies from entertaining similar restrictions on competition, and research
often can have applications beyond the industry on which it is focused.
Finally, the FTC provides guidance to parties in an effort to prevent antitrust and
consumer protection violations in the first instance. It also tries to minimize the costs it
imposes on parties, both in terms of direct compliance costs and errors in case selection.
That there is likely to be a far more attenuated link between these FTC actions and
market outcomes than between enforcement and market outcomes exacerbates the
measurement issues discussed above.
B.

Proxies for Direct Welfare Measurements

As discussed above, there are inherent difficulties associated with the direct
measurement of the change in welfare from FTC actions. Although it may be possible to
measure the direct benefits of specific FTC actions in some circumstances, more often the
agency must rely on proxies – often focused on agency outputs or intermediate outcomes
– to gauge welfare effects.
The FTC currently undertakes an annual performance evaluation and submits a
Performance and Accountability Report (“PAR”) 719 in accordance with several statutes,
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FTC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2008) [hereinafter FTC PAR],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/2008parreport.pdf.
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including the Government Performance and Results Act (“GPRA”). 720 Congress
designed GPRA to improve government efficiency, and it requires agencies to develop
strategic goals, define plans to achieve these goals, and develop means to measure agency
performance relative to these goals. In the PAR, the FTC broadly sets out four objectives
for its strategic goals to protect consumers and maintain competition: (1) identify fraud,
deception, unfair practices, and anticompetitive conduct; (2) stop this conduct; (3)
prevent consumer injury through education; and (4) engage in research, reports,
advocacy, and international cooperation. 721 The PAR does not measure changes in
welfare directly, but instead uses a combination of output and outcome measures to
assess the FTC’s fulfillment of its mission. 722 Below is a discussion of metrics used in
the FTC’s PAR as well as other indirect measurements of the FTC’s success in fulfilling
its mission, such as the outcome of enforcement actions, the deterrent effect and
precedential value of those actions, the FTC’s intellectual leadership, and the burdens the
FTC places on industry.
1.

Enforcement Success

The FTC primarily is an enforcement agency. Antitrust and consumer protection
enforcement provides benefits to consumers directly in the form of arresting welfarereducing conduct. The benefits of enforcement also accrue in ways that are hard to
measure in a systematic, empirical manner. Cases that deter future welfare-reducing
conduct or that clarify or move legal doctrine toward a more welfare-enhancing rule also
provide an important benefit. This section examines the strengths and weaknesses of
using certain metrics to measure the success of FTC enforcement.
a.

Number of Cases and Win Rates

As discussed in Chapter VI.B.1, panelists generally agreed that focusing on the
number of cases filed in a given year is not likely to provide a good indication of the
extent to which the FTC is fulfilling its mission to promote consumer welfare. As
discussed in Chapter I, the agency ideally should define its mission in terms of ultimate
outcomes for consumers, not agency output. Accordingly, agency assessment should
focus on actual outcomes, rather than agency output, unless there is a strong
demonstrated link between the output, such as number of cases brought, and consumer
welfare. 723 Although at one level bringing cases can demonstrate that “the cop is really
720
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on the beat,” 724 and thereby boost deterrence, unless there is an empirically demonstrated
nexus between consumer welfare and the sheer number of cases brought (including
merger challenges), this measure alone is unlikely to capture the FTC’s impact on
consumer welfare. 725 Further, counting cases is not a completely reliable measure of
deterrence benefits because the absence of enforcement activity could signal either
significant deterrence or none at all. 726 One panelist starkly explained, for example:
“Economists would never say number of cases is a good measure of anything, in
particular.” 727 Similarly, another panelist stated with respect to consumer protection
enforcement that “the mission of the FTC is not to bring cases. The mission . . . is to stop
deception, stop unfairness.” 728
Although less problematic than counting case filings, primarily focusing on the
number or percentage of cases won also would likely fail to provide meaningful
information on the effectiveness of the FTC’s enforcement activities. An agency must
win some percentage of its cases to preserve credibility, 729 but as one panelist noted, “the
function of the agency as an enforcement agency is to get the right answer. It is not to
win cases for the sake of winning cases.” 730 A similar point was made with respect to the
evolution of the FTC’s approach to advertising – from merely looking for deception cases
that could be won in court to considering ways to “get at whatever we think may be
deceptive about [the advertising in question] without interfering with or dismantling the
benefits of the advertising.” 731 Clearly, winning cases that do not advance, or even
hinder, consumer welfare does not further the FTC’s mission.
Further, to the extent that only the closest cases are brought, the agency should
not expect to see a near-perfect win rate; a high win rate may signal that the FTC is only
challenging easy-to-win cases and thus underdeterring bad conduct. For example, two
former Bureau of Competition directors noted the value of the FTC’s actions in the patent
settlement area, although they have not met with uniform success. As William Baer
noted:
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The Schering case also stands for the notion, you can do a
lot of good and lose the case. Even though the standard
adopted by the Commission was rejected by the Eleventh
Circuit, the Supreme Court refused to grant cert, the fact of
the matter is that settlements now are scrutinized more
carefully by the parties to figure out is this defensible from
a competitive point of view by light years over the way
they were 10 years ago. The sunlight is on. The spotlight
is on. It means that behavior has changed. Even though
people perhaps are not going as far as the Commission
today thinks is appropriate, the fact of the matter is some of
the stuff that was largely indefensible just ain’t happening,
and it is because the Commission was the cop on the
beat. 732
Susan Creighton echoed this point, explaining that “win, lose, or draw, I think the
Commission has done a huge amount of good work in bringing those series of cases.” 733
Panelists observed that the reason behind a string of losses is likely to be a more
important indicator of performance than a low win rate itself. 734 As noted above, if the
FTC is losing tough cases involving complex and unsettled areas of law, losses are not
likely to be a signal of poor performance. 735 If, however, the FTC is losing easy cases,
this would signal a need to improve performance. Further, if losses occur in cases that
are “frivolous” to begin with, or cases that rest on legal or factual premises that
consistently have been rejected by courts or are out of step with current economic
learning, then a high loss rate may signal a need to reassess internal thinking on the type
of conduct that violates the FTC Act. 736
Currently as part of its PAR, the FTC reports the positive outcomes from
investigations and cases. Specifically, for consumer protection enforcement, the PAR
includes the number of orders or other direct interventions with business that result in a
change in business conduct. 737 For competition enforcement, the PAR includes the
percentage of positive results for cases the FTC brings, including a win in court, a
consent agreement, or abandonment of an anticompetitive transaction after the FTC has
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raised antitrust concerns. 738 Importantly, the PAR target for positive outcomes is not 100
percent. Rather, it is set at 80 percent to reflect the fact that if the FTC is selecting cases
properly, as discussed above, it is unlikely to achieve a positive outcome in all
instances. 739 At the same time, if the FTC carefully chooses when to issue second
requests or to open a nonmerger investigation, it also should be expected to win a
substantial majority of the cases it ultimately prosecutes. The FTC also measures the
percentage of merger and nonmerger investigations that result in one of the following
outcomes: Commission authorization of a complaint in federal court or an administrative
complaint; a consent agreement; resolution of antitrust concerns without enforcement
action; or closing an investigation without subsequent events indicating that the conduct
in question harmed competition. 740 Again, this measure is designed to provide an
indication of whether the FTC is effectively identifying merger and nonmerger conduct
that is likely to cause consumer harm. 741
b.

Deterring Misconduct

By demonstrating that it can detect, and will prosecute, violations of the antitrust
and consumer protection laws, the FTC reduces the future level of such violations. 742 As
several panelists noted, deterrence should be the key criteria when choosing enforcement
priorities because the value of deterrence – the discounted present value of all future
harmful conduct that does not occur – is likely to swamp the one-time cost of stopping
illegal activity. 743 The stronger the deterrent effect, moreover, the larger the avoided
damage. Thus, the extent to which particular FTC actions deter future conduct is likely
to be a more relevant metric to measure the quality of outcomes than the amount of
redress in a particular case. 744 Indeed, one panelist argued that deterrence “should be the
holy grail of enforcement[;] enforcement should be operated as far as possible to
maximize deterrence.” 745 Although cases implicating large markets can provide large
immediate benefits, when the FTC challenges conduct in a small case, the action
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nevertheless may have a large deterrent effect if it prevents similar conduct in many other
small or large markets. 746
Unlike investigating a bank robbery, where it is clear that the law has been
broken, antitrust investigations often involve determining whether the law has been
broken in the first place. 747 When designing and implementing an enforcement agenda,
an agency should recognize that in areas where the line between what is legal and illegal
is uncertain, enforcement is likely to deter both desirable and undesirable conduct, and
the agency should strive to strike the optimal balance between the costs associated with
both under- and overdeterrence. As one panelist explained, “[W]hat you really care
about is not just how much you punish bad behavior. What you care about is how big the
difference is between the expected penalty for good behavior and bad behavior.” 748
When implementing an enforcement program in areas where it may be especially difficult
to distinguish procompetitive or neutral conduct from anticompetitive conduct, sensitivity
to these types of error cost concerns can militate toward selecting cases involving
relatively small markets. 749
Currently, the FTC does not directly measure the deterrent effect of its actions,
noting that it is “difficult, if not impossible, to measure precisely the value (in monetary
terms or otherwise) of deterrence . . . .” 750 It does, however, count the number of print
media articles (and the circulation of the print media) related to competition and
consumer protection activities and also monitors hits on the FTC’s website related to
business guidance for FTC enforcement of the competition laws. 751 It is reasonable to
assume that deterrence of misconduct (or facilitation of lawful conduct) is a positive
function of the extent to which potential lawbreakers are informed about the probability
of FTC action or advised of ways to avoid such action. Thus, although not a direct
measure of deterrence, these PAR metrics likely are positively related to deterrence in
some manner. 752 As the PAR notes in regard to competition activities, “[b]y using these
mechanisms to signal its enforcement policies and priorities, the FTC seeks to deter
would-be violators of the law. . . . The FTC seeks to make its law enforcement presence
visible and its enforcement policies transparent in order to serve its objectives through
746
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deterrence.” 753 Following is a discussion of some possible direct and indirect means for
measuring the extent to which FTC enforcement actions deter unlawful behavior as well
as for measuring whether current levels of deterrence are appropriate.
Direct Measurement of Deterrence. Ideally, the deterrent effects of Commission
actions (as a proxy for welfare effects of those actions) would themselves be measured
directly. However, as with the direct measurement of welfare effects, direct
measurement of deterrent effects is necessarily difficult because it entails measuring
conduct that did not happen. 754 Some outside academics and FTC staff, however, have
conducted several studies that attempt to measure the general deterrence effects of the
Commission’s advertising substantiation and fraud programs. The methods and results of
these studies may be instructive for other attempts to measure (directly or through
proxies) the welfare effects of FTC actions.
BCP staff also has attempted to assess the Commission’s general deterrent impact
in one area of fraudulent activity: deceptive weight-loss claims. Staff compared the
frequency and content of weight-loss advertising in a sample of magazines published in
both 2001 and 1992. Although the Commission brought more than 80 cases during this
time period, the quantity of weight-loss claims doubled, and claims were much more
likely to contain unsupported promises of rapid, dramatic, and permanent weight loss.
Staff concluded that the Commission’s prior actions, primarily law enforcement actions,
were not sufficient to deter deceptive weight-loss claims (and it urged the media to
monitor advertisements for blatantly deceptive “red flag” claims). 755
Additionally, stock market information can be used to measure directly the
deterrent power of an FTC advertising enforcement action against a publicly traded
company. Stock market “event” studies compare the movement in the stock price of an
FTC defendant – before and after the announcement of a complaint, consent agreement,
or final litigated order – with movements in a portfolio of stocks with similar risk over
the same time period. This methodology attributes systematic differences in the
performance of the target company’s stock value vis-à-vis the benchmark portfolio to the
impact of the FTC action on company good will and the effectiveness of its future
advertising. In this manner, these event studies test whether a Commission action affects
the cost of engaging in deceptive advertising, and hence the deterrent power of FTC
enforcement.
The first study examined the stock behavior of 23 companies that were the targets
of FTC deceptive advertising complaints (either litigated or settled by consent) from 1962
to 1975, and it found a three percent mean loss in stock value associated with the
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announcement of an FTC complaint. 756 Two subsequent event studies found similar
results. 757 Despite a general assumption that FTC administrative cease and desist orders
provided little, if any, deterrent impact because they provided firms with a penalty-free
“first bite of the apple,” 758 the size of the effect on the stock suggests that stockholders
take an FTC order very seriously and that publicity surrounding the order, or perhaps the
possibility of future monetary penalties for order violations, was expected to affect future
consumer purchase behavior. Thus, these studies suggest that FTC advertising
enforcement is likely to have a strong deterrent effect.
At least one study also tested the hypothesis that the FTC’s “reasonable basis
doctrine” for advertising substantiation, which the Commission enunciated in its Pfizer
decision, 759 deterred both harmful and beneficial advertising. The ultimate goal of the
reasonable basis doctrine articulated in Pfizer is to raise the credibility that consumers
can attach to objective claims in advertising without imposing evidentiary burdens that
discourage the dissemination of useful information. If the ad substantiation program
works as intended, firms that possess a reasonable basis for performance claims will find
advertising a more productive mechanism to increase sales. Thus, a correctly set
substantiation standard may lead to more advertising. Alternatively, if the FTC has set
the substantiation requirements too high, informative advertising may decrease overall.
The study provides a direct test of the extent to which the Pfizer decision deterred
beneficial advertising, by examining advertising intensity (advertising outlays as a
percent of product sales) in all media before and after Pfizer for 20 firms selling “search”
or “inexpensive experience” goods and 18 firms selling “credence” or “expensive
experience” goods. 760 The authors found that, following the introduction of the ad
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substantiation program, advertising intensity for the 18 firms in the latter category
increased significantly relative to the 20 firms in the former category. 761 The study also
gauged the impact of Pfizer on entry by new firms; because advertising is of particular
value for new products, heavy substantiation burdens could impede entry and slow the
growth of new entrants. The authors examined sales data for all new products entering
the over-the-counter drug market during the 1967-69 and 1973-75 periods and found that
new entrants grew faster and attained their mature sales level faster in the post-Pfizer
period. 762 This result provides a direct measurement of enforcement effects and suggests
not only that Pfizer increased advertising credibility, but that it did so without a
disproportionate increase in substantiation costs. 763
Although these studies have some obvious limitations, the results have been
interesting and even striking, often running counter to the expectations of the
investigators. Further, although acquiring data and identifying the proper benchmark can
be difficult, these studies may provide templates for direct measurement of the deterrent
effect of other FTC programs.
Indirect Measurement of Deterrence. Panelists observed that the deterrent effect
of enforcement actions often is seen most vividly in the course of counseling clients, 764
and other agencies have pursued additional, indirect methods of measuring deterrence.
One possibility is through survey data. In this vein, the OFT engaged an outside
consultant to survey senior U.K. competition lawyers on how many clients abandoned or
changed initiatives due to concerns about OFT investigations. 765 The survey revealed
by consumers, as there would be little gain from making a fraudulent claim that consumers could detect
almost immediately. In those situations, presumably, sellers would either make accurate claims about
objective characteristics or engage in “puff” advertising intended to grab consumer attention. As a result,
the introduction of the ad substantiation program in 1972 might have had little impact on advertising
content or intensity for those products. The opposite would be true for products that are expensive and
infrequently purchased, or for “credence goods” with performance characteristics that consumers cannot
evaluate easily through experience. In such cases, consumers might rely heavily on credible performance
claims, and a perception by consumers that such claims have become more credible could encourage firms
to advertise more heavily.
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that many companies had altered or abandoned mergers or other conduct because of the
concern about possible OFT action. The study concluded that for each merger
enforcement action, another merger was deterred. 766 For nonmerger conduct, such as
cartel activity and abuses of dominance, the study concluded the ratio was four-to-one or
higher. 767 The study has its limits, however. As it notes, the deterrence figures it
provides were generally lower bounds because of self-policing that prevents companies
from reaching a point at which it becomes appropriate to consult with counsel about the
potential illegality of particular conduct. 768 The sample size was small, meaning the data
might have significant limitations. 769 Further, the benefits of the deterrent effect of
agency actions obviously depend on whether the underlying actions were themselves
beneficial – yet another reason for agencies to undertake ex post evaluations and test the
benefits of the underlying actions.
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission also has employed
survey data to measure the extent to which its antitrust laws deter illegal conduct. 770 The
data collection was divided into two groups: qualitative interviews and quantitative
responses. The ACCC interviewed 39 current and former staff of the ACCC to establish
ways in which businesses reacted to ACCC enforcement activity and its impact on
business compliance. It also collected survey responses from 999 Australian businesses
(with a 43-percent response rate) across all industries, filled out by the most senior person
responsible for trade practice compliance. The survey revealed that larger businesses
exhibited more of the characteristics associated with a higher degree of compliance as
they have a greater capacity to comply, feel vulnerable to regulatory enforcement, and are
more likely to have had past ACCC interactions. Deterrence levels varied little by
industry, with the primary agricultural industries having the lowest levels of compliance.
Those with past ACCC interaction saw the cost of compliance as outweighing
compliance gains, were more aware of their Trade Practices Act (“TPA”) obligations, and
were more likely to rate themselves as higher on their compliance and compliance
management activity. Those who admitted TPA breaches perceived the gain of
noncompliance as greater than the costs, even if these actions were investigated by the
ACCC.
One panelist suggested additional indirect indicators that competition enforcement
is having a deterrent effect. For example, the money that companies spend on
compliance programs, the size of law firms’ antitrust groups, and the number of business
schools that offer programs in antitrust likely are correlated with a deterrent effect on
business. 771 On the consumer protection side, some roundtable panelists suggested that
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the level of consumer complaints could act as a proxy for the level of deterrence. 772 For
example, observing a downward trend in certain types of complaints in the Consumer
Sentinel database following an FTC enforcement action or education campaign may
provide some evidence of a deterrent effect. One must be careful about inferring a causal
relationship from such trends, however, because complaints are likely to have a selfreporting bias. 773 Further, as discussed above in the context of merger retrospectives, it
may be difficult to identify a proper benchmark level of complaints with which to
compare the number of observed complaints. 774
c.

Direct Impact from Enforcement Actions

As noted above, panelists generally agreed that deterrence should be the primary
goal of enforcement, but it is also clear that stopping conduct that is causing immediate
harm to consumers is welfare-enhancing. Thus, focusing on cases with large consumer
harm is likely to be beneficial to consumers, thus furthering the FTC’s mission. 775 For
example, several panelists explained that emphasis on enforcement in large sectors of the
economy, like supermarkets, health care, and petroleum markets, is appropriate because
of the large role these industries play in consumers’ lives. 776 Bringing large cases (which
is correlated to certain PAR measurements 777 ) also can enhance the reputation of the
agency, providing, for example, enhanced leverage in negotiations with other parties. 778
The EC’s Directorate General for Competition focuses primarily on cases with
large consumer harm. 779 This focus, however, is in part due to the very limited private
rights of action in the EU; because private individuals cannot vindicate their own rights,
they rely on DG Comp to bring suit to stop the conduct at issue. 780 Given the vibrant
market for private litigation in the U.S., however, consumer redress may not be as
important a metric for evaluating the success of the FTC. 781 The marginal impact of an
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FTC action in a case that implicates a large amount of consumer harm may be small to
the extent that there are already strong private incentives to bring antitrust or consumer
protection actions. As one panelist noted, when the FTC selects cases, it should prefer
“doctrine rather than dollars because if there are a lot of dollars, probably private
plaintiffs are going to be ready to do it.” 782 If the harm from conduct that would violate
antitrust or consumer protection laws accrues to one or a small number of parties, there
may be sufficient incentives for private parties to bring legal action. When a large
amount of harm is dispersed over a large number of consumers, however, it may not
make financial sense for any single consumer to bring an action, and class actions may be
an insufficient tool to vindicate consumer harm. 783 This situation may be especially
likely to obtain with respect to consumer protection enforcement. 784
Currently, the PAR reports an estimate of the savings accruing to consumers from
both competition and consumer protection actions. 785 Although the estimated monetary
value of harm to consumers that is avoided due to FTC enforcement – necessarily a rough
estimate in light of all the issues discussed above – represents an increase in consumer
welfare, it does not capture deterrence or precedential effects. Additionally, it does not
capture the relative efficiency of the enforcement effort. As discussed above, if a private
party (or perhaps a self-regulatory body) were likely to bring a comparable challenge to
the conduct in question, agency resources may be better invested elsewhere.
d.

Precedent

Another benefit of enforcement actions identified by panelists is that they provide
guidance and precedent on legal doctrine and the agency’s enforcement approaches. 786
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Cases involving unsettled areas of law are likely to be more risky, and thus associated
with lower win rates, but can have large payoffs if they move the law in a direction that
enhances competition. Former Chairman Timothy Muris, for example, touched on the
Commission’s experience in bringing state action and Noerr-Pennington cases, which
implicate state-imposed restrictions on competition. Specifically, he pointed to staff’s
understandable reluctance to bring the Unocal case because it has “Noerr problems,” but
explained that “[e]veryone across the antitrust spectrum agrees [that state action and
Noerr-Pennington cases] are good cases.” 787 Although such exemption cases may be
more difficult to win than those involving purely private conduct, given the size of likely
welfare losses from state-imposed restraints on competition, it is likely that pushing the
law in a direction that makes obtaining and imposing state restraints on competition more
difficult is likely to provide consumers with significant welfare gains. 788 Further,
valuable cases may be brought when direct consumer redress is relatively small. For
example, the Three Tenors decision laid out a flexible approach to the rule of reason,
which the D.C. Circuit ultimately affirmed. 789
One panelist, however, cautioned that the precedential value of many FTC
decisions and prosecutions is limited where they are resolved through consent decrees,
rather than litigated cases. 790 Particularly in cases where parties are anxious to avoid
litigation, consents may contain theories that would not succeed if litigated. 791
Court decisions that clarify a murky area of law are valuable to businesses in the
form of increased predictability. 792 Accordingly, even an FTC loss that provides clarity
to the business community in an unsettled area of law likely provides a benefit. 793 As
one panelist noted with respect to the FTC’s standard-setting and Hatch-Waxman cases,
“It was very important to know what the courts think about them. That is really a service
to consumers and business as well.” 794 Further, if important precedential cases do not
involve large markets, there may be little incentive for private enforcement to move the
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law in the correct direction. 795 Thus, FTC action may be necessary to effect the desired
improvement in consumer welfare.
Currently, the PAR does not attempt to measure the benefits from establishing
better or at least clearer legal rules. Nor did panelists offer any possible metrics. To
measure the welfare effects from changes in legal rules directly likely would require
methods similar to those used to measure the change in firms’ advertising after the Pfizer
decision. 796
2.

Intellectual Leadership

Intellectual leadership broadly refers to the FTC playing a leading role in shaping
sound competition and consumer protection policy. The FTC’s role as an intellectual
leader in competition policy can be traced back to its origins. Congress intended the FTC
to guide the courts and the business community at large about what the antitrust laws
prohibit and allow, and, to fulfill this mandate, it provided the FTC with broad
investigatory powers and intended the Commission to be populated with expert attorneys
and economists. 797 As one panelist noted, the FTC is “part of the think-tank of antitrust
and competition policy.” 798
Thus, one desirable quality of FTC output is that it demonstrates intellectual
leadership, 799 and it can do so in various ways. Commission adjudicative decisions can
provide leadership in developing antitrust and consumer protection jurisprudence. 800 The
agency can focus attention on new threats to consumers and ways to approach them. For
example, although not met with universal success, the FTC’s cases involving competition
in the pharmaceutical industry demonstrated to policymakers that the type of conduct at
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issue in these cases deserved close antitrust scrutiny. 801 Several panelists also expressed
support for the FTC’s recent work in identifying and addressing privacy issues, 802 and,
more broadly, panelists suggested that the FTC has demonstrated leadership through its
market-based approach to consumer protection enforcement. 803 As discussed in Chapter
V.C, research is necessary for intellectual leadership, both internally to guide FTC
enforcement decisions in a direction that is likely to improve consumer welfare, 804 and
externally for the FTC to use to educate policymakers and courts.805 As discussed in
Chapter VI, the FTC also can exert intellectual leadership through guidelines, advocacy,
speeches, and other domestic and international outreach that inform the relevant external
constituencies about the FTC’s current thinking in certain areas. 806
A final tool with which to exercise intellectual leadership is the education of
policymakers and consumers about the value of competition. For example, former OPP
Director Susan DeSanti explained that in her experience the public and Congress often
look at competition in terms of “whether things are fair or not,” rather than understanding
the “value of competition in terms of growing the economy, lowering prices, producing
innovation, [and] improving quality.” 807 She noted that, “if there is an agency that has a
mandate that would include education [on the importance of competition], it is this
agency.” 808 In this context, consumer education and formal or informal advocacy
demonstrates leadership when it provides consumers and policymakers with answers that
may be unpopular, but ultimately are in the best interest of consumers. For example,
although proposals aimed at perceived price gouging in the oil and gas industry have
been considered by Congress in the past, through reports and congressional testimony,
the FTC consistently has demonstrated leadership by advocating against such measures
because they ultimately are bad for consumers. 809 Further, by carefully explaining to
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consumers and other external constituents the rationale behind certain FTC actions, the
FTC can maintain support for its mission.810
Although any measure of intellectual leadership necessarily will be subjective,
several proxies for leadership lend themselves to objective measurement. Currently, in
its PAR, the FTC measures (1) the number of workshops or hearings it holds, 811 (2) the
number of reports and advocacy filings it issues, 812 (3) the number of amicus briefs it
files, 813 and (4) the number of consultations with foreign authorities. 814 These measures,
however, are all focused on FTC output rather than outcomes. 815
Panelists suggested some additional outcome-oriented measures for intellectual
leadership. For example, the influence of research and competition advocacy can be
measured by examining the extent to which these outputs have affected outcomes. 816
Further, the extent to which courts adopt FTC legal theories likely is a useful proxy for
FTC leadership in antitrust and consumer protection enforcement. FTC research cited in
court decisions or other scholarly work likely is a reflection of the degree to which this
output has had a positive effect on consumers. 817 These metrics could be used to
determine whether there are problems in the process for developing policy R&D projects,
such as producing too few or focusing on the wrong issues.
In evaluating the FTC’s work in the international arena, consultation participants
proposed a variety of specific indicators for measuring success, including, among others,
the quality of contributions to multinational fora (as well as the dissemination of other
agencies’ contributions to such fora throughout the FTC), 818 the quality and quantity of
810

See Venit, Brussels Tr. at 30 (“I think one practical thing may be to begin your educational policy not
directed at the [populace] at large, but directed at the politicians themselves, the lawmakers, and try and
educate them [as to] the complexities of the problems, what the agency’s mission is and why it may not be
able to respond to certain [populace] demands and try and deal with it at that level.”).
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FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 54 (BCP); id. at 79 (BC).
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Id. at 55 (BCP); id. at 80 (BC).
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Id. at 55 (BCP); id. at 81 (BC).

814

Id. at 56 (BCP); id. at 83 (BC). This measure focuses on cases in which the FTC cooperated with
foreign authorities, consultations or comments filed with foreign authorities, written submissions to
international fora, international events attended, and leadership positions in international competition
organizations held by FTC staff.

815

See, e.g., Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 72 (arguing that measurement of number of competition advocacies is
not a particularly good means to determine their effect on consumers).
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See id. at 117-18.
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See id.; Ennis, Paris Tr. at 128; Greene, Boston Tr. at 47.

818

Consultation with the Israeli Antitrust Authority, Aug. 19, 2008. Members of the Israeli Antitrust
Authority stated that their agency’s international efforts are strengthened by the willingness to involve staff
from outside of the international department in international discussions and by the dissemination of
information from the international meetings across the agency. In the area of contributions to multilateral
fora, there was a recommendation that, to get more substantive contributions, agencies’ delegations include
more staff who are working on cases. See Reindl, NY Tr. at 104-05.
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cooperation received on specific cases, 819 and the willingness of the agency to consult
private sector actors and academics in creating best practices. 820
One panelist also noted that one can measure the extent to which competition
advocacy has influenced policy outcomes in directions favored by the FTC through
surveys. 821 One study that attempted to assess the FTC advocacy program’s impact on
regulatory outcomes from 1985 to 1987 found that 39 percent of comment recipients
reported that the comments were at least “moderately effective,” meaning that “the
governmental entity’s actions were totally or in large part consistent with at least some of
the FTC recommendations, and that any action taken was largely or partly because of
those recommendations.” 822 The author concedes, however, that this “does not establish
that the FTC effect on those decisions improved them; that is what cannot be
measured.” 823
A more recent survey concerning advocacy filings from 2001 to 2006 by the
FTC’s Office of Policy Planning sought to improve on the methodology employed in the
1985-1987 survey. For example, the survey solicited input not only from the advocacy
requestor but also others involved in the decision-making process, including those
opposed to the position articulated in the FTC advocacy. Further, the survey included
questions designed to assess the extent to which the FTC affected the outcome of the
legislative or regulatory process. This survey found that 53 percent of respondents
agreed that the outcome of the regulatory process was largely consistent with the FTC
position, 94 percent of respondents said that the FTC comment was considered, and 54
percent of respondents (and 79 percent of those respondents who had an opinion)
believed that the FTC comment influenced the outcome. Further, 81 percent of
respondents answered that the fact that the comment came from the FTC caused them to
give it more weight than they otherwise would have. 824
819

Consultation with ACCC, Oct. 2, 2008.

820

DC Consultation on International Issues, Nov. 6, 2008; Korsun, NY Tr. at 139. The FTC was
commended by one roundtable panelist for its work with nongovernmental advisors. See Blechman, NY
Tr. at 136.

821

See Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 27-28. In fact, the FTC is considering whether to measure the outcome of
advocacies as part of future PARs. See FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 34.

822

Arnold C. Celnicker, The Federal Trade Commission’s Competition and Consumer Advocacy Program,
33 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 379, 391 (1989). Another 11 percent of the survey respondents found the comments to
be “slightly effective,” meaning that “the governmental entity’s actions were to a small degree consistent
with at least some of the FTC recommendations, and that any action taken was largely or partly because of
those recommendations.” Id. Additionally, the author found that 47 percent of respondents gave the
comments “substantial weight because it came from the FTC.” Id. at 392. In 1989, a virtually identical
survey was sent by the Director of the FTC’s Advocacy Office to recipients of comments dated June 1,
1987 through June 2, 1989. The responses to this second survey were consistent with those from the first.
823

Id. at 400.

824

United States, Note for OECD Roundtable on Evaluation of the Actions and Resources of Competition
Authorities, at 13-14 (May 25, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/evalauth.pdf.
See also Deborah Platt Majoras, A Dose of Our Own Medicine: Applying a Cost/Benefit Analysis to the
FTC’s Advocacy Program, Keynote Address, Current Topics in Antitrust Economics and Competition
Policy, Charles River Associates (Feb. 8, 2005), available at
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3.

Transparency and Guidance to Business and Consumers

Several panelists noted that the business community greatly values prospective
guidance from the Commission on its current enforcement views in the conduct and
merger areas. 825 Providing guidance, moreover, is consistent both with President
Wilson’s original vision for the agency 826 and with the FTC’s “special mission in the
policy area,” 827 which is to act as the preeminent competition and consumer protection
policy authority. 828 This guidance comes not only from formal guidelines and industry
guides, but also from speeches, advisory opinions, and closing statements, and it can
reduce total societal costs by allowing businesses to “get it right” in the first instance,
rather than having to engage with the Commission. 829
As noted in Chapter VI.B.5, notwithstanding criticisms levied against agency
guidelines, many roundtable participants urged the Commission to produce more formal
business guidance in the form of guidelines and guides. 830 As one panelist put it, the
“appetite of the private bar for guidance[ and] guidelines is inexhaustible.” 831 Others
generally lauded the Commission’s use in recent years of its complaints and settlement
agreements to provide information to the business community and other enforcement
agencies as to why certain practices were violations of the FTC Act. 832 As one panelist
explained:
The value of the FTC has not just been as catalyst to
legislative change, advocacy, promoter of removal of
government restrictions on competition, but also it has just
made the law work better by bringing cases, clarifying its
view of the law, getting some wins, occasionally losing –
but that is all part of the process – but indirectly making it

http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050208currebttopics.pdf (describing selected advocacy successes and
comparing substantial benefits to limited costs of advocacy program).
825

See, e.g., Leary, 7/29 DC Tr. at 13-14; Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 17; Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 85; Bowie,
7/29 DC Tr. at 86; A. Schwartz, 7/29 DC Tr. at 204-07; Fenton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 220; Greenbaum, NY Tr. at
182-83. See supra Chapter VI.B.5 for a discussion of some of the principal means by which the FTC
provides guidance.

826

See supra text accompanying note 576.

827

McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 54.

828

See Kovacic, Quality, supra note 72, at 918 (noting the original Congressional intent that the FTC be the
preeminent competition policy authority).

829

See Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 85. See also McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 54-55; Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 17-18.

830

See, e.g., Cerasale, NY Tr. at 201-02 (suggesting that there be more guidance for small businesses);
Greenbaum, NY Tr. at 204-05.

831

Fenton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 220.

832

See, e.g., Bowie, 7/29 DC Tr. at 86-87.
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much easier for others, including private parties themselves
to enforce the law. 833
Transparency, or the ability of the outside to look into the FTC’s decision-making
process and the FTC’s ability to communicate to the public, also promotes the FTC’s
ability to provide guidance to the business community. A careful explanation of why
certain FTC actions are in consumers’ interests can provide valuable information to the
business community and can build external support for these policies.834 As one panelist
noted, “guidelines are an exercise in agency transparency.”835 A clear understanding of
how the FTC is likely to treat a transaction or business practice increases predictability,
which is likely to reduce firms’ costs by making it easier for them to plan for
compliance. 836 It also is likely to economize on agency enforcement resources by
promoting deterrence and voluntary compliance with the antitrust and consumer
protection laws. 837
Panelists also observed that transparency in decision making can force agencies to
produce better outcomes than they otherwise would: “If you’re committed to having to
explain yourself publicly in any kind of detail, you’re going to do a better job ahead of
time.” 838 Similarly, another panelist observed that an agency may be more careful in its
analysis of a particular matter if it anticipates issuing a closing statement. 839 Further,
transparency can have the indirect effect of improving policy by allowing a public
discussion on a complex issue. 840 Finally, transparency also can have international
benefits by providing guidance to foreign competition and consumer protection
authorities. 841
When assessing the FTC, it is appropriate to examine the extent to which its
actions have provided guidance both to the business community and to fellow
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Vickers, London Tr. at 16-17.

834

See Temple Lang, Brussels Tr. at 39-40; Boast, NY Tr. at 33-34.

835

Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 143.

836

See Lowe, supra note 689, at 2; see also ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 8; AMC REPORT,
supra note 682, at 65. Lowe notes the tradeoff between providing greater predictability and the need to
deal with each case on its particular facts: “Based on empirical evidence, some structures or conducts have
almost always produced outcomes which are harmful to competition and consumers. As a result it may be
possible to establish some clear ex-ante rules which offer a high level of predictability. However, where
past evidence is mixed, the most that can be done to provide a degree of predictability is to indicate what
assessment methodology will be used.” Lowe, supra note 689, at 2.

837

See, e.g., Lowe, supra note 689, at 9 (“Communicating effectively about [DG Comp’s] work has a
preventive effect. We can explain the law and highlight the penalties for not respecting the law.”).
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Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 109-10. See also McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 111; AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra
note 150, at 210.

839

See Wright, Chicago Tr. at 130.

840

See Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 64-68, 109.

841

See ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 8.
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enforcement agencies and private parties enforcing the antitrust or consumer protection
laws. Currently, the PAR measures the extent to which the public accesses relevant
consumer protection and competition information from the FTC’s website. 842 Although
no panelists offered a way to measure transparency, one possible metric would be to
count the number of FTC outputs (for example, speeches, advisory opinions, and closing
statements) that provide the external community with an insight into how the FTC arrives
at its decisions. Although this metric clearly is focused on output rather than outcome, in
the case of transparency, output and outcome largely merge – the focus of transparency is
on FTC output.
The FTC also provides guidance to consumers to reduce the incidence of fraud
and deception. This type of consumer protection education is distinct from that related to
competition. Unlike in the case of antitrust violations, consumers can take actions to
reduce the probability of becoming a victim of fraud and deception. Thus, targeting
messages directly to consumers to inform them of these actions can reduce the
occurrence of fraud and deception. Consumer education has evolved over the past 20
years from a relatively minor adjunct to the consumer protection program to a major tool
in addressing consumer protection issues. 843 This change reflects the recognition that, in
some areas, changing consumer behavior may be more effective than bringing
enforcement actions. For example, the fraudulent practice of “phishing” for financial
account information becomes less lucrative to the extent that consumers opt not to
respond to such emails or telephone calls. 844 To address the problem of identity theft –
where the fraud may be a criminal act perpetrated by one individual – the Commission
has prepared an array of educational materials designed to assist not only the victimized
consumers, but also the entire network of entities that may play a role in deterring,
detecting, and defending against the fraud; these include law enforcement agents,
businesses, and organizations in a position to educate their membership.
Currently, under its PAR the FTC tracks the number of consumer protection
messages accessed online or in print (both in English and in Spanish) and the number of
times print media publishes articles referring to FTC consumer protection activities and
the circulation of the media that publish those articles. 845 A more outcome-oriented
metric that captures the extent to which these materials actually lead to beneficial
changes in consumer behavior would be preferable, but likely very difficult to implement
in all cases. 846 However, perhaps a few discrete case studies that examine the incidence
of certain types of fraud or deception – using survey data and data from the Consumer
Sentinel database – following the implementation of a consumer education program
could establish the relationship between consumer education and fraud and deception for
842

FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 50-51 (tracking access to consumer and business education concerning
consumer protection matters); id. at 82 (tracking access to competition-related materials).
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See Baker, Chicago Tr. at 60. See also supra Chapter VI.B.6.

844

See Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 195.

845

FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 50-51.
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See id.
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evaluation purposes. Further, former Commissioner Yao suggested that the FTC could
evaluate the effectiveness of consumer education through a field examination.
Specifically, his proposal involved the FTC running a mock false advertisement and then
introducing a consumer education campaign directed at this specific type of deceptive
advertising. A reduction in the number of consumer inquiries about the product after the
education campaign would serve as a measure of its effectiveness. 847
4.

Burdens on Industry and Timeliness

As noted earlier in this chapter, the FTC mission calls for it to prevent business
practices that are anticompetitive or unfair or deceptive without “unduly burdening
business activity.” Thus, FTC actions also should be assessed by the extent to which they
saddle industry with unnecessary monetary and time costs. Panelists, for example,
commented on the burdens that FTC investigations placed on their clients in terms of
document production. 848 Several panelists also addressed the length of time it often takes
the FTC to conduct an investigation. 849 While dilatory tactics by respondents may
account for some delays in Commission investigations, 850 delays at the agency can place
unreasonable burdens on the business community and can adversely affect the FTC’s
credibility. 851
In addition to the direct costs associated with lengthy investigations, there are
indirect costs. First, if investigations into whether certain conduct violates Section 5
linger without resolution (either issuance of a complaint or closing of the investigation),
the uncertainty is likely to chill what may be procompetitive conduct. 852 Second, there
may be a negative relationship between the quality of work involved in a case and the
length of the investigation. As one panelist explained, “When things just bog down and
drag on, the quality of the fact finding and the quality of the legal analysis, I think
declines as well.” 853
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See Yao, Boston Tr. at 126.
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See, e.g., Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 96-97, 109; Bowie, 7/29 DC Tr. at 110-11.
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See, e.g., Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 94; Bowie, 7/29 DC Tr. at 94-95.
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A target of an FTC investigation has an incentive to let such investigation go on indefinitely –
particularly if the target has reason to believe that the investigation likely will not result in any enforcement
action on the part of the agency.

851

See Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 91; see also McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 112-13 (explaining that allowing a
nonmerger investigation to last five years is “certainly not good government”); ABA TRANSITION REPORT,
supra note 11, at 9-10 (noting the burden associated with long investigations and suggesting that the
agencies commit to a time line).
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See Wright, Chicago Tr. at 190 (“the idea that keeping these investigations open, doesn’t have some sort
of chilling effect on what could be procompetitive conduct strikes me as not plausible and it’s at least a
factor that should weigh into these determinations”).
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McChesney, Chicago Tr. at 124. This deleterious effect may arise because as cases drag on, there is
often turnover in staff, which leads to “an awful lot of things [having to be] started over again both on the
fact-finding side and to the extent that there has been any legal work completed, reviewing that again.” Id.
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Although the FTC currently provides no measurement of costs imposed on the
business community, one possibility suggested by a panelist would be to report estimates
of the financial burdens of second requests and other investigation demands as well as the
time spent investigating matters or litigating in Part III.854 As one panelist noted, if the
FTC were to begin regularly reporting the length of case investigations, it not only would
apprise the public of the FTC’s performance but also likely would create pressure to
resolve issues more quickly than they are currently. 855
C.

Responsiveness to Core Constituencies

The FTC has several constituencies; chief among them are Congress, consumers,
and business. As discussed in Chapter I.C, lack of external support from core
constituencies can jeopardize the legitimacy of the agency. Part of maintaining
constituency support involves paying close attention to the views of external stakeholders
to calibrate the FTC’s approach to protecting consumers and markets. For example, in
periods when the FTC was unresponsive to congressional and business concerns, it lost
its ability to operate effectively. 856 One panelist also noted the growing importance of
reliance on networks of government agencies and external stakeholders to “share and be
involved in activities” to solve problems. 857 More generally, the ability of an agency to
understand the problems that are garnering political attention and to demonstrate that the
agency is “part of the solution” rather than “part of the problem,” is a key component to
long-term success. 858
Currently, the FTC measures its responsiveness to consumer protection
complaints in the PAR. 859 It also measures the holding of, and substantial participation
in, workshops that involve both competition and consumer protection issues. 860 In a
broader sense, workshops are a means by which the FTC demonstrates a willingness to
respond to, and learn from, constituencies about pressing issues. Although there likely is
no objective measurement of responsiveness to constituencies in most areas, internal
evaluation of the extent to which the FTC communicates with constituencies also may be
a useful metric.
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See Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 137-38.
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See Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 113.
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See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 16, at 207-08 (explaining that Chairman Pertschuk’s activism in certain
areas failed in part because it “aroused the opposition of broad segments of the business community”);
Kovacic, Quality, supra note 72, at 922-23 (explaining that Pertschuk “misjudged the changing political
character of Congress, which grew increasingly conservative in the late 1970s, as the FTC pursued an
unprecedented collection of ambitious antitrust and consumer protection measures”).
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Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 41-42. See also Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 56-57 (noting that communication and
consultations with outside constituencies was helpful in anticipating controversies).
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See Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 34-35.
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FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 45.
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Id. at 54 (BCP); id. at 79 (BC).
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Some panelists raised concerns that constituents do not always demand welfareenhancing action from the FTC. For example, as noted above, some panelists observed
that neither consumers nor policymakers necessarily fully appreciate the dynamics of,
and benefits from, competition in complex markets. 861 Further, as one panelist noted,
interest groups “are not representing the interest of consumers generally. They’re
representing a particular interest.” 862 Thus, before taking actions in response to requests
from interest groups, the FTC must “calibrate[] what its mission is and recognize[]
whether what is being requested of the Commission is consistent with stopping fraud,
stopping deception, or stopping unfairness.” 863
Accordingly, taking actions to satisfy the policy demands of constituencies may
not necessarily provide a good measure of whether the FTC is taking actions that advance
consumer welfare. Constituencies may ask for outputs that suit their self-interest, which
does not necessarily correlate to consumers’ interest. Because the FTC cannot operate
effectively without external constituent support, however, there can sometimes be a
tension between intellectual leadership – which may require taking positions that are
unpopular with political overseers and consumers, but are based on agency expertise of
what is in consumers’ best interest – and responding to the desires of core constituents.
As one panelist noted, when these circumstances arise, it is essential for a competition
agency to bring along its constituencies as it acts to ameliorate this tension. 864 Part of
this exercise involves being accessible and willing to entertain a constituency’s particular
policy demand. It does not, however, require acquiescence to every such demand. As
noted in Chapter I.C, it is important to distinguish between long-term support for the
agency’s mission – which is necessary – and unanimous support for every agency action
– which is not. 865
*

*

*

When assessing the characteristics of agency output, the FTC should stay focused
on how its actions impact consumer welfare. In some instances, welfare changes can be
measured directly, but in most cases direct measurement will be impractical.
Consequently, evaluation of FTC actions often will focus on some mixture of output and
outcome measures to proxy for direct consumer impacts.
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See, e.g., DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 161 (“we operate in a society where the value of competition is not
well understood”); Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 163 (with regard to gasoline prices, “the public . . . did not
understand the workings of [a] competitive marketplace and they were writing their congressmen”); Davis,
7/29 DC Tr. at 175-76 (noting that one of the challenges the FTC faces is educating congressional
stakeholders on the value of the agency’s competition mission).
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MacLeod, 7/30 DC Tr. at 144.
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Id.
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See Hill, Paris Tr. at 107. See also Venit, Brussels Tr. at 35-37.
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See Muris, Principles, supra note 17, at 167 (having support of external constituencies for an agency’s
mission “does not mean that the agency’s mission must be ‘popular’ or that the constituents must support
every particular agency action”).
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Some proxies, however, have a closer nexus with welfare changes than others.
The raw number of cases brought is at best a limited metric to evaluate FTC enforcement
actions. Further, a focus on the number of wins is likely to be similarly uninformative – a
large number of wins is likely to signal that the Commission is bringing only easy cases
and that more problematic conduct remains underdeterred; a smaller number of wins
could mean that the agency was doing a poor job of litigating, but also could mean that
the agency was bringing challenging cases. Thus, evaluators should pay attention to the
extent to which the FTC is bringing the proper mix of cases to maximize its positive
impact on consumer welfare. This mix will include cases in large markets that vindicate
substantial consumer interests in the short run, but also cases that are likely to have large,
long-run deterrent and precedential value. Determining the optimal mix of cases to use
as a benchmark for the actual mix of cases is likely to be somewhat subjective.
Empirical study of the relationship between FTC enforcement (and other) actions
and market outcomes may guide this endeavor. For example, evaluating the deterrence
effects of enforcement actions targeting anticompetitive conduct may yield useful
information to guide future enforcement efforts. Because consumers can take actions to
reduce the incidence of fraud and deception, consumer education can be an effective
adjunct to enforcement in promoting consumer protection. Evaluating the success of
consumer education in reducing fraud and deception may be difficult in every
circumstance, but a few carefully designed studies may provide valuable information.
FTC actions also should be evaluated to determine whether they demonstrate
intellectual leadership in the areas of competition and consumer protection policy.
Commission cases can lead the way in developing legal norms. Further, it is important
for the FTC to engage in competition and consumer protection policy R&D to calibrate
the fit between FTC actions and consumer welfare and to inform courts and policymakers
in their decisions. The extent to which courts, policymakers, and academics follow the
FTC’s lead in these areas is an important evaluative criterion. Educating the public and
policymakers on the benefits of competition also is important. Thus, any evaluation
should measure the extent to which consumers use FTC competition-promoting materials
and the extent to which FTC advocacy influences policy outcomes.
The external community values guidance from the FTC, and the agency should
strive to make decisions more transparent to improve policy determinations. Any
evaluation of FTC actions should ask, for example, whether the FTC adequately
publicizes its actions and whether it effectively conveys policy norms to industry and the
courts.
Evaluations of FTC output also should measure the extent to which FTC actions
place unreasonable costs on the business community, both in terms of money and time.
Such measurement will inform Congress, industry, and the public and also likely will
enhance internal incentives to reduce burdens the FTC places on businesses. When
developing a metric, it is important to develop appropriate benchmarks for both financial
and time burdens, which are likely to vary by action. Potential timeliness metrics might
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focus on the appropriate time to process investigations or from filing an administrative
complaint until a final Commission decision.
Finally, being open and responsive to core constituencies’ concerns is crucial.
Absent external support for its mission over time, the FTC cannot operate effectively. At
the same time, it is important to distinguish between cultivating external support for the
mission by demonstrating a willingness to take seriously constituency concerns, and
attempting to garner unanimous support for every agency action. Further, the agency
should be cognizant of the potential tension between intellectual leadership and
responsiveness to constituency demands. When these circumstances arise, the FTC can
ameliorate this tension by engaging in outreach to develop support from its constituencies
for its policies.
Answering the fundamental question of how to determine whether the FTC is
successful requires understanding the agency’s mission, the tools it can employ, how it
uses those tools, and how it should measure success. Measurements and metrics are
useful and should be carefully designed and routinely applied. It is also important to
recognize, however, the intangible nature of the perception of success. As one roundtable
panelist offered, “[W]hen you are trying to estimate how well you are doing, there are
things that count that can’t be counted and there are things that you can count that don’t
count.” 866 This project’s deep inquiry into how the agency should examine itself and its
actions is meant to identify and examine the quantifiable and the intangible
characteristics of success and serve as a guide for the FTC as it approaches its one
hundredth anniversary in 2014.
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Marsden, London Tr. at 121.
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PART 4: CHAIRMAN’S RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the preceding discussion of the institutional arrangements by which the
Commission performs its responsibilities (in Chapters I-VI), as well as the means for
measuring the effectiveness of the agency’s performance (in Chapter VII), following are
recommendations for consideration by future leaders of the Federal Trade Commission.
These proposals are offered with the expectation that many measures will require
continuing effort over a number of years. A larger objective is to build a cultural norm
that sustains regular, substantial investments in long-term agency capacity. In all of the
matters addressed below, the FTC should use a combination of self-study, consultation
with external organizations, and benchmarking with other competition authorities.
Mission
With internal and external constituencies, the FTC should continue to build a
consensus that the core purpose of the agency is to promote the well-being of consumers.
The Commission should assess each proposed initiative by its capacity, among other
ends, to improve the range of goods and services available to consumers and to
strengthen the capacity of consumers to make well-informed choices among those
alternatives.
In its Annual Report and in other statements, the Commission regularly should
state its goals and the means with which it intends to achieve such goals. Where possible,
the Commission should define its aims in terms of desired outcomes (such as
enhancements in economic performance or consumer welfare) rather than in terms of
outputs (such as the number of new law enforcement matters).
The Commission should engage in regular, periodic consultations with external
constituencies – including legislators, other public agencies, consumer groups, business
organizations, academic institutions, and legal societies – about the aims that should
motivate the agency’s choice of programs and about the interpretation of its authority.
Useful means to this end would include:
Workshops, seminars, and hearings that focus on the conceptual framework for
applying the agency’s authority. One recent illustration is the workshop the
Commission conducted in October 2008 on the use of the agency’s power to
challenge unfair methods of competition under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
Increased use of blogs and similar tools to foster a conversation about the
agency’s aims and programs.
The Commission should engage in regular internal consultations with its
administrative professionals, attorneys, and economists to discuss the agency’s objectives
and the selection of measures to accomplish its goals. In addition to measures already
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taken, the agency should:
Expand the use of policy review sessions in which the Commission meets in
plenary sessions with the agency staff to examine specific issues.
Hold regular town hall meetings, which enable the agency’s entire staff, or major
operating units, to gather as a group to discuss the agency’s aims and programs.
Increase the use of internal protocols that help guide the staff with respect to the
agency’s aims and the formulation of projects to achieve them.
The Commission should continue its dialogue with Congress about the utility of
existing limits on its jurisdiction. For example, the sensibility of exemptions governing
common carriers, not-for-profit entities, and financial services warrant close examination.
To leave existing restrictions in place will undermine the capacity of the agency to
deliver effective, integrated policy solutions to important competition and consumer
protection problems.
Agency Structure and Operations
The Commission should engage in regular assessments of whether its structure
and operational procedures can be modified to improve its delivery of effective programs.
The Commission should augment existing efforts to improve communications
across the agency generally and among its operating units. These efforts might include:
Providing a clear statement of the agency’s aims and explanations about how
individual programs are linked to the attainment of those aims.
Expanding efforts, through small group discussions and larger meetings, to
discuss policy initiatives with the agency’s staff.
Creating an internal “wiki” or similar tool for accumulating knowledge about past
and present agency activities.
The agency should explore ways to integrate knowledge and expertise more
effectively across bureaus. This would include:
Deeper integration of economic analysis into the formulation of competition and
consumer protection initiatives.
More extensive development of integrated competition and consumer protection
responses to specific issues.
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The agency should expand existing efforts to manage litigation and nonlitigation
initiatives by measures such as:
Setting and reviewing timetables for the completion of all major projects.
Refining internal electronic databases to determine the status of each project.
Resources
The Commission should explore additional ways to preserve and enhance its
human capital. Means to this end might include:
Intensification of existing efforts to devise personal development plans for each
employee.
Expansion of internal and external training opportunities.
Greater movement of staff across operating units as a way of expanding the range
of experiences within the agency.
The Commission should continue to develop a capital budget that provides
periodic increases in outlays for information management and communications systems.
The purpose of these increases is to ensure that the agency has state-of-the-art capability
to address the full range of its technology needs.
The agency should continue to engage Congress in a discussion about the
possibility for augmenting the existing federal pay scale to enable the FTC to make
salary-based departures to the private sector less frequent. There is serious question
about whether the Commission’s capacity, and that of other public agencies in the United
States, can be sustained at acceptable levels if compensation levels are not increased
substantially.
Relationships
The Commission should expand its efforts to share expertise and develop
common programs with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Specific
measures might include:
Development of working groups that will meet regularly to share experience and
discuss superior techniques for responsibilities such as merger review.
Devising a regular program of staff exchanges for attorneys and economists.
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Preparation, in consultation with congressional committees, of a new agreement
to govern the clearance of law enforcement matters.
The Commission should expand its formal and informal efforts to build networks
with other public institutions within the United States. Means to this end might include:
Formulation of working groups with individual federal agencies with related
policymaking responsibilities whose exercise affects the attainment of the
Commission’s competition policy and consumer protection goals. Memoranda of
understanding might be prepared to structure these and related measures.
Expansion of the scope of cooperation with state competition and consumer
protection authorities. Focal points for expanded cooperation might include
common training exercises, broader collaboration on case development, and the
pooling of experience in areas of shared responsibility.
Establishment of a domestic competition network and a domestic consumer
protection network that would provide a forum for discussion and cooperation for
officials in public agencies in the United States.
The Commission should continue and refine its commitment of resources to
cooperate with foreign competition and consumer protection authorities in the context of
bilateral, regional, and global networks. Focal points for cooperation might include:
In the context of bilateral relationships, greater common efforts to cooperate on
merger and nonmerger cases, to devise and carry out research projects of common
interest (such as the evaluation of enforcement decisions taken in matters
reviewed by both jurisdictions), to prepare workshops and seminars, and to
conduct routine exchanges of staff.
The Commission should continue to develop links to academic research
institutions whose work is related to the agency’s responsibilities.
The Commission should designate FTC officials to serve as liaisons to
nongovernment bodies such as consumer groups and industry associations.
Strategic Planning
The Commission should consider refinements to the existing collection of
mechanisms by which it sets priorities and chooses programs. The agency should
progress toward the refinement of a framework that analyzes proposed FTC litigation and
nonlitigation matters according to their likely benefits for consumers, their potential
impact on doctrine or other aspects of public policy, their cost in resources and time, and
their risk. The agency should view all of its matters as part of a portfolio that should be
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balanced across low-, medium-, and high-risk activities. Means to this end might
include:
Expansion of the role of the Office of Policy Planning (an office outside the major
bureaus) to serve as a focal point for the preparation of materials that the
Commission can use to establish the agency’s strategic plan.
Regular, periodic public consultations to obtain views about the appropriate
choice of the agency’s competition and consumer protection programs.
Development within the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Economics of a
formal planning framework comparable to the mechanism used by the Bureau of
Consumer Protection.
Policy Research and Development
The Commission should consider the refinement of existing processes for
formulating and carrying out its research program. Measures to this end might include:
Formal consideration, as part of the annual budgeting process, of the amount of
FTC resources to be dedicated to theoretical and applied research projects.
Replication within the Bureaus of Competition and Consumer Protection of a
research planning committee now used by the Bureau of Economics.
Use of an agency-wide mechanism – such as the Office of Policy Planning – to
serve as a clearinghouse for agency research activities.
The Commission should make the use of its Section 6(b) authority a routine
element of its research program, including the initiation in each annual budget cycle of
one or more studies that employ this policy tool.
The Commission should continue to devote substantial resources to public
consultations as policymaking tools. In its role as a convener of hearings, workshops,
seminars, and town hall meetings, the Commission has considerable capacity to learn of
important legal and economic phenomena and encourage useful public discussion about
important issues.
Resource Deployment
The Commission’s main operating units should devise principles that spell out the
criteria the staff should use in assigning priority to different enforcement and
nonenforcement projects.
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The Commission should consider setting internal, bureau-specific deadlines for
investigations and regularly should hold meetings to discuss progress achieved in
individual matters.
The Commission should strive to issue a statement that explains why it has closed
a matter that involved a significant investigation.
Measuring Effectiveness
The Commission should continue to improve the measures by which it can assess
its effectiveness with respect to all areas of its operations. The agency’s goal should be
to imbed an ethic of self-assessment and continuous improvement. Focal points for this
effort should include means for assessing the agency’s use of enforcement and
nonenforcement tools, the completeness and quality of information it provides about its
activities, its guidance to external constituencies, the timeliness of its operations, the
justifications for burdens that it imposes on business operators, and its openness to
proposals offered by constituencies outside the Commission.
Commission staff should identify in memos recommending agency actions how
the effectiveness of those actions, if they came to fruition, might be evaluated.
The Commission should prepare publicly available data sets that report on its
activities over time.
The Commission should continue to refine its GPRA performance measures to
focus on outcomes directly and, as a second-best solution, to devise output measures that
are likely to serve as good proxies for desired outcomes.
The Commission should maintain datasets that track the time taken to perform
routine administrative tasks.
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APPENDIX 1 – LIST OF FTC AT 100 ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS
Washington, D.C. Roundtable (July 29-30, 2008)
William Baer

Partner, Arnold & Porter
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Competition

Michael R. Baye

Director, FTC Bureau of Economics

Joan Z. Bernstein

Of Counsel, Bryan Cave
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection

Darren A. Bowie

Legal Director, North American Markets, Nokia
Former Attorney Advisor to FTC Chairman Timothy Muris
Former Assistant Director, Division of Financial Practices
and Division of Advertising Practices, FTC Bureau of
Consumer Protection

Jonathan D. Breul

Partner, IBM Global Business Services
Executive Director, IBM Center for the Business of
Government

Jeanne Bumpus

Director, FTC Office of Congressional Relations

John E. Calfee

Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
Former Special Assistant to the Director, FTC Bureau of
Economics

Stephen Calkins

Professor, Wayne State University
Former FTC General Counsel

Robert W. Crandall

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Susan A. Creighton

Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Competition

Anna H. Davis

Executive Director, Government Relations, National Board
for Professional Teaching Standards
Former Director, FTC Office of Congressional Relations
Former Director, FTC Office of Public Affairs

Susan S. DeSanti

Partner, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal
Former FTC Deputy General Counsel for Policy Studies
Former Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning
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Jerry Ellig

Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center
Former Acting Director and Deputy Director, FTC Office
of Policy Planning

Kathryn M. Fenton

Partner, Jones Day
Former Attorney Advisor to FTC Chairman James Miller

Rebecca Fisher

Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Section, Office of the
Texas Attorney General

Luke M. Froeb

Professor, Owen Graduate School of Management,
Vanderbilt University
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Economics

Vivek Ghosal

Professor, School of Economics, Georgia Institute of
Technology

Eileen Harrington

Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection

Thomas W. Hazlett

Professor, George Mason University School of Law

Andrew J. Heimert

Office of Policy & Coordination, FTC Bureau of
Competition

Ken Heyer

Economics Director, Economic Analysis Group, U.S.
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division

Nancy N. Judy

Director, FTC Office of Public Affairs

Joseph Kattan

Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
Former Assistant Director, Office of Policy & Evaluation,
FTC Bureau of Competition

William E. Kovacic

Chairman, Federal Trade Commission

Thomas G. Krattenmaker

Of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
Former Advisor, Office of Policy & Coordination, FTC
Bureau of Competition
Former Assistant Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer
Protection

Thomas B. Leary

Of Counsel, Hogan & Hartson
Former Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission

Gregory P. Luib

Assistant Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning
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William C. MacLeod

Partner, Kelley Drye
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection
Former Attorney Advisor to FTC Chairman James Miller

Janet L. McDavid

Partner, Hogan & Hartson

Timothy J. Muris

Of Counsel, O’Melveny & Myers
Foundation Professor, George Mason University School of
Law
Former Chairman, Federal Trade Commission

Maureen K. Ohlhausen

Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning

Richard Parker

Partner, O’Melveny & Myers
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Competition

Paul A. Pautler

Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of Economics

C. Lee Peeler

President and CEO, National Advertising Review Council
Executive Vice President, National Advertising SelfRegulation, Council of Better Business Bureaus
Former Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer
Protection

Paul H. Rubin

Professor of Law and Economics, Emory School of Law
Professor of Economics, Emory University
Former FTC Director of Advertising Economics

Michael A. Salinger

Professor, Finance and Economics Department, Boston
University
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Economics

Ari Schwartz

Vice President & Chief Operating Officer, Center for
Democracy and Technology

David P. Wales

Acting Director, FTC Bureau of Competition

Gregory J. Werden

Senior Economic Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division
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London Roundtable (September 12, 2008)
Alden Abbott

Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition

David Aitman

Co-Head, Global Antitrust, Competition, and Trade
Practice Group, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

William Bishop

Vice President, Charles River Associates International
Professor of the Economics of Competition, College of
Europe in Bruges

Margaret Bloom

Visiting Professor, King’s College, London
Senior Consultant, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

Maria Coppola Tineo

Counsel for International Antitrust, FTC Office of
International Affairs

John Davies

Chief Economist and Former Director of Economic
Analysis, United Kingdom Competition Commission

John Fingleton

Chief Executive, United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading

Peter Freeman

Chairman and Former Deputy Chairman, United Kingdom
Competition Commission

Edward Humpherson

Assistant Auditor General and Director of Regulation
Studies, United Kingdom National Audit Office

Valentine Korah

Emeritus Professor of Competition Law, University
College London

Jeremy Lever

Fellow and Senior Dean, All Souls College, Oxford
University

Philip Marsden

Director and Senior Research Fellow, Competition Law
Forum, British Institute for International and Comparative
Law

Maureen Ohlhausen

Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning

Simon Pritchard

Senior Director of Mergers, United Kingdom Office of Fair
Trading

Debra Valentine

Global Head of Legal, Rio Tinto plc
Former FTC General Counsel
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John Vickers

Warden and Drummond Professor of Political Economy
and Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford University

Catherine Waddams

Professor, Norwich Business School

Richard Whish

Professor of Law, Kings College, London
Non-Executive Director and Former Member of the
Director General of Fair Trading’s Advisory Panel, United
Kingdom Office of Fair Trading

Stephen Wilks

Professor of Politics and Former Deputy Vice Chancellor
(Research), University of Exeter
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Ottawa Roundtable (September 18, 2008)
Anthony Baldanza

Senior Partner, Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP

John Bodrug

Partner, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP

Paul Crampton

Partner, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP

Russell Damtoft

Associate Director, FTC Office of International Affairs

Calvin Goldman

Chair of the Competition Group, Blake, Cassels & Graydon
LLP

Tim Kennish

Counsel and former Co-Chair, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt
LLP

William Kovacic

Chairman, Federal Trade Commission

Margaret Sanderson

Vice President, Charles River Associates International

A. Neil Campbell

McMillan LLP (consultation held Sept. 17, 2008)
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Chicago Roundtable (September 25, 2008)
Alden F. Abbott

Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition

C. Steven Baker

Director, FTC Midwest Region

Michael R. Baye

Director, FTC Bureau of Economics

William L. Brauch

Special Assistant Attorney General and Director, Consumer
Protection Division, Office of the Iowa Attorney General

Henry N. Butler

Executive Director, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and
Economic Growth at Northwestern University
Senior Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law

Thomas Campbell

Partner, Baker & McKenzie LLP

Denis W. Carlton

Senior Managing Director, Compass Lexecon
Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Graduate
School of Business

Blake L. Harrop

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Bureau, Office
of the Illinois Attorney General

Paul H. Luehr

Managing Director and Deputy General Counsel, Stroz
Friedberg, LLC
Former Assistant Director, Division of Marketing Practices,
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection

Fred M. McChesney

Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law
Former Associate Director, Office of Policy & Evaluation,
FTC Bureau of Competition

Aviv Nevo

Professor, Department of Economics and Kellogg School
of Business, Northwestern University

Randal C. Picker

Professor of Commercial Law, University of Chicago Law
School

Teresa M. Schwartz

Professor Emeritus of Public Interest Law, George
Washington University School of Law
Former Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer
Protection
Former Attorney Advisor to FTC Commissioner Mary
Gardiner Jones
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Carl Shapiro

Professor of Business Strategy, Haas School of Business,
University of California at Berkeley
Director, Institute of Business and Economic Research,
University of California at Berkeley

Abraham L. Wickelgren

Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law
School
Visiting Professor, Duke University School of Law
Former Economist, FTC Bureau of Economics

Joshua D. Wright

Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University
School of Law
Visiting Professor, University of Texas School of Law
Former Scholar in Residence, FTC Bureau of Competition
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Tokyo Roundtable (October 7, 2008)
Alden F. Abbott

Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition

Yasuhisa Abe

Director, Economic Policy Bureau II, Nippon Keidanren

Toru Aizeki

Deputy Secretary General of International Affairs, Japan
Fair Trade Commission

Kei Amemiya

Partner, Morrison & Foerster LLP

Robert Grondine

Partner, White & Case

William Kovacic

Chairman, Federal Trade Commission

Mitsuo Matsushita

Advisor, Nagashima, Ohno & Tsunematsu
Professor Emeritus, Tokyo University

Masahiro Murakami

Professor, Graduate School of International Corporate
Strategy, Hitosubashi University

Hideo Nakajima

Deputy Secretary General, Trade Practices Department,
Japan Fair Trade Commission

Deirdre Shanahan

Competition Counsel for Asia Pacific, FTC Office of
International Affairs

Shozo Takahashi

Director, General Affairs Division, Secretariat, Japan Fair
Trade Commission

Kazuhiko Takeshima

Chair, Japan Fair Trade Commission

Jiro Tamura

Professor, Keio University

Akinori Uesugi

Senior Consultant, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
Professor, Graduate School of International Corporate
Strategy, Hitotsubashi University

Kimitoshi Yabuki

Head, Yabuki Law Offices

192

Boston Roundtable (October 14, 2008)
Alden F. Abbott

Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition

Einer R. Elhauge

Caroll and Milton Petrie Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School

Hillary Greene

Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut
School of Law
Former FTC Project Director for Intellectual Property

Andrew J. Heimert

Office of Policy & Coordination, FTC Bureau of
Competition

Keith N. Hylton

Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law and Professor of Law,
Boston University School of Law

Robert M. Langer

Partner, Wiggin and Dana

Nancy L. Rose

Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Director, National Bureau of Economic Research Program
in Industrial Organization

Michael A. Salinger

Professor and Everett W. Lord Distinguished Faculty
Scholar, Finance and Economics Department, Boston
University
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Economics

Dennis Yao

Lawrence E. Fouraker Professor of Business
Administration, Harvard Business School
Former Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission
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Brussels Roundtable (October 21, 2008)
Alden Abbott

Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition

Antonio Bavasso

Partner, Allen & Overy
Professor of EC Competition Law and Founder and
Director of the Jevons Institute, UCL

Hendrik Bourgeois

Senior Counsel, Competition, Regulation and Government
Relations for Europe, General Electric Company

Rachel Brandenburger

Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

James Cooper

Acting Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning

Götz Drauz

Partner, Howrey

Luc Gyselen

Partner, Arnold & Porter

Jonas Koponen

Partner, Linklaters

William Kovacic

Chairman, Federal Trade Commission

Jorge Padilla

Managing Director, LECG
Research Fellow, Center for Economic Policy Research

John Temple Lang

Consultant, Cleary Gottlieb
Senior Visiting Research Fellow, University of Oxford
Visiting Professor, Trinity College, Dublin

James Venit

Partner, Skadden, Arps
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Paris Roundtable (October 24, 2008)
Alden Abbott

Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition

James Cooper

Acting Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning

Sean Ennis

Senior Economist, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development

Allan Fels

Dean of the Australia and New Zealand School of
Government

Alberto Heimler

Central Director for Research and International Affairs,
Italian Competition Authority

Nicholas Hill

Chief Executive, New Zealand Commerce Commission

Rene Jansen

Member of the Board, Netherlands Competition Authority
(NMa)

Frederic Jenny

Member of the Cours de Cassation, France
Chairman, Competition Committee, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development

William Kovacic

Chairman, Federal Trade Commission

Csaba Kovacs

Head of Section, Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH)

Markus Lange

Head of the International Section of the Bundeskartellamt,
Germany

François Lévêque

Professor of Law and Economics, Ecole des Mines de Paris

Francisco Marcos Fernandez Professor of Law, IE Law School
Director General of the Defence Competition Service,
Madrid Regional Competition Court
Andreas Mundt

Head of Section, General Competition Law Issues,
Bundeskartellamt, Germany

Zoltán Nagy

President, Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH)

Bernard (Joe) Phillips

Head of the Competition Division, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
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Simon Roberts

Divisional Manager of Policy and Research, South African
Competition Commission

Jacques Steenbergen

Director General, Belgian Competition Authority

Walter Stoffel

Chairman, Swiss Competition Commission
Professor of Economic Law, University of Fribourg

Monica Widegren

Head of International Section, Swedish Competition
Authority
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New York Roundtable (October 24, 2008)
Joseph Angland

Partner, White & Case

Michael D. Blechman

Partner, Kaye Scholer LLP

Molly S. Boast

Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Competition

Beau Brendler

Director, Consumer Reports WebWatch, Consumers Union

Daniel Brenner

Senior Vice President, Law and Regulatory Policy,
National Cable & Telecommunications Association

Jerry Cerasale

Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, Direct
Marketing Association
Former Attorney Advisor to FTC Chairman Janet Steiger

Kevin G. DeMarrais

Senior Business Writer/Columnist, The Record (Bergen
County, NJ)

Joy Feigenbaum

Chief, Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection, Office
of the New York Attorney General

Harry First

Professor of Law and Director, Trade Regulation Program,
New York University School of Law

Eleanor M. Fox

Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University
School of Law
Of Counsel, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett

Leonard L. Gordon

Director, FTC Northeast Region

Jeffrey A. Greenbaum

Partner, Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz, PC

Lois C. Greisman

Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection

Michael Kaiser

Executive Director, National Cyber Security Alliance

Georges G. Korsun

Director, Economic and Statistical Consulting, Deloitte
Financial Advisory Services, LLP

Cynthia L. Lagdameo

Counsel for International Antitrust, FTC Office of
International Affairs
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Andrea C. Levine

Director, National Advertising Division
Senior Vice President, Council of Better Business Bureaus

Maureen K. Ohlhausen

Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning

Andreas P. Reindl

Adjunct Professor of Law and Executive Director, Fordham
Competition Law Institute, Fordham University School of
Law

David T. Scheffman

Director, LECG
Adjunct Professor, Owen Graduate School of Management,
Vanderbilt University
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Economics

Peter P. Swire

Professor of Law, Ohio State University Moritz College of
Law
Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
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APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF AGENCIES, ORGANIZATIONS, AND INDIVIDUALS
PARTICIPATING IN FTC AT 100 EXTERNAL CONSULTATIONS
Israeli Antitrust Authority, August 19, 2008
Korean Fair Trade Commission, September 4, 2008
Latin American Competition Agencies and International Organizations,
September 11, 2008:
Superintendent of Companies, Bolivia
Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), Brazil
Secretariat of Economic Law, Brazil
National Economic Prosecutor’s Office, Chile
Superintendent of Commerce, Colombia
Commission to Promote Competition, Costa Rica
Ministry of Economy, Ecuador
Superintendent of Competition, El Salvador
Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Competition, Honduras
Federal Competition Commission, Mexico
Authority for Consumer Protection and Competition Defense, Panama
Competition Authority, Portugal
Inter-American Development Bank
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading, September 11, 2008
United Kingdom Competition Commission, September 12, 2008
United Kingdom Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform,
September 12, 2008
United Kingdom Consumer Organization Representatives, September 12, 2008:
Citizen’s Advice
Consumer Focus (formerly National Consumer Council)
Privacy International
Trading Standards Institute/European Citizen’s Centre
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, September 17, 2008
Canadian Competition Bureau, September 17, 2008
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, September 17, 2008
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Ontario Ministry of Small Business and Consumer Services, September 17, 2008
Japan Fair Trade Commission, September 19, 2008
Japanese Cabinet Office, September 19, 2008
South African Competition Tribunal, September 19, 2008
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, October 2 & 6, 2008
Melbourne, Consultation with Private Sector Stakeholders, October 2, 2008:
Andrew Christopher
Linda Evans
Aymon Guigus
Dave Poddar
William Reid
Simon Uthmeyer

Partner, Baker & McKenzie
Partner, Clayton Utz
Partner, Blake Dawson
Partner, Mallesons Stephen Jaques
Partner, Blake Dawson
Partner, DLA Phillips Fox

Latin American Consumer Protection Agencies and International Organizations,
October 8, 2008:
Subsectariat for Consumer Protection, Argentina
National Consumer Service, Chile
Superintendence for Consumer Protection, Colombia
Directorate for Consumer Protection, Costa Rica
Office for the Defense of the Consumer, El Salvador
Directorate for Consumer Protection, Guatemala
Attorney General for Consumer Protection, Mexico
Directorate for Consumer Protection, Nicaragua
National Institute for Defense of Competition and Property Protection, Peru
National Institute for Consumption, Spain
Buenos Aires, Consultation with Private Sector Stakeholders, October 14, 2008:
Marcelo Calliari
Miguel del Pino
Marcelo den Toom
Mauro Grinberg
Ubiratan Mattos
Julian Peña

Partner, TozziniFreire Advogados, Brazil
Partner, Marval, O’Farrell & Mairal, Argentina
Partner, M. & M. Bomchil Abogados, Argentina
Partner, Barcellos Tucunduva Advogados, Brazil
Partner, Mattos Muriel Kestener Advogados, Brazil
Partner, Allende & Brea, Argentina

Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs, European Commission,
October 20, 2008
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Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (independent advisory group to European
Commission), October 20, 2008
Directorate General for Competition, European Commission, October 21 & 23, 2008
Representatives from several member and observer consumer agencies and governmental
ministries to the OECD Committee on Consumer Policy, October 22, 2008
Conseil de la Concurrence, France, October 23, 2008
Washington, DC Consultation on International Issues, November 6, 2008:
Donald Baker
Terry Calvani

Baker & Miller
Of Counsel, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
Former Acting Chairman and Commissioner, FTC
Andrew Gavil
Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law
(consultation held Nov. 20, 2008)
R. Shyam Khemani Principal, Microeconomic Consulting & Research
Associates, Inc.
Ilene Knable Gotts Partner, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz
William Kolasky
Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
Abbott (Tad) Lipsky Partner, Latham & Watkins, LLP (consultation held
Nov. 20, 2008)
Deborah Platt Majoras General Counsel, Procter & Gamble
Former Chairman, Federal Trade Commission
Janet McDavid
Partner, Hogan & Hartson LLP
James Rill
Senior Partner, Howrey LLP
Mark Whitener
Senior Counsel, General Electric Company
Irish Competition Authority, November 27, 2008
Australian Communications & Media Authority (via written correspondence)
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